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Abstract 
 
My thesis analyzes the determinants of the differential impact of natural disasters in 
Latin America and the Caribbean identifying the political, social and economic structures 
that determine social outcomes of natural disasters. It studies two adaptation tools, one 
individual (social capital) and one institutional (public spending and humanitarian aid) 
that could reduce the social impact of natural disasters.  
At aggregate level (countries) I conduct a time-series cross-section (TSCS) analysis, 
between 1960 and 2010, to analyze the impact of social capital, international aid, and 
public spending on the number of deaths caused by natural disasters. At individual level, 
I use logistic regression models to predict the probability of becoming poor after the 
Haitian and Chilean earthquakes in 2010.  
Findings at aggregated level confirm that higher the levels of social capital, disaster relief 
aid and public spending lower the number of casualties due to a natural disaster. 
However, the efficacy of these tools depends on the institutional framework of the 
country. Countries with higher democratization levels public spending is more effective 
in reducing the death toll after natural disasters. On the contrary, in more autocratic 
governments humanitarian aid becomes more efficient in reducing the death rate. 
The individual level results show that the social participation and network ties are 
fundamental in reducing the impact of the earthquakes on the levels of poverty with 
some differences between the countries.  Regarding institutional mechanisms, both in 
Haiti and Chile the previous levels of public spending and aid within societies do help in 
mitigating the impact of disasters, however, results demonstrate the funding distributed 
afterwards encounter several limitations.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Almost half a million people have died and two hundred million have been affected by 
earthquakes, storms, floods or droughts in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1960 
(EM-DAT, 2011). More than 750 natural events have been registered over that period, 
with the frequency of natural disasters steadily rising (EM-DAT, 2011).  
In January 2010 a 7.0 Richter scale earthquake hit Haiti, killing 270 thousand people and 
leaving thousands more displaced and injured, generating an humanitarian crisis in one 
of the poorest countries of the world. A few hours after the catastrophe, hundreds of 
volunteers and members of international agencies arrived to take control of the recovery 
process. The reconstruction has been long and difficult, leaving thousands of Haitians 
still living in displacement camps (IASC, 2012) and in need of both health and food 
provision two years after the quake.  
In February 2010, a month after the Haitian earthquake, Chile suffered an 8.8 Richter 
scale earthquake with its epicenter in the Bio Bio region (EM-DAT, 2011). 520 people 
died and thousands were displaced, reaching a total of 1.8 million people affected by the 
quake and with total economic losses estimated at 30 billion US dollars (EM-DAT, 
2011). The reconstruction process was led by the national government with almost no 
participation from international agencies or local communities.  
The impact of the December earthquake on Haitian society was significantly more 
severe than the effects of the Chilean disaster. Three main elements, across three specific 
moments, shaped the differential outcome. First, the pre-existing social, political and 
economic structures determined a differential vulnerability and exposure in each society. 
The economic conditions, political framework and socio demographic characteristics 
conditioned a far more severe impact on Haiti, despite the Chilean quake being of 
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greater magnitude. Second, the reaction and response from each government, population 
and international agencies in the immediate hours following the disasters shaped a 
disparate result in the number of casualties and those who were displaced. The lack of 
coordination of foreign aid together with the weakness of the Haitian Government led 
to severe problems in the distribution of help and attention in the first hours after the 
disaster. Thirdly, in the reconstruction stage, problems with distribution of funds, 
supposition of responsibilities and lack of coordination determined the course the 
recovery process of the Caribbean country would take (McGreal, 2010; Provost, 2012). 
However, despite the enormous differences, some similarities can be identified. First, in 
both countries the lack of participation and the involvement of the affected communities 
have been revealed as common denominators. Furthermore, the provision of a 
permanent housing solution for those affected has been slow and arduous, resulting in 
hundreds of families remaining in camps or informal settlements for two years. In 
addition, in both countries the redistribution of funds and subsidies has proved difficult 
and problematic and characterised by a lack of transparency and efficiency. Both in Chile 
and in Haiti, the difficulties and delays in the provision of permanent solutions to the 
affected populations has led to the occurrence of protests and manifestations of 
demands for better transparency and solutions for the affected and displaced.  
The differences and similarities between the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes raise 
several questions regarding how societies and institutions prepare, adapt and cope with 
natural disasters. The increasing occurrence of disasters, and the lack of research in the 
region, calls for further studies on how disasters impact on Latin America and Caribbean 
countries and how they respond and prepare for the effects of catastrophes.  
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to overcoming this void in research by studying 
the determinants of a differential impact of natural disasters in Latin America and 
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identifying what political, social and economic structures determine the social outcomes 
of natural disasters.. I discuss how institutional mechanisms, such as public spending and 
humanitarian aid, and individual tools, such as social capital, can potentially enhance the 
adaptive capacity of societies and how they can potentially reduce the impact of natural 
disasters.   
1. Theory and Argument 
 
The sociology of disasters emerged in the 1950s in the United States and mainly focused 
on the study of social responses to natural disasters in the developed world (Dynes, 
1970; Fritz and Marks, 1954; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). Several contributions from 
this perspective serve as the theoretical background to my thesis. First, such studies were 
pioneers in the study of social responses of individuals to natural disasters, 
acknowledging that human beings react and respond to the threat rather than being the 
mere victims of a catastrophe. Second, the theory has largely contributed to the study of 
the role of social organizations in attenuating the negative consequences of natural 
disasters, exposing potential problems that can emerge between existent and emergent 
groups after disasters.  
A different account, known as social vulnerability theory, has been devoted to the study 
of the differential impact of natural disasters on a population, especially in the global 
south (Blaikie et al., 1994; Cutter, 1996; Wisner, 1993). This theory claims that disasters 
affect societies in different ways and such differences are explained by reference to 
existing social, political and economical inequalities. The focus of vulnerability theory, 
contrary to sociology of disasters, is to study the social and political determinants of 
vulnerability under the assumption that disasters reflect social inequalities and unequal 
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access to resources throughout the developing world. From this perspective, disasters 
occur when human beings are affected by a particular hazard. 
Extended research within social vulnerability theory has stressed the unequal 
consequences of natural disasters for developing and developed countries (Blaikie et al., 
1994; O'Keefe et al., 1976; Wisner, 1993). Yet, both the sociology of disasters and 
vulnerability theory has often neglected the existing heterogeneity within the developing 
world. On one hand, the sociology of disasters has focused on the United States with the 
emphasis lying on how the American society organizes responses to different events. On 
the other hand, social vulnerability research notably fails to explain why some developing 
countries are better prepared and are able to protect their populations against the 
dramatic effects of natural disasters than others. Furthermore, existing studies devote 
little empirical effort in demonstrating the mechanisms under which societies adapt and 
respond to natural disasters. Notable exceptions exist, such as the research carried out in 
the field of adaptive capacity and adaptive potential (Adger, 2003; Brooks et al., 2005; 
Kelly and Adger, 2000; Pelling, 1998), or the early work done in the sociology of 
disasters regarding social responses to natural disasters in the United States (Dynes, 
1970; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). Adaptive capacity, or potential, refers to the 
mechanisms activated by societies to cope, respond and adapt to the impact of a hazard 
(Ersing and Kost, 2012; Kelly and Adger, 2000; Pelling, 2002). Within the literature, one 
of the most studied tools of societies in adapting to disasters and climate change has 
been social capital. The role of social capital as a mitigation mechanism has been studied 
both by social vulnerability theory (Adger, 2003; Ersing and Kost, 2012; Pelling, 1998; 
Pelling and High, 2005) and within the sociology of disasters (Buckle, 2006; Dynes, 
2006). Findings from these studies suggest that the strength of network ties and social 
relationships between individuals could provide information, support and knowledge to 
communities and therefore decrease the impact of a natural disaster.  
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Far less attention has been devoted to the study of how institutions react and respond to 
the impact of natural disasters. On one hand, some research has been dedicated to 
studying the role of governments in reducing the effects of natural disasters on their  
populations (Besley, 2002; Kahn, 2005; Plümper and Neumayer, 2009; Stromberg, 2007). 
Findings of these studies have suggested that countries with stronger institutions and 
higher levels of democratization appear to have fewer casualties following natural 
disasters.  (Kahn, 2005; Platt, 1999; Plümper and Neumayer, 2009; Raschky, 2008; Sen, 
1991; Stromberg, 2007). On the other hand, several scholars have directed their attention 
to the study of the effectiveness of international agencies and humanitarian aid in 
decreasing the impacts of disasters. Results have shown that agencies pursue strategic 
objectives when distributing funding, and these are not in every case directly related to 
the needs of the population but more to geo-political decisions (Pankaj, 2005; Woods, 
2005). In addition, academics have pointed to the problems of coordination and 
overlapping that the distribution of disaster relief faces caused by numerous donors 
pursuing several objectives in the same territory (Pankaj, 2005; Rey, 2001; Woods, 2005). 
Finally, the involvement of communities in the reconstruction process has also been 
studied with findings suggesting that agencies have systematically failed to include the 
affected population in the preparedness, mitigation and reconstruction process in the 
wake of  disasters (IASC, 2010; McGreal, 2010; O'Connor, 2011; Telford and Cosgrave, 
2007).  
I have identified several gaps in research exploring the role of social capital, international 
agencies and nation states as relievers of the impact of disasters. First, social capital has 
typically been taken as a one-dimensional concept, and studied in relation to specific case 
studies after disasters have occurred. I argue that in this approach it is not clear how 
different components of social capital operate to decrease the impact of disasters and 
how time and space shape those actions. Second, with reference to international agencies 
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and disaster relief aid, the majority of research has been devoted to analyzing the 
effectiveness of their actions on an aggregated scale (countries) but without providing a 
theoretical account of the micro-foundations underpinning such aggregated results 
(Raschky and Schwindt, 2009; Stromberg, 2007).  
The research on the institutional capacity of societies to adapt to climate change and 
natural disasters is particularly new and emergent. A number of scholars have identified 
several limitations to the actual research. Eakin and Luers (2006:376) have pointed out 
that ‘[t]he challenge remains (…) to account for the dynamic nature of vulnerability and 
to represent spatially some indicators (e.g., social capital, institutional relations) that may 
well be the determinant of vulnerability in particular places’. Adger has also stated the 
need of better understanding the role of institutions and the governance process 
combined with measures of vulnerability, taking into account the dynamic characteristic 
of the concept (who is vulnerable today might not be vulnerable tomorrow) (Adger, 
2006). 
Motivated by these contributions, demands and gaps this thesis analyzes two different 
adaptation tools, one individual (social capital) and two institutional (public spending and 
humanitarian aid) that could potentially reduce the impact of natural disasters on a 
population. I differentiate between an individual mechanism (social capital), referring to 
the tools used by individuals to potentially mitigate the impact of natural disasters, and 
institutional mechanisms (humanitarian aid and public spending), referring to the actions 
taken by governments and agencies to reduce the impact of disasters on a population. I 
further propose to study each mechanism on several scales and in different moments of 
time to account for the fluctuating nature of vulnerability to disasters.  
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Social capital  
First, as an individual tool of adaptation, I argue that the levels of social capital within a 
society enhance the adaptive capacity of individuals and in this way decrease the social 
impact of natural disasters. Putnam (1995:664) defines social capital as ‘features of social 
life—networks, norms and trust—that enable participants to act together more 
effectively to pursue shared objectives’. Putnam (1993) further distinguishes between 
bonding social capital, referring to the strength of the relations between individuals, and 
bridging social capital, referring to ties between different groups or segments of the 
population. I suggest that bonding social capital (ties between individuals) and bridging 
social capital (ties between population groups) operate in dissimilar ways to enhance the 
adaptive capacity of individuals.  
I sustain that bonding social capital develops the adaptive capacity of individuals 
through several mechanisms in different stages or periods surrounding the event. In the 
preparedness stage, before disasters occur, social relationships constitute one of the most 
important mechanisms for transmiting knowledge and information regarding how to 
react and respond to possible threats. Second, in the early recovery phase social 
networks can constitute a primary source of help, providing healthcare, food and shelter 
to those affected. Finally, in the reconstruction stage, retaining strong network ties could 
imply more opportunities for individuals, such as access to jobs, moving abroad or 
receiving income from family and friends.  
Bridging social capital, which refers to the ties between different groups in the 
population, increases the adaptive capacity of societies in several ways.  
First, social organizations have the potential to operate as a bridge between community 
demands and authorities. For example, protests and demonstrations commonly occur 
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following disasters as a way of communicating demands to authorities regarding the 
reconstruction process. Such protests are generated through groups and organizations 
and have potentially successful outcomes according to the nature of their demands. 
Second, new groups and organizations can emerge after catastrophes mainly with the 
purpose of taking over certain tasks that were not successfully carried out by the 
responsible entity. Also, community organizations that were already present in the 
territory tend to extend their activities and help in the reconstruction process. The action 
taken by these organizations can potentially reduce the impact of natural disasters by 
preparing and contributing to the adaptive capacity of individuals to respond to hazards. 
Such activities could include the provision of public goods (food, shelter, healthcare) and 
also participating in search and rescue operations. Finally, the existence of pre-
established mechanisms of participation, as community committees or local NGOs, 
could potentially help in the inclusion of the community in the reconstruction plan being 
implemented by governments or international organizations. 
Despite the vast research conducted so far on social capital and natural disasters I argue 
that the concept is rarely unpacked and in disaster research is usually taken as an 
aggregated model.  I contribute to the study of social capital and disasters in several 
ways. First, I distinguish between the role of bridging social capital and bonding social 
capital as stimulators of the adaptive capacity of individuals. I propose to unpack the 
concept of social capital in two dimensions to better understand how social relationships 
enhance the adaptation of individuals. Second, I add a temporal and spatial dimension to 
the analysis, sustaining the argument that the role of social networks fluctuates in the 
different stages of disasters and also on several scales (local, regional, national). I 
propose that the study of social ties is highly relevant, not only at local level, but also in 
capturing the aggregated outcomes of a society with strong social networks.  
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Public Spending and Humanitarian Aid  
As institutional mechanisms of adaptation, I propose that actions taken by 
governments, reflected through public spending, and those taken by international 
agencies, measured through humanitarian aid inflows, could potentially enhance the 
adaptive potential of individuals and reduce the impact of disasters.  
It is undeniable that public spending and humanitarian aid have the potential to shape 
the social determinants of vulnerability in the form of educational levels, unemployment, 
housing conditions, amongst others. Second, apart from the effect on the social 
determinants of vulnerability, I propose that on the same levels of exposure or 
vulnerability, aid and spending can mitigate and stimulate the adaptive capacity of 
individuals. The first mechanism is activated through the establishment of measures 
implemented prior to disasters, such as the establishing of construction codes and early 
warning systems. Also, preparedness can include disseminating information and 
communicating the likely occurrence of natural disasters. Second, after disasters take 
place funding is required to meet the early recovery process, in the form of search and 
rescue operations, setting up displacement camps  the provision of food, water and 
healthcare attention. Finally, spending is needed in the long-term reconstruction process 
to restore damaged houses, infrastructures, and the general economy.  
In sum, I contribute theoretically to disaster research by proposing that public spending 
and humanitarian aid constitute institutional tools that enhances the adaptive capacity of 
societies to disasters. I maintain that the way they operate varies with time and space; 
therefore the actions taken both by nation states and international agencies before, 
within and after disasters changes at every stage. Moreover, I propose that the manner in 
which funding is distributed is geographically determined. Funding is primarily 
designated to the epicenter of disasters, to the most visible and problematic areas. 
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Therefore the effectiveness of disaster relief aid or public spending should be studied 
across several regions and scales. Finally, I suggest that the way spending and aid are 
invested in preparation, mitigation and recovery fluctuates regarding the institutional 
framework of the country. I propose that the levels of democratization within the 
country serve to mediate the efficiency of public spending in reducing the impact of 
natural disasters. The association between democracies and natural disasters has been 
principally tackled in several investigations (Besley, 2002; Kahn, 2005; Plümper and 
Neumayer, 2009; Stromberg, 2007). Supported by these project findings, I argue that 
democracies depend on their constituency for reelection and therefore have greater 
incentives to protect their population from the impact of natural disasters, both before 
and after they occur. Autocracies, on the other hand, depend on elites for mandates; 
therefore providing public goods and adaptation tools to their citizens is not necessarily 
a priority. In this sense democracies have more incentives than autocracies to mitigate 
the impact of disasters and to become involved and lead the reconstruction process. 
Public spending has become a tool of democratic governments in achieving these goals. 
In sum, I propose that public spending tends to be more effective in reducing the 
impacts of natural disasters in democratic social environments where they are the result 
of stimuli and pressure from within the constituency. In contrast, I suggest that 
international institutions face fewer obstacles in autocratic rather than democratic 
countries when implementing disaster relief aid as they can take the lead in the 
preparedness, responses and reconstruction process without necessarily consulting or 
taking into account the national government.   
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2. Data and Methods 
 
Empirically, my thesis aims to distinguish between several countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, under the assumption that each political, economical and social 
context determines a differential level of social vulnerability towards natural disasters. 
My research constitutes the first comparative and historical analysis of social 
vulnerability to natural disasters in the region. To capture the temporal dimension of 
social vulnerability and adaptation a time dimension is included in order to better 
understand how social vulnerability and coping mechanisms vary over time. At the 
individual level I propose a new measure of the impact of natural disasters: changes in 
the levels of poverty. I argue that apart from being a determinant of social vulnerability, 
becoming poor is one of the most severe outcomes that natural disasters have on 
societies. Finally, I test both at the individual and aggregated levels (countries), the role 
of social capital, humanitarian aid and public spending in decreasing the impact of 
natural disasters on populations. Empirically, I test the predictions for two levels of 
analysis in order to better understand the micro foundations behind the adaptive 
capacity of societies to natural disasters.  
The selection of Latin America and the Caribbean as case studies is grounded mainly in 
two dimensions. First, data shows that natural disasters are steadily increasing in Latin 
America, with two hundred million affected since 1960. Second, I maintain that research 
has largely neglected the existent differences within the developing world. I therefore 
argue that each country, and every region within the countries, react and respond 
differently to possible hazards. In this sense, comparison of all developing countries 
(against the developed) could be misleading in so far as understanding the micro 
foundations of the adaptive capacity of the societies in concerned. The social, political 
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and economical structures of Latin America differ radically from African or Asian 
realities. Although an interesting line to pursue, it would be beyond the scope of this 
thesis to analyze how public spending, aid and social capital operate in African or Asian 
countries in comparison with Latin America.  
Under the assumption that social vulnerability and the adaptation mechanisms should be 
studied across several scales of analysis, this thesis proposes the testing of hypotheses 
both at the aggregated level (countries) and micro level (individuals) in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. On both levels, I first identify the social, political and economical 
determinants of the impact of disasters (measured in different ways at country or 
individual level) and second I test the predictions that social capital, international aid and 
domestic spending enhance the adaptive capacity of individuals and decrease levels of 
social vulnerability to natural disasters.  
On the aggregated level, I present a time-series cross-section (TSCS) analysis of all Latin 
American and Caribbean countries between 1960 and 2010. The analysis is based on an 
unbalanced pooled time series analysis. The dataset is constructed based on social, 
economical and political variables relevant to showcasing my argument. The analysis also 
includes several control variables. Information on natural disasters is extracted from the 
CRED natural disasters database (EM-DAT, 2011) and contains a total of 785 natural 
events, including earthquakes, floods, droughts, storms and mass movements from 1960 
through to 2010.  
On the individual level, two study cases are selected: the Chilean and Haitian earthquakes 
in 2010. The decision to include both countries as case studies is grounded in several 
dimensions. First, the levels of humanitarian aid, public spending and social capital differ 
significantly among the countries. Chile holds high levels of public spending per capita, 
with high levels of democratization (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) and a low inflow of aid 
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within the country. Furthermore, they exhibit strong bonding social capital 
(interpersonal trust, remittances inflow) and low levels of bridging social capital (social 
participation, community involvement) (LAPOP, 2010).  In contrast, Haiti is one of the 
countries with the highest levels of aid inflow in the region, according to the World 
Bank. Also, they hold lower levels of democratization than Chile (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2002) and also higher bridging social capital levels, based in public opinion surveys 
(LAPOP, 2010). A second reason for the selection of Chile and Haiti is that both 
suffered the same type of natural disasters in a similar historical moment. This aspect is 
relevant as the role of institutions and individuals in adapting or preparing for the impact 
of a potential hazard could be different in relation to the length and type of natural 
disaster. 
I based my analysis in data from the LAPOP survey (2010) for Haiti and the Casen1 
survey for Chile (2010). A logit regression model is applied for Haiti and a multilevel 
logit model for Chile, including the social determinants of the impact of the earthquake 
together with measures for public spending, humanitarian aid and social capital levels.  
To measure social vulnerability, the dependent variable of my thesis, various academics 
have supported their empirical approach with a deductive methodology, based on the 
attempt to identify vulnerable populations after disasters occur (Dilley, 2005; UNDP, 
2004). Others, following an inductive methodology, have designed measures of 
vulnerability based on the selection of socio demographic and exposure data (Cutter, 
2003; Vincent, 2004).  
                                                          
1 The Chilean analysis was based on the Post Earthquake Survey. I thank the Chilean Ministry of Planification, 
intellectual owner of the survey, in allowing me to use the database. All the results are my responsibility and does not 
compromise the Ministry.  
 
  
22 
Several scholars have pointed to the methodological, theoretical and empirical limitations 
of many of the existent indexes and measures of vulnerability (Füssel, 2009; Gall, 2007; 
Pelling, 2006). On one hand, those that follow a deductive methodology have limitations 
in predicting future events (Pelling, 2006) and it is also difficult to predict where the 
vulnerable population is going to be when the next disaster strikes. Another problem 
with these measures is that because the data is gained post-disasters, this omits any 
analysis of the population that suffered no consequences. The inherent problem here is 
that the fact of have not been affected in the past does not necessarily imply that you are 
not going to be affected in the future.  
On the other hand, the indexes that follow an inductive methodology have the risk of 
mixing the determinants of vulnerability with vulnerability itself. The assumptions made 
in order to create these indexes are questionable, and many times suffer from 
endogeneity problems. Being uneducated, poor or young does not necessarily make a 
person vulnerable to a disaster. Furthermore, assuming that some population is 
vulnerable in the context of certain social and economic characteristics could exclude a 
population that is vulnerable, but did not meet these particular conditions.  
I argue that social vulnerability is the likelihood of being affected by a natural disaster, 
lying on a continuum between low probability and high probability. Following a 
deductive methodology used to measure vulnerability to natural disasters at the 
aggregated level (countries) I use mortality rates due to floods, droughts, earthquakes, 
storms and mass movements in Latin American and other countries from 1960 to 2010. 
This measure has equally several limitations and contributions. On one hand, following a 
deductive methodology covers for endogeneity and tautological problems where the 
consequences and the determinants of vulnerability are interlinked. At a country level, 
any population killed by a natural disaster was vulnerable beyond doubt before the 
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disaster occurred. Here there is a clear and straightforward linear causality, between the 
disaster, its outcome, and the number of casualties. Another advantage of this measure is 
that mortality has been widely used in previous research on disasters (Neumayer and 
Plümper, 2007; Plümper and Neumayer, 2009; UNDP, 2004) allowing for comparative 
analysis.  
However, I acknowledge that this measure holds several limitations. First, because the 
prediction is on the number of deaths due to natural disasters I have to exclude from the 
analysis the factor in which all affected did not die. In this same sense, I only include in 
the analysis countries that suffered at least one natural disaster in that year, from 1960 to 
2010. Second, data on disasters can be inaccurate and poorly collected or disseminated 
by governments or institutions. Finally, the determinants of vulnerability are dynamic 
and change across time and space; therefore the results have limited prediction capacity 
(Pelling, 2006).  
At the individual level, I measure the impact of the disaster in terms of changes in the 
levels of wealth or populations that became poor after the Haitian and Chilean 2010 
earthquakes. Using this measure at the individual level allows for the inclusion of the 
entire population in the analysis whilst following a deductive methodology. Subsequently 
the whole of the Haitian and Chilean populations are included in the study although they 
were not all directly affected by the quake. Both measures also have several limitations. 
The causes of changes in levels of wealth could be exogenous to the earthquake, the 
determinants of poverty are multi-causal and therefore attributing an increase in poverty 
to an earthquake could be seen as problematic. Second, the measure holds the risk of an 
endogenous causal mechanism; the cause of vulnerability and the outcome could be 
linked in a cyclical loop.  Despite these limitations, the measure contributes theoretically 
and empirically to vulnerability research by including, as a possible consequence of 
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natural disaster, an increase in levels of poverty. The consequences suffered by the 
population can be found not only in mortality or injuries, but also in changes in their 
levels of well-being and quality of life. One of the most important indicators of well-
being is the poverty level and for this reason it seems theoretically relevant to distinguish 
between the role of poverty as a determinant of vulnerability and poverty as a social 
consequence of natural disasters. Both concepts have been related within the literature 
although many scholars have pointed out that not every poor individual is vulnerable to 
natural disasters and in the same sense not all those vulnerable to floods or earthquakes 
are poor prior to disasters (Blaikie et al., 1994; Schneiderbauer, 2006). I propose to 
measure changes in the levels of wealth as an outcome of natural disasters, therefore a 
determinant of levels of poverty of a country is also confined to the occurrence of 
natural disasters. 
3. Findings and thesis structure  
 
The following chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the thesis and presents 
the contributions of, and gaps in, the sociology of disasters and social vulnerability 
theory. It then introduces the main theoretical argument together with the hypotheses.  
Chapter III discusses the aggregated level results (countries). Through a Time Series 
Cross Sectional comparison of Latin American and the Caribbean countries it predicts if 
social capital, humanitarian aid and public spending reduced the likelihood of dying from 
a natural disaster between 1960 and 2010. The findings of the analysis confirm the 
prediction that bonding and bridging social capital enhance the adaptive capacity of 
individuals by decreasing the number of deaths after natural disasters. Results also show 
that public spending and humanitarian aid reduce the impact of natural disasters on the 
population conditioned by the level of democratization. At the country level, disaster 
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relief aid is more effective in reducing the death rate due to natural disasters in autocratic 
contexts. In contrast, public spending is more efficient among democracies.  
Chapter IV introduces the two case studies, the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes in 2010 
and provides a detailed description of the main effects of the earthquakes on both 
societies. It further explains the role of social capital, disaster relief aid and public 
spending in the response and reconstruction process.  
Chapter V predicts the impact of the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes on levels of 
poverty and wealth within the two societies. It tests the hypotheses that social capital, 
humanitarian aid and public spending reduce the impact of the earthquakes on each 
society. The results discussed in the chapter suggest that previous levels of social 
participation (bridging social capital) tend to effectively reduce the impact of natural 
disasters on societies. Also, the levels of trust and remittances inflows, as measures of 
bonding social capital, do decrease the social vulnerability levels of the societies in 
question.  
Results show that previous levels of public spending within societies have helped in 
mitigating the impact of disasters, however, funding distributed afterwards encounter 
several limitations in terms of effectiveness. Speed, transparency and lack of 
coordination are some of the difficulties that both international agencies and 
governments face when distributing public expenditure. In addition, it is clear that 
governments or international organizations were not particularly successful in including 
the community in the reconstruction process after the earthquakes.   
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the main findings and theoretical, empirical and policy 
implications.  
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II. Vulnerability and Adaptation to Natural Disasters 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to study the differential impact of natural disasters on 
the population and the adaptive capacity of societies to mitigate those effects. These 
objectives introduce at least two main theoretical assumptions. Firstly, that disasters 
impact unequally on the population and secondly that human beings and institutions 
hold the potentiality to prepare, adapt and respond in different ways to the impact. 
These postulations have been previously addressed by two fundamental theories: the 
sociology of disasters and social vulnerability theory. I argue that both perspectives 
provide useful insights to better understand the role of the societies in adapting, coping 
and responding to natural disasters.  
On the one hand, sociology has played a fundamental role in the development of the 
study of disasters since the 1950s, especially in the United States. This work was based 
on the study of social structures, agency, convergence and emergence in the response 
mechanisms to disasters (Dynes, 1970; Fritz and Marks, 1954; Quarantelli and Dynes, 
1977). Several contributions from this current of thought shape the theoretical 
background of this thesis, especially their conceptualization of disasters and the role 
played by organizations and individuals when faced with disasters. On the other hand, 
social vulnerability theory, especially the orientation stemming from political economy 
and political ecology perspectives, mainly focuses in the differential impact of natural 
disasters on the population, especially in the global south (Blaikie et al., 1994; Cutter, 
1996; Wisner, 1993). Important elements of this theory are included in the theoretical 
framework of this thesis, particularly those relating to the differential impact of disasters 
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in terms of social, political and economical inequalities and the concept of adaptive 
capacity or adaptive potential (Pelling, 2003).  
This chapter is organized as follows. First, it introduces a discussion of the literature on 
natural disasters relevant for the purpose of this thesis followed by the presentation of 
the main theoretical arguments.  It then outlines the hypotheses that give shape to this 
research.  
2. The Main Theoretical Orientations: The Sociology of 
Disasters and Social Vulnerability Theory 
 
As suggested, two main theoretical orientations serve as grounds for this thesis, the 
sociology of disasters and social vulnerability theory. For some researchers, social 
vulnerability theory is grounded in sociological thought: more specifically in Marxian and 
conflict theories (Peacock et al., 1997; Stallings, 2002) whereas for others social 
vulnerability theory derives from the political ecology arena (Bolin, 2006). Despite this 
discussion, researchers and academics from both orientations increasingly cross the 
boundaries of their disciplines, aiming for a more flexible and adaptable theoretical 
framework (Adger, 2006; Dynes, 2006; Pelling, 2003; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Tierney, 
2006).  
2.1. Sociology of disasters  
 
The studies of disasters from a sociological perspective emerged in 1950, principally in 
North America, and was centered in the work of three universities: University of 
Chicago, led by Marks and Fritz at the National Opinion Research Center, (1954); 
University of Maryland (Powell, 1954) and Oklahoma (Logan, 1952). Initially, the 
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majority of researchers studying disasters were sociologists, mostly funded by American 
military institutions anxious, or driven, by the possible social consequences of an enemy 
attack on the United States (Quarantelli, 1994). A few years later, in 1963 the Disaster 
Research Center was established funded by three of the most influential sociologists in 
the history of disaster research: Russell Dynes, Eugene Hass and E.L. Quarantelli. The 
Center was located first at Ohio State University and in 1985 moved to the University of 
Delawere, and today remains one of the main sources of sociological research on 
disasters.  
This perspective, influenced by sociological thought, shaped the disaster research arena 
for decades making invaluable contributions to the development of disaster studies. 
Firstly, they conceive disasters as disruptions of social routines, wherein social structures 
can be visualized and easily studied (Rodriguez et al., 2006). Within this definition the 
view of disasters as opportunities to study human behavior, structures and social 
processes is implicit (Rodriguez et al., 2006). Therefore, studying social structures and 
processes when disasters occur gives a deep insight to the social structures of society. As 
Dynes and Drabek (1994:7) point out a disaster is a ‘natural laboratory’ to study society 
and develop new social theories.  
My thesis is based on this sociological perspective of disasters for several reasons. Firstly, 
I sustain that social structures do count in determining how a given society deals and 
responds to natural disasters. Societies respond and react as a direct result of the social 
structures previously existent. Second, despite new social processes emerging as a 
response to disasters, I argue that they are related to existing social dynamics among 
communities. In sum, disasters are socially constructed as a reflection of the inherent 
social structures of the society in question.  
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A second fundamental contribution from sociological theory in the study of disasters, 
and adopted by this thesis, is the identification of the mechanisms used by societies and 
institutions to respond, cope and recover from disasters. Initially, in the 1950s, the 
dominant orientation among sociologist was to study responses to disasters at an 
individual level. After the creation of the Disaster Research Center (DRC), in 1963, there 
was a shift in sociological research to the study of how societies reorganize to face 
disasters, and specifically how catastrophes stimulate the emergence of new groups and 
organizations (Kreps and Bosworth, 2006). Apart from the types of organizations 
surrounding the response to disasters, sociology also contributed by showing that 
humans do not panic and behave chaotically when disasters occur but instead helped and 
collaborated with the community to overcome the crisis. As  (Quarantelli, 1986) points 
out:   
People as a whole do not panic. In fact, instead of flight away from the danger 
site, there is much more likely to be convergence on an impacted area. Disasters 
victims´ are usually quite frightened, but that does not mean they will act selfishly 
or impulsively (Quarantelli, 1986:4) 
They also found that anti-social behavior such as crime and looting were not part of the 
actions taken by the citizens in the western world (Quarantelli, 1986; Quarantelli and 
Dynes, 1977).  Quarantelli even goes further to state that ‘crimes rates will usually drop’ 
(Quarantelli, 1986:3).  From this perspective, disasters stimulate the altruistic side of 
human beings, instead of one that is primarily criminal or selfish. Problems arising after 
disasters are, in this view, not caused by society but rather by organizations (Quarantelli, 
1986) who tend to perform poorly based on misguided assumption of populations’ 
reactions.  
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People almost always rise to a collective crisis occasion. Groups usually stumble 
around. But organizations do worst when they assume the worst about human 
beings in a disaster (Quarantelli, 1986:3).  
An invaluable theoretical input for this thesis, derived from the sociology of disasters, 
addresses the fact that organizations find it difficult to coordinate and react suitably to 
the challenge, with a tendency to assume that the citizens are ‘victims’ without any 
capacity to contribute to the recovery process and who additionally need ‘outsiders’ to 
handle the reconstruction process (Quarantelli, 1986; Rodriguez et al., 2006). 
Investigations also showed that the presence of outsiders leading the reconstruction 
process can bring many difficulties with regard to the involvement of the community, 
especially in the coordination of tasks and the implementation of new policies due to the 
friction with local organizations (Quarantelli, 2005b). 
In conclusion, sociological research on disasters bring to light the importance of not 
seeing human beings as mere passive victims of crisis who resort to chaotic behavior, 
but rather as social actors with resources to respond to the impact of natural disasters. 
Also, sociological theory on disasters demonstrates the importance of social 
organizations in stimulating and coordinating social action, although not always with 
great success. It therefore provides an account of the problems that could be found 
when there is a lack of coordination between new and old organizations, external and 
internal to the community.  
Despite these major contributions, I identify several gaps in the sociological research on 
disasters. First, the focus of the sociology of disaster has been on cases in the United 
States, where most of the researchers originate and where most of the fieldwork has 
been conducted. Although this limitation has been widely acknowledged (Quarantelli, 
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1986; Rodriguez et al., 2006) further research is needed to study the mechanisms through 
which populations in the developing world adapt and cope with natural disasters.  
Another gap in the sociological research of disasters is the lack of comparative macro 
analysis. The cross-sectional research on this aspect in sociology is remains rare (Britton, 
2006). Sociology’s empirical approach to the study of disasters has been mainly focused 
in case studies that  lack any substantial comparative content.  
Another limitation is the focus given to the response to natural disasters and not to the 
preparedness processes (Rodriguez et al., 2006). The relevance of preparedness 
mechanisms to attenuate the impact of disasters is unquestionable. The more prepared a 
society, the less the negative impact of disasters. In this sense, studying social structures 
before a disaster happens also coincides with a better understanding of the social 
processes inherent to disasters.  
Sociological research has also systematically neglected the differential impact of disasters, 
not only between the developed and developing world but also within countries. The 
social inequality of disasters should be seen as a major driver of sociological research, 
and has been more or less dismissed by the main representatives of the discipline.  
Finally, I argue that one of the most severe gaps in existing sociological research is the 
lack of study of the social, political and economical contexts where disaster occurs. Very 
little has been done within sociological research regarding how political structures and 
systems determine a differential impact of disasters, or how the economic policies could 
attenuate disasters (Kreps and Bosworth, 2006). 
Social vulnerability theory, for some academics outside of sociological thought but also 
for those within it (Stallings, 2002), comes into play and fills the void created by some of 
these theoretical and empirical problems.  
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2.2. Social Vulnerability Theory  
 
Natural disasters occur when hazardous events affect the population. Intrinsic to this 
definition is the social dimension of natural disasters: disasters exist when humans are 
affected. The probability of being harmed by natural disasters is related to social, 
economical and political characteristics, both of individuals and the society to which they 
belong. This is the main contribution of social vulnerability theory and the central 
theoretical pillar of this thesis (Blaikie et al., 1994; Cutter, 1996; O'Keefe et al., 1976; 
Wisner, 1993).   
The theory adds a deep and broad explanation for the dissimilar impacts of natural 
disasters among society. It is located in the idea that different likelhoods of being 
harmed exist and that the probabilities of these are strictly related to social, economical, 
political and geographical variables.  
The approach has been classified in at least three frameworks, mainly differentiated by 
the purpose, the concepts and the scale (Eakin, 2006). First, the risk hazard perspective, 
where the epicenter of the discussion is hazard characterization and adjustment to 
environmental risk. The work of White, Kates and Burton (1993), for example, is 
associated with this perspective. A second viewpoint on vulnerability is ecological 
resilience. This perspective mainly focuses on the ability to absorb the consequences of 
disasters and the maintaining of interaction with the environment. One of the pioneers 
of the field, Timmerman (1981), stated the importance of understanding the vulnerability 
phenomenon towards natural disasters as well as studying the capacity of certain 
communities in adapting to environmental hazards, a concept he called resilience.   
Finally, the political economy orientation, in which this thesis is based, is centered in the 
analysis of the social, political and economical processes surrounding vulnerability to 
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natural hazards, acknowledging the relevance of studying the concept at different scales 
of analysis (Blaikie et al., 1994; Pelling, 2003; Wisner, 1993).   
This perspective contributes in several ways to the better understanding of the impact of 
disasters among populations and constitutes the major theoretical inputs for my thesis.  
Initially, from the perspective of political economy, disasters are not considered a 
‘natural’ event but instead are social events. In O´Keefe, Westgate and Wisner’s (1976) 
emblematic paper ‘Taking the naturalness from natural disasters’ the need of viewing 
natural disasters as related to the societies they affect, and not as a mere effect of climate 
shocks, is made clear. In their view, a disaster occurs when society is harmed or affected, 
differentiating between hazards (that refers to the event) and disasters (referring to 
events that affected the population).  Based on their work, disasters are consistently seen 
as social events triggered by a specific hazard (Blaikie et al., 1994; Pelling, 2003; 
Schneiderbauer, 2004).  This perspective challenges the view of disasters simply as 
hazards, but  instead views disasters not as mere climatic or physical events but results of 
a combination of the event and the vulnerability of human beings (Schneiderbauer, 
2004).  
The theory of social vulnerability also contributes to acknowledging that disasters affect 
populations in different ways (Hewitt, 1997). This likelihood of being affected is 
determined by the existing social, economical and political characteristics of the 
individual and the society in which s/he belongs. Social vulnerability, as has been defined 
by Blaikie et al. (1994:11) refers to:  
The characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their 
capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural 
hazard (an extreme natural event or process). It involves a combination of 
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factors that determine the degree to which someone´s life, livelihood, property 
and other assets are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature and 
society.  
Another fundamental input of social vulnerability theory is the focus given to the study 
of the determinants and causes of vulnerability to disasters. Early research conducted in 
the 1990s identified the main determinants of vulnerability in ethnicity, class and gender 
(Blaikie et al., 1994; Cutter, 1996). As the research progressed, new dimensions were 
included, not only centered in individual characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, age, 
class, but also in institutional variables, in the form of political regimes, policies and 
economical context. Vulnerability, both for Pelling (1997) and Adger (1999) is indicated 
not by economic poverty and inequality alone, but also by institutional weakness.  
Another contribution of social vulnerability theory is the multi-scale perspective for 
studying the impact of natural disasters. As Schneiderbauer  (2006:85) suggests ‘the 
average vulnerability of an individual is made up of a set vulnerabilities connected to 
different social levels that each individual belongs to’. The author identifies several levels 
in which vulnerability is developed: individual, household, national, and regional, 
amongst others. This recognition, also made by Blaikie (1994) and Hewitt (1997), is 
fundamental both theoretically and empirically. From a theoretical point of view, 
vulnerability theory takes into account different levels of determinants of disasters, not 
only at the individual level, but recognizes also that economic and political contexts 
determine a differential impact of disasters on societies (Bolin, 2006). What makes an 
individual more or less vulnerable can be found at local, community, regional and 
national levels. From an empirical point of view, this reveals the relevance of studying 
vulnerability within a society both at the local level and at the macro and comparative 
levels, thus incorporating evaluations of large-scale determinants of vulnerability.  
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Finally, one of the most important contributions of social vulnerability theory is research 
carried out on adaptation and adaptive capacity, referring to the mechanisms used by 
societies to prepare, cope, and respond to natural disasters (Kelly and Adger, 2000; 
Pelling, 2002). The literature has identified the determinants of the adaptive capacity of 
societies as aspects of types of infrastructures, resources, environmental conditions, 
financial credit and network strength, amongst others (Smit and Wandel, 2006; Watts 
and Bohle, 1993). These aspects can be found at local levels while others can be shaped 
by the contextual economical and political system at the macro level (Adger, 1999; Kelly 
and Adger, 2000). These levels of adaptative capacity are interlinked, with the capacity of 
one particular individual depending not only on the household s/he lives in, but also as 
shaped by the community and the country.  
Despite the vast development of the theory over recent years, several gaps can still be 
found in their postulations. First, there is no unified definition of vulnerability and even 
less is said about its determinants. Eaking and Luers (2006) raised the need to better 
clarify not only the meaning but also the use given to the concept of vulnerability among 
researchers. Research acknowledges that different levels of vulnerability determine 
differential impacts of disasters, but what exactly is vulnerability? And in the same line of 
argument, how is it caused? I maintain that within the literature the concept is not clearly 
defined and on some occasions what determines vulnerability (low income, illiteracy, 
health problems) is interlinked with vulnerability itself.  I further maintain that 
recognizing the differences between the concept and its determinants contributes to a 
better understanding of how societies can adapt to a changing environment. In this 
thesis vulnerability constitutes the probability of an individual being affected by a natural 
disaster. It refers in particular to the likelihood of being affected on a continuum 
between low probability and high probability. I distinguish between the causes and 
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consequences of vulnerability to disasters and therefore isolate the determinants of 
vulnerability from the probability of being harmed by a disaster.  
A second important gap, acknowledged by some leading researchers in the field (Adger, 
2006), is viewing the characteristic of being vulnerable as fixed and immobile. At times, 
the literature suggests that the socio-demographic determinants of vulnerability are 
conceived as the social conditions of human beings, but in so doing neglects the 
dynamic and cyclical characteristic of social structures. On several occasions the concept 
of vulnerability already presupposes certain personal characteristics, leaving outside the 
equation everyone that does not necessarily meet those conditions. Hewit (1997:8), one 
of the most prominent vulnerability researchers points out in this respect that ‘we use 
the term to mean those who are more at risk: when we talk of vulnerable people it is 
clear that we mean those who are at the “worse” end of the spectrum’. But who are the 
ones that are at the ‘worse’ end? And furthermore, what happens to those who are not at 
the end of the spectrum but still suffer the consequences or impact of the disaster? I 
maintain that vulnerability is a status, changing in time and place, and for that reason the 
degree to which an individual is vulnerable to disasters is constantly shifting. Being 
‘vulnerable’ is not a social characteristic, as is being female, young or illiterate, but 
instead is a probability of being affected by a shock.  
However, this aspect leads us to the next limitation: the lack of research conducted on 
how the micro causes of vulnerability and aggregated determinants interconnect. The 
determinants of the likelihood of being affected by a disaster and the adaptive capacity 
of societies can be identified at several levels of analysis. Social characteristics or the 
individual, geographical characteristics of an area, its local and national government 
policies, international organizations’ actions, can all be determinants of either an increase 
or decrease in vulnerability at certain moments in time and across space. From a 
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theoretical point of view, it is important to disentangle different types of determinants 
regarding the scale, and subsequently acknowledge the multi-scalar dimension of 
vulnerability. Empirically, studying vulnerability at the micro level (individuals) would 
entail omitting from the analysis the aggregated social, economical and political context. 
In the opposite direction, only studying aggregated level data would neglect the 
individual mechanisms by which adaptation capacities reduce the impact of disasters.  
An additional gap is evident in so far as the theory tends towards a homogenizing 
standpoint, taking the ‘south’ as a whole without distinguishing between countries. The 
outcomes of this may be useful when trying to address the ecological debt (Simms, 2005) 
that the wealthier nations have to the poorest nations of the planet, but may also mislead 
in terms of understanding the differential consequences of natural disasters in dissimilar 
countries. Understanding these differences and the particularities is a central issue in 
order to study the determinants of vulnerability to disasters and adaptation capacities.  
3. Theoretical Construction  
 
Based on social vulnerability theory and the sociology of disasters I pursue the idea that 
disasters are a social construction generated as a reflection of the social inequalities of 
the societies in which they happen. In this sense disasters constitute a social crisis, a 
social disruption of daily routines. How societies react, respond and recover from such a 
crisis depends on certain established mechanisms existing before the disaster occurs and 
emergent mechanisms after they happen.  
Throughout my research I study two possible enhancers of the adaptive capacity of 
societies: social capital, as an individual attribute to cope with natural disasters (Adger, 
2003; Dynes, 2006; Pelling, 1998; Pelling and High, 2005) and international and public 
spending, as institutional actions that increase adaptation levels within the society in 
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question (Plümper and Neumayer, 2009; Raschky and Schwindt, 2009; Stromberg, 2007; 
Van Ommeren et al., 2005). The distinction between individual and institutional tools is 
based on a similar conceptualization by Pelling (2002), who suggests two ways of 
adaptive potential: coping and institutional modification. For the author, coping refers to 
the direct decline in the likelihood of being harmed by a hazardous event. Institutional 
modification implies changes implemented by institutions in order to mitigate the impact 
of disasters on the population2.  
In this thesis I propose a quite different definition. I differentiate between an individual 
mechanism of adaptive capacity (social capital), referring to tools that could potentially 
increase the mitigation and response capacity of individuals to the impact of hazards, and 
institutional actions (humanitarian aid and public spending), referring to the measures 
applied by governments and agencies to reduce the impact of disasters on the 
population.  
The role of social capital as a mitigation mechanism both in the literature of social 
vulnerability theory (Adger, 2003; Ersing and Kost, 2012; Pelling, 1998; Pelling and 
High, 2005) and within the sociology of disasters (Buckle, 2006; Dynes, 2006) is 
considerable. Social capital has been regarded as one of ‘our most significant resource in 
responding to damage caused by natural and other hazards’ (Dynes, 2006:2). Although 
already studied in the 1990s by a small number of researchers (Blaikie et al., 1994; Pelling, 
1998), in the last decade the inclusion of social networks and social capital as 
determinants of vulnerability has been extended among the literature (Adger, 2003; 
Ersing and Kost, 2012; Pelling and High, 2005).  
                                                          
2 Note that throughout my thesis I refer to adaptive potential or adaptive capacity as the same concept: the capacities 
of individuals to adapt, respond and recover from natural disasters.  
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Social capital refers to the strength of network connections and social ties within society. 
The concept can be originally traced to the work of Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988) 
and Putnam (1993). For Putnam social capital is ‘features of social life—networks, 
norms and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue 
shared objectives’ (Putnam, 1995:664). He classifies social capital as bonding, referring to 
the ties between individuals, and bridging, referring to the ties between different 
segments of the population (Putnam, 2001). Additionally, bridging social capital can be 
further classified as linking capital, which refers to relationships between different 
groups, for example the relations between communities and donors (Putnam, 2001). 
Despite the enormous growth in studies on social capital and natural disasters, research 
has largely neglected exploring how different aspects of social capital operate to decrease 
the impact of natural disasters. I contribute to the social theory on disasters by 
proposing two new elements to the study of social capital.   
First, based on the distinction made by Putnam (2001) which conceptually separates 
bridging and bonding social capital, I argue that both forms function to enhance the 
adaptive capacity of individuals. Bonding social capital is generated by the strength of 
network relationships between individuals. One example would be the help provided by 
friends and family members in the provision of food, shelter or healthcare after disasters. 
The second mechanism, bridging social capital, refers to social participation and 
community involvement. This could be, for example, participation in protest or 
community groups. However, importantly, the way both components of social capital 
function to decrease the impact of disasters is dissimilar3. Bonding social capital 
contributes through the tighter network, directly mitigating the effects of a disaster 
through the provision of goods, shelter or emotional support. Bridging social capital 
                                                          
3
 The mechanism under which bridging and bonding social capital enhances the adaptive capacity of individuals is presented in 
Section 4 of this chapter 
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operates in more extensive and sometimes indirect ways. Organizations or community 
groups function to reduce the impact of disasters on the affected population, but the 
target population is in general much more extensive than the closest family circle. For 
this reason my thesis theoretically proposes to distinguish between bridging and bonding 
social capital in order to better understand how both mechanisms enhance the adaptive 
capacity of individuals to disasters.  
Second, I add a temporal dimension to the effects of social capital. The literature has 
largely dismissed differentiating between the effects of social capital at different phases 
of disasters. I claim that the manner in which network ties (bonding) and social 
participation (bridging) operate in the societies is different at each phase of a disaster 
(preparedness, response, recovery). Before disasters, groups and individuals are involved 
in the provision of information and also operate as mechanisms to demand public 
goods. After disasters, individuals and groups provide services, support and help. 
Consequentially, these distinctions can lead to a clearer and more straightforward study 
of the effectiveness of social capital as an adaptive measure in the face of natural 
disasters.  
This thesis also explores two institutional actions, taken by Governments and 
International Agencies, which enhance the adaptive capacity of societies: public 
spending and humanitarian aid.  
Regarding the role of governments in mitigating the impact of disasters, existing research 
has mainly centered around the idea that accountable and efficient governments tend to 
be more effective in reducing the impact of the disasters within societies (Besley, 2002; 
Kahn, 2005; Plümper and Neumayer, 2009; Stromberg, 2007). Others studies have also 
found that the weaker the institutional framework of a country, the higher the social and 
economic impact of disasters (Kahn, 2005; Raschky, 2008). Similarly, Raschky (2008), 
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confirms that countries with stronger institutions appear to have fewer victims due to 
disasters while also other researchers have shown that democracies appear more 
effective in reducing deaths from natural disasters (Kahn, 2005; Platt, 1999; Plümper and 
Neumayer, 2009; Sen, 1991; Stromberg, 2007). The reasons behind these associations 
seem straightforward; the levels of responsibility and accountability attributable to 
democracies towards their citizens is higher than in autocracies. A democratic 
government depends on its citizens for reelection, therefore they have more incentive to 
meet demands and expectations (Besley, 2002; Kotov and Nikitina, 1995; Li, 2006). 
Furthermore, the freedom of the press together with the information flow tend to be 
higher within democracies and can be an important tool to stimulate the accountability 
of governments at the same time as providing information to societies (Barrett and 
Graddy, 2000; Besley, 2002; Telford and Cosgrave, 2007). Good access to information in 
moments of crisis could establish better decisions amongst the population, and also 
provide a mechanism for avoiding corruption and lack of transparency in the 
reconstruction process. Among autocracies the control group is not the citizens but 
instead a small elite that is easily manipulated and corruptible (Scruggs, 1999).  
Despite some contributions both from the sociology of disasters and vulnerability theory 
concerning the relevance of governmental measures in diminishing the impact of 
disasters (Besley, 2002; Kahn, 2005; Stromberg, 2007), I claim that existing research has 
largely neglected the specific role of public spending as an stimulator of the adaptation 
capacity to natural disasters.  
I propose that public spending constitutes one of the most important tools of 
institutional adaptation to disasters. I argue that countries with strong state participation 
and high public spending levels will tend to suffer less from the impact of natural 
disasters. Public spending operates at two levels. First, it shapes the determinants of 
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vulnerability, in the form of educational levels, combating unemployment and poor 
housing conditions, amongst others. Second, it has a direct impact on the adaptation 
tools available to individuals to respond and cope with disasters.  
I further maintain that the mechanism through which public spending enhances the 
adaptive capacity of individuals to disasters fluctuates across time and space. First, 
regarding a temporal dimension, I argue that before, during, and after disasters the role 
of spending in mitigating the impact of disasters changes, from provision of indirect 
measures of mitigation to, following the catastrophe, direct efforts to decrease the social 
impact. In terms of space, I argue that the ways in which each government decides to 
devote funds to the preparedness, response and reconstruction varies from one country 
to another; and even from one region to another. I propose that one of the most 
important determinants of these variations is the institutional framework of the country.   
Apart from public spending, I suggest that the actions taken by international agencies, 
reflected by humanitarian aid is a second fundamental institutional tool available to 
societies, especially in less developed countries, to adapt and mitigate to the impact of 
disasters.  
Research on the effectiveness and role of humanitarian aid in reducing the impact of 
natural disasters is still emerging and therefore rare, with some important exceptions. 
First, some research has shown that decisions on where to allocate aid are based on 
geopolitical strategies originating in the donor country, and sometimes not strictly related 
to the characteristics of the recipient countries, therefore caution should be taken 
regarding the objectives and motives of donors (Pankaj, 2005; Woods, 2005). Secondly, 
as Woods (2005) has pointed out, international organizations systematically dismiss 
national governments, forwarding the motivations of international agencies over the 
preferences of national governments. Also, investigations have identified that different 
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donors follow different interests, which results in an overlapping of activities. 
Coordination and implementation problems suffered by international organizations 
subsequently constitutes a major setback to the effectiveness of aid (Rey, 2001). 
Scholars specifically researching disaster relief aid have found that donors tend to be 
more prominent, and successful, in relation to high profile events where the impact of 
their help can be easily advertised among their supporters (Stromberg, 2007)., They also 
lean towards supporting countries that are closer both geographically and politically and 
economically relevant to their own interests (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Stromberg, 2007). 
Linnerooth-Bayer et al. (2005) argue that humanitarian aid has mainly focused on post 
disaster support, consequently being totally ineffective in enhancing adaptive capacity or 
preparedness policies before disasters occur. Linnerooth-Bayer et al. argue that more aid 
should be dedicated to mitigation mechanisms rather than response after the natural 
events happen.  Finally, the intervention of international agencies has long been 
questioned in so far as it fails to fully integrate local communities into their work,, taking 
the population as mere victims lacking any capacity for reconstruction (IASC, 2010; 
McGreal, 2010; O'Connor, 2011; Telford and Cosgrave, 2007).  
Despite these contributions to the study of humanitarian aid and natural disasters, 
disaster relief aid has not been theoretically conceived by the literature as a component 
of the adaptive capacity of societies nor studied from a comparative multi-level 
perspective. Theoretically, I contribute to the disaster research by claiming that 
humanitarian aid is an institutional mechanism that enhances the adaptive capacity of 
societies, therefore the aid inflows to a country could potentially mitigate the possible 
impact of natural disasters. Also, I claim that the roles of aid as stimulator of adaptive 
capacity should be observed from a temporal and spatial dimension, before, during and 
after a disaster occurs. Actions taken by international organizations are not static and 
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unidirectional but rather are capable of rapid adaptation to situations. As with public 
spending, I further argue that the institutional context and political regime of a country 
where the disaster occurs determine a differential role for disaster relief aid.  
A considerable proportion of the literature has been devoted to studying the association 
between aid and political regimes with different, and often contradictory, outcomes. On 
one hand, scholars have found that aid promotes democracy, supporting good 
governance practices, accountability, and economic growth (Barro, 1999; Burnside and 
Dollar, 1997; Svensson, 1999). Authors such as Stevensson (1999) and Burnside (1997) 
have demonstrated that aid has a positive effect on growth in democratic countries.  
On the other hand, researchers claim that aid can operate in the opposite direction by 
diminishing democracies through a decrease in governmental accountability under the 
pressure of international agencies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Grossman, 1992; Knack, 
2004; Svensson, 1999). Governments need to meet the conditions set out by donors in 
order to receive support; these conditions might not be necessarily in concordance with 
the political strategies and policies that the national government was carrying out. Aid, 
therefore, could imply a change in existing public policies. In addition, other academics 
have argued that the provision of aid could cause, or amplify, domestic civil conflicts 
between groups that receive subsidies and sections of the population that do not. The 
provision of aid could, in this sense, exclude part of the population and generate erosion 
amongst social relations within the society (Grossman, 1992; Svensson, 1999).  
This thesis maintains that the role of humanitarian aid is shaped by the institutional 
context of national governments. In contrast to the role of public spending, disaster 
relief aid tends to be more effective in weaker institutional contexts. I argue that the lack 
of a strong national government implies an easier and less bureaucratic process in the 
distribution of aid. International agencies can potentially take the lead with almost no 
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consultation and subsequently have total freedom in applying those policies they 
consider relevant or which are deemed by them as geopolitically important.  However, 
democratic governments tend to be more accountable to their citizens and place more 
barriers and controls in the way of plans to be implemented, potentially slowing down 
the process of distribution of aid and subsidies.  
4. Argument and Hypothesis 
 
The main theoretical objective of this thesis is the in-depth analysis of two potential 
tools, one central to society (social capital) and the second derived from institutions (aid 
and welfare policies), that enhance the adaptive capacity of individuals to disasters and 
therefore decreasing the levels of social vulnerability to natural disasters. Empirically, 
both at the aggregate level (countries) and the micro level (individuals) I measure the 
determinants of vulnerability to natural disasters and verify how social capital and aid, 
both public and international, operate to enhance the adaptive capacity of the 
communities and countries concerned.  
From the theoretical construction introduced in the last section, I extract three 
hypotheses that will be empirically tested along this thesis: 
H1. ‘Higher levels of social capital within a society have lowered the impact of natural disasters on 
populations in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1960 to 2011’ 
       H2. ‘Higher levels of public spending within the country lessen the impact of natural disasters       
among the population, conditional on the democratization levels in the country’  
H3. ‘Higher levels of humanitarian aid lessen the impact of natural disasters, conditional on the 
democratization levels within the country’  
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Throughout this section I unpack the mechanisms behind each hypothesis, presenting 
the micro foundations that support each assumption. 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Social capital increases the adaptive capacity of individuals decreasing the effects of 
disasters  
I argue that both bonding and bridging social capital4 enhance the adaptive capacity, 
reducing the impact of natural disasters on the population.  
Bonding social capital, referring to the ties between individuals (Putnam, 2001), 
improves the adaptive capacity due to several mechanisms. First, the importance of the 
role of family, friends and community members during the first hours following a natural 
disaster is unquestionable. The support could operate in several ways, through the 
provision of food, shelter, healthcare and also taking care of children and the elderly. 
Data from Chile shows that after the 2010 earthquake, the main activities adopted by 
families as a collective strategy were the provision of food, water and security in the 
neighborhood (CASEN, 2010). Assistance may be required for long periods especially in 
cases where the reconstruction process is slow, support from the outside is delayed, or in 
the case of long-term disaster situations (such as floods or droughts). As an example, 
numbers suggest that after the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, 600,000 people stayed with 
host families for several months without the possibility of returning to their homes 
(CAP, 2012). In summary, network ties between individuals serve as prime resources for 
societies in time of disasters, however this support is conditional on the strength of 
relationships, that is, on the levels of bonding social capital.  
                                                          
4
 Bonding social capital reflects the strength of the horizontal ties between communities and bridging refers to the ties 
between different segments of the population Putnam, R. 2001. "Social capital: Measurement and consequences." 
Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2:41-51., 
  
47 
A second form through which bonding social capital enhances the adaptive capacity of 
individuals is the provision of information before, during and after natural disasters 
(Dynes, 2006; Takeuchi et al., 2011). In the preparedness phase, the role of families and 
friends as providers of information constitute a fundamental contribution of social 
capital (Takeuchi et al., 2011). The knowledge of how to predict and cope with the 
possibility of a disaster is often transmitted within the family. In the case of earthquakes, 
the actual event may only last a few minutes, but in case of droughts and floods the 
catastrophe can play out over several months adding an unpredictable element to its 
effect.  Consequently, information of how to proceed could be fundamental in reducing 
the impact of such a disaster. Finally, during the recovery process, the provision of 
information can bring opportunities to the population in terms of seeking work or 
alternative means to earn money if their jobs were affected by the disaster.  
Another mechanism through which bonding social capital can reduce the impact of 
disasters is the provision of emotional support. Research shows that individuals with 
family support tend to recover better emotionally from the impact of disasters than 
those that have to cope alone (Solomon et al., 1993). The emotional impact of disasters 
could include suicide (Krug et al., 1998) and post traumatic shock (Steinglass and Gerrity, 
1990). In brief, family and friends can ease the emotional stress suffered by individuals, 
contributing to the recovery process, via a faster reassertion of community life.  
As a form of bridging social capital, referring to network ties between different groups in 
the society (Putnam, 2001), social organizations have been identified as one of the most 
effective mechanisms societies have in adapting to the impact of natural disasters (Eakin, 
2006; Gruberg, 2004; Moore, 2005; Pelling, 2003; Pulgar, 2010). Community 
participation is crucial not only during the first few hours after the event, but also in the 
reconstruction process through an involvement in policy planning and implementation. 
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Firstly, they provide support for community members when facing the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster through the provision of shelter, health awareness, search and 
rescue tasks and food distribution.  
Apart from the provision of public services, organizations can also operate as 
intermediaries between societies and local and national governments. These groups 
could be generated after disasters occur, often as the result of the population’s 
dissatisfaction with how governments undertake the reconstruction process. The 
existence of protests and demonstrations following disasters is not unusual. Both in 
Haiti and Chile, after the 2010 earthquakes, people gathered to protest: against the 
United Nations in the Haitian case, and against the national government in Chile 
(Carroll, 2010; CEME, 2012). Protests therefore constitute a mechanism for 
communicating dissatisfaction with the processes being implemented and are frequently 
led by an emergent group or organization.  
Besides protests, pre-existent groups or structures can operate as mechanisms for 
communicating with governments. For example a parents’ group established for the 
maintenance and operation of a school can be transformed and begin to officiate as a 
link between the society and government. Pre-existent groups tend to adapt quicker and 
be more effective than an emergent group (those that emerge suddenly after the 
disaster), as they have previously functioned collectively with clear knowledge of the 
dynamics and leaderships within the group. 
Finally, social participation can contribute to a more effective and inclusive 
reconstruction plan wherein the needs of the population are self identified resulting in 
more accurate policies. The participation of communities in the reconstruction process 
has been widely identified as a mechanism of coping with disasters (Pelling, 1998; 
Quarantelli, 1986; Rodriguez et al., 2006) although this is often difficult to achieve. Both 
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in Haiti and Chile, despite the economic and social differences of the two countries, 
governments and international agencies were unsuccessful in including the community 
and affected population in the reconstruction process (HaitiGrassrootsWatch, 2011; 
IASC, 2010; Lizana, 2011; Pulgar, 2010). The policies were applied without the consent 
of communities leading to the emergence of several social problems and conflicts. A few 
months after the earthquakes, protests and demonstrations occurred both in Chile and 
Haiti demanding a more inclusive reconstruction process. Despite one process being led 
by international organizations, in Haiti, and a second by a democratic government, in 
Chile, both encounter the difficulty of integrating the society in the process of recovery 
and reconstruction (Carroll, 2010; IASC, 2010; Pulgar, 2010).  
Hypothesis II:_Public spending enhances the adaptive capacity of human beings to natural disasters, 
conditional on the democratization levels within the country 
I argue that governments, through public spending, can potentially increase the adaptive 
capacity of individuals and in this way reduce the impact of natural disasters, conditional 
on the level of democratization in the country.  
The mechanism under which public spending reduces vulnerability and enhances 
adaptive capacity appears straightforward. Firstly, before disasters occur, the policies 
designed to prepare the population for a possible hazard are in general implemented 
with resources from local and national governments. These programs can include 
spreading awareness of risks and potential disasters, transmitting important information 
and education. Apart from this communication task, in the same phase, governments 
have the responsibility of creating prevention mechanisms, as early warning alerts or the 
design of norms to prevent disaster damage (such as construction codes or housing 
regulation). In all of these tasks, public spending is required and could potentially reduce 
the effects of natural disasters on the population.  
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Secondly, public spending is needed when disasters occur. The provision of food, shelter 
and healthcare as well as search and rescue operations, amongst others, cost millions to 
national governments5. Governments can directly target some parts of the affected 
population and can also provide support as a form of public good to all individuals who 
have suffered the effects of the disaster.  These tasks can be well or poorly accomplished 
and consequentially imply a direct mitigation or amplification of the disaster’s impact on 
the population.  Finally, in the reconstruction process, governments can be more, or less, 
effective in the provision of permanent shelter, reconstruction of roads and 
infrastructure. The existence of subsidies, insurance or benefits for the affected could 
lead to a faster recovery and therefore a decrease in the impact of the disaster.  
Despite the seemingly simple mechanism behind public spending, and because of the 
opportunistic nature of governments, sometimes there is no stimulus to designate 
funding to prepare, mitigate and adapt to natural disasters. Governments calculate the 
benefits of reducing spending against the probability of the occurrence of a natural 
disaster, and in this way decide on the funding designated to early warning measures, 
construction code regulations, and other measures. The preferences of the electorate to 
increase public spending on preparedness and mitigation measures are divided regarding 
their levels of vulnerability. Individuals that are more likely to be affected tend to prefer 
an increase in spending, whereas those with less likelihood of suffering the impact of a 
disaster pressurize governments not to increase spending on such tools. A similar 
combination of preferences can be witnessed after disaster strikes where the affected 
population makes demands for prompt and effective solutions, meaning an increase in 
public spending devoted to reconstruction activities; however, those elements of the 
                                                          
5 Is not the objective of this thesis to study monetary costs of natural disasters but the information is available at the 
International Disasters Database. EM-DAT. 2011. "The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database." WHO 
Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. 
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population who remain unaffected prefer to confine public spending to areas that were 
designated before the disaster occurred.  
Autocratic governments, in contrast, need to satisfy the demands of a small elite to 
remain in power, and not those of the entire citizenship (Plümper and Neumayer, 2009). 
The stimulus for autocratic governments to extend public spending on mitigation and 
reconstruction is reduced to the demands of elitist minorities and therefore not everyone 
affected by the disaster is going to be heard by national governments. In sum, as a main 
hypothesis, I argue that higher the levels of public spending lessen the impact of natural 
disasters – but the effect is mediated by the levels of democratization within the country.   
Hypothesis 3: Humanitarian Aid increases the Adaptive Capacity of individuals to natural disasters, 
decreasing the social effects 
Besides national governments, I claim that international agencies are central actors in the 
prevention and mitigation of natural disasters in the developing world, especially through 
the provision of disaster relief aid.  
I argue that aid reduces the effects of natural disasters under several mechanisms. Firstly, 
funding from international aid is frequently directed into the preparedness phase, where 
information and education become fundamental to mitigate a possible impact of a 
hazard on the country. Secondly, large proportions of funds are channeled into the 
emergency response, especially in the first hours following disasters, where search and 
rescue operations can potentially save many lives. Moreover, funding is invested in the 
provision of housing, food and healthcare for the affected population. Finally, aid is also 
implemented in long-term reconstruction programs and plans.  
Despite this clear-cut potential intervention of disaster relief aid, I maintain that the 
efficacy with which aid is invested depends on the political decisions and social 
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characteristics of the country. Specifically, I argue that the way in which humanitarian aid 
operates depends on the levels of democratization of the country. As with public 
spending I argue that the levels of democratization in the country determine the 
effectiveness of disaster relief aid in reducing the social effects of the disaster. In 
autocracies international aid organizations find easier mechanisms to apply the funds, 
meeting almost no obstacles from the national government. Contrary to public spending 
in democratic governments, autocratic governments find almost no incentives for 
investing public funds for either reconstruction or prevention of disasters, but do 
possess several incentives for allowing international agencies operate within the territory.  
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III. Explaining the Death Toll from Natural Disasters 
in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the social, political and economical determinants of 
social vulnerability and adaptation tools at the aggregated level, through the 
implementation of a Time Series Cross-Sectional analysis of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries from 1960 to 2010. I evaluate the role of social capital, public 
spending and humanitarian aid in enhancing the adaptive capacity of societies to natural 
disasters. I claim that the higher the level of social capital in a society, the lower the 
number of casualties caused by a natural disaster. Also, I suggest that both public 
spending and humanitarian aid reduce the impact of disasters, although not in every 
scenario. In democratic contexts, public spending tends to be more effective than 
humanitarian aid in reducing the death toll of disasters. However, in autocratic 
environments, humanitarian aid becomes more efficient; with less control and 
supervision from the nation state they have more freedom of action and to make 
decisions on how to implement programs and reconstruction plans.  
The sections in this chapter are organized as follows. First, based on the theoretical 
discussion presented in Chapter II, I derive a set of hypotheses to be tested at the 
aggregated level. Next, turning to the empirical section of the chapter, I conduct a 
general analysis of the socio-demographic and economic variables that determine social 
vulnerability to disasters. Following this, I test the main empirical implications from the 
theory, demonstrating how deadly natural disasters prove to be depending on levels of 
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social capital, international aid, and levels of domestic public spending in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Finally, a number of brief conclusions close this chapter. 
2. Reducing the impact of natural disasters  
 
This chapter empirically tests the predictions that social capital, public spending and 
international aid enhance the adaptive capacity of individuals and therefore reduce social 
vulnerability to natural disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean. The three 
hypotheses, presented in detail in Chapter II, are tested at an aggregated level (countries) 
through a time series cross sectional analysis of Latin American countries from 1960 to 
2010.  
The first hypothesis predicts that social capital expands the adaptive capacity of 
individuals to natural disasters, decreasing the likelihood of being affected.  Social capital 
provides an account of the structure quality and strengths of social networks (Coleman, 
1988; Putnam, 1995) and has been classified as bonding, referring to the ties between 
individuals, and bridging social capital, referring to ties between different groups 
(Putnam, 2001).  
Summarizing the mechanism described in depth in the second chapter of this thesis, I 
argue that social capital levels within the country can reduce the number of deaths after a 
quake, flood or storm through several mechanisms6. First, concerning bonding social 
capital, family and friends can provide food, shelter and attention to those affected by 
the disaster. They can also operate as an information source disseminating relevant 
knowledge on how to deal with the catastrophe and how to recover. In addition, and 
                                                          
6A deeper analysis of the social capital concept, the mechanisms by which reduce the impacts of disasters and the 
theoretical contribution were presented in Chapter II.   
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also a fundamental aspect, maintaining tight relationships with family and friends may 
reduce the emotional shock experienced in the wake of extreme events.  
In relation to the concept of bridging social capital, referring to network ties between 
different groups in the society (Putnam, 2001), social organizations constitute a 
fundamental component of the preparedness, response and reconstruction process in 
the face of natural disasters (Eakin, 2006; Gruberg, 2004; Moore, 2005; Pelling, 2003; 
Pulgar, 2010). At the country level, I argue that higher levels of social participation lower 
the impact of natural disasters. As discussed in depth in Chapter II, organizations can 
operate as providers of shelter, healthcare, search and rescue operations and food 
provision. These tasks, effectively done, could reduce the number of deaths due to a 
catastrophe. A second mechanism under which organizations could potentially reduce 
the number of deaths is through the provision of information and communication 
between national and local governments and the population. Also, regarding bridging 
social capital, I suggest that societies with high levels of political activism are more prone 
to be involved in the preparedness, implementation and reconstruction process after 
disasters, possessing more pre-existent tools to channel demands and needs to 
governments and international organizations. I forward the idea that societies with high 
levels of political participation prior to the occurrence of a disaster, and with pre-
established participation mechanisms, cope better with the impact through the provision 
of resources and help to the community in the initial hours of the disaster. Well-
organized communities can minimize the number of injured and fatalities, via better 
coordination of emergency activities and directing attention to the displaced and injured.   
In sum, I propose as my first hypothesis that a higher level of social capital within the 
country lowers the death toll after natural disasters. The predictions are empirically 
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divided into two models, first a measure of bonding social capital is included (network 
ties) and secondly a proxy of bridging social capital (social participation).   
Apart from social capital, a coping tool originating from within societies, I argue that 
two institutional mechanisms can enhance the adaptive capacity and reduce the number 
of deaths: public spending and humanitarian aid7. Furthermore, I argue that this 
relationship is conditional on the democratization levels of the country.  
Public spending can potentially reduce deaths in several ways. Firstly, the impact of 
disasters depend, besides many other issues, on how prepared the society is. The 
preparedness and mitigation policies implemented necessarily involve public funds to be 
executed, as early warning mechanisms, application of construction codes, organized 
urbanization processes, education and diffusion of risks, etc. Secondly, once disasters 
occur, the provision of food, shelter, and healthcare requires immediate funding from 
national governments. The success of these policies in the immediate aftermath could 
potentially reduce hundreds of deaths and can also represent a faster recovery process 
for those affected. Moreover, the reconstruction process implies high costs for 
governments but could result in the reduction of more disaster-related casualties from 
the spread of disease or famine.   
I argue that this mechanism is enhanced or conditional on the levels of democratization 
in the country. The type of political regime has long been related to more effective 
policies aimed at mitigating the impact of disasters (Besley, 2002; Kahn, 2005; 
Stromberg, 2007). Democratic systems tend to protect their population from 
environmental hazards in ways that are more efficient than those of autocratic regimes, 
                                                          
7 Detailed descriptions of the mechanisms by which spending and aid decrease the likelihood of being affected by a 
natural disaster were discussed in the last chapter. Nevertheless I introduce here a brief summary.  
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mainly because the provision of goods and public acceptance is vital for reelection. The 
success of a democratic government is centered on its desire for further terms in office 
and thus attending to the population’s demands and needs, whereas an autocratic 
government does not need the population’s acceptance in order to rule, of course with 
some exceptions. Furthermore, democracies are also associated to better communication 
mechanisms and freedom of the press, issues that become fundamental to mitigate the 
potential impact of disasters. More information implies more freedom of action and 
decision, providing the population with more tools to become aware and prepared for 
the potential impact of disasters.  
These attributes make democracies more apt in easing the impact of disasters on the 
population through the provision of those goods and public services that assist the 
community in the preparedness, response and reconstruction process. These aspects 
stimulate democratic governments in taking the lead in the reconstruction process. In 
conclusion, I propose as a second hypothesis that higher levels of public spending 
lower the number of deaths from natural disasters, conditional on the levels of 
democratization in the country.  
Having discussed to issue of public spending, I now propose that international aid 
contributes to the preparedness and reconstruction process for enhancing the adaptive 
capacity of a society, reducing the number of deaths caused by natural disasters. The 
relevance of aid as a mitigation mechanism has been widely studied, alongside the 
problems arising from intervention (Raschky and Schwindt, 2009; Stromberg, 2007; Van 
Ommeren et al., 2005). International organizations, together with resources (aid), play a 
fundamental role in the recovery and preparedness process meeting the effects of natural 
disasters in Latin America. I suggest that the effect of humanitarian aid in reducing the 
number of deaths is conditional on the democratization levels of the country. In this 
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chapter, and as my third hypothesis, I intend to show that more international aid 
decreases the number of deaths at the aggregated level, but the effectiveness is disparate 
among democratic and undemocratic countries.  Within autocracies, international 
organizations have more autonomy and freedom to operate. In countries with stronger 
governments and institutions international aid does not decrease the likelihood of dying 
in a natural disaster.  
Finally, based on the assumption that diverse political, social and economic processes 
determine a differential impact of natural disasters among the population, I include 
certain variables that might predict the levels of vulnerability within a society. The 
determinants included in my analysis are population density, urban growth, GDP per 
capita, GDP growth, and population under 14 years of age (Fig. 1). Urbanization and 
population growth have been widely associated in the literature to an increase in the 
likelihood of being affected by natural disasters (Cuny, 1983; Cutter, 2000; Mitchell, 
1993; Pelling, 2003). As presented in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, disasters occur 
when human beings are affected, being a socially constructed event. In consequence the 
increasing process of urbanization in Latin America determines an increase in risk, 
especially for those living in the marginality of big cities (Greenfield, 1994; Pelling, 2002). 
Urbanization has contributed to an increase in precarious settlements, often located in 
areas of potential flooding or mass movements. One case of the impact of urbanization 
on vulnerability levels can be found in the precarious settlements around large cities in 
Brazil. In January 2011 a summer storm, followed by floods and mass movement hit Rio 
de Janeiro, in Brazil, causing 900 deaths and 21,500 homeless.  The deaths occurred 
mainly in the mountain area, peripheral to Rio de Janeiro and home to 600,000 people, 
living in precarious settlements or ‘favelas’ as they are known in Brazil. The urbanization 
process in Brazil was triggered in the mid 1980s and 1990s after a boom in the cities’  
textile industries and the lack of agricultural work in rural areas. The population 
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migrating to the cities settled on the outskirts in precarious and instable locations, being 
affected systematically by the increasing occurrence of floods and mass movements 
occurring in Brazil (Economist, 2011). In sum, the rapid urbanization process 
encountered in most Latin American and Caribbean countries increases levels of the 
vulnerability of the population to natural disasters.  
Apart from urbanization processes, studies analyzing vulnerability levels in countries 
generally include GDP per capita as a way of controlling differences caused by the 
economic wealth of the country (Kahn, 2005; Neumayer and Plümper, 2007; Raschky, 
2008; Yang, 2006). Therefore, higher GDP per capita within the country lowers the 
number of casualties and those affected by natural disasters (see Graph 1).  
 
Graph 1: National Average Deaths per Natural disasters and GDP per Capita (Kahn, 
2005) 
 
 
Finally, I incorporate the population ‘less than 14 years of age’ under the assumption that 
the age composition within the country may have an impact on their levels of 
vulnerability to natural disasters. It has been suggested that both children and the elderly 
tend to suffer the most from natural disasters due to the lack of tools for adapting, 
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coping and recovering (Blaikie et al., 1994; Cutter, 2000; Donner and Rodriguez, 2011; 
Hewitt, 1997; Morrow, 1999) 
To empirically test these ideas I firstly propose an empirical model for studying the 
socio-demographic and economical determinants of the number of deaths by natural 
disasters. In this model I include the already identified, although not always tested, social 
and economical determinants of social vulnerability: population density, urban growth, 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, and population under 14 years of age, among others 
(Birkmann, 2006; Schneiderbauer, 2006). The objective is to study a basic set of social 
and economic characteristics that might shape social vulnerability to natural disasters and 
in subsequently to test the theoretical relevance of each dimension for the Latin 
American context.   
I then predict the impact of social capital, humanitarian aid and public spending in 
reducing the death rate from natural disasters, testing for the three main hypotheses of 
this thesis.  
  
  
61 
3. Explaining deaths from natural disasters 
 
Research Design 
Data 
Results are based on an unbalanced pooled time series analysis. The panel data combines 
cross-sectional and time-series information with cross-sectional dominant data (CSTS) 
(Sevestre, 2008). The datasets consist of historical data, from 1960 to 2010, from Latin 
American and the Caribbean countries including economic, political, social and 
environmental variables. The database is constructed based on different sources: the 
World Bank Dataset, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(CEPAL., 2007), Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001), Database of 
Educational Attainment (Barro and Lee, 1994), Database of Donor Performance 
(Roodman, 2007).  
The data on natural disasters is extracted from the CRED natural disasters database 
(EM-DAT, 2011). It contains a total of 785 natural events, composed by earthquakes, 
floods, droughts, storms and mass movements from 1960 to 2010.  
Dependent Variable 
The Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) provided by the World Health 
Organization Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED), contains information on the number of people affected, made homeless or 
having died as a consequence of different types of natural disasters from the 1960s to 
today at a world level. Based on data from the EM-DAT, I use as dependent variable the 
rate of deaths by total population due to earthquakes, floods, droughts, storms and 
landslide in Latin America from 1960 to 2011.  
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The impact of disasters can be assessed in many ways, through the number of displaced, 
money losses, number of casualties, loss of jobs, income or health problems8. Because of 
limited availability of country data I decided to use the number of casualties by natural 
disaster in Latin America as a proxy of the impact of the disaster on the population. This 
measure holds several limitations as well as a number of advantages as an indicator of 
the impact of natural disasters.  
Regarding the limitations, as Pelling (2006) has previously noted, those that did not die 
are excluded from analysis as vulnerable, limiting the identification of the causes of 
vulnerability. Because I am predicting the number of deaths caused by natural disasters I 
can only include in the macro analysis countries that suffered at least one natural disaster 
between 1960 and 2010. Secondly, the mortality data can be inaccurate due to problems 
in collection and subsequent declarations by national governments. Furthermore, the 
causes of deaths after natural disasters can be direct, as in the case of people who died 
from the quake in Haiti in 2010, or indirect, as in the population that died several 
months later due to an outbreak of cholera. The population dying from other causes, 
although linked to the primary natural disaster, are not taken into account in the data 
available from the International Dataset of Disasters (EM-DAT, 2011). Finally, the 
determinants of vulnerability are dynamic and change across time and space; therefore 
the results have limited prediction capacity (Pelling, 2006).  
However, despite these limitations the measure has several potential advantages. Firstly, 
the populations that died due to a natural disaster were undoubtedly vulnerable before 
the natural shock, making clear the causal mechanism between the occurrence of a 
disaster and the outcome. This avoids one of the most widespread criticisms of inductive 
type of measurement, whereby the causes of vulnerability and outcome are interlinked 
                                                          
8 At individual level I use changes in the level of income or population that became poor after the event as a measure 
of the impact of the disaster. The individual level results are presented in the next two chapters.  
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and almost tautological (Füssel, 2009; Gall, 2007; Pelling, 2006).  As Pelling (2006:181) 
points out ‘mortality is arguably the most reliable comparative indicator of human loss at 
the global scale’. Secondly, since the publication of the EM-DAT dataset of natural 
disasters, the death toll has been systematically used as a measure of the impact of 
natural disasters (Neumayer and Plümper, 2007; Plümper and Neumayer, 2009; UNDP, 
2004), allowing for an increasing development of comparative disaster research. 
Table 1: Dependent Variable Descriptive 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
Deathratio    |       739    .0000715    .0004833          0   .0101291 
Around 661,000 people have died due to natural disasters in Latin America and the 
Caribbean since 1960. Earthquakes, including the 2010 Haitian earthquake that took 
222,570 lives, have caused around 65% of the deaths. The second type of natural disaster 
that caused more deaths in Latin America is flooding, resulting in 20% of total of deaths 
during this period (a total of 132,340) and finally storms with 45,013 casualties.  
Explanatory Variables 
Four main independent variables are included in the analysis of the hypothesis presented 
above: international aid, public spending, social capital and regime type.  
First, the measurement of social capital has been at the center of debate among social 
scientists for many years. On one hand, bonding social capital has been widely measured 
through interpersonal trust (Fukuyama, 1995; Pelling and High, 2005). Trust, as defined 
by Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1995:26) is:  
The expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and 
cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms on the part of other 
members of that community 
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Based in survey data, both at local and national levels, researchers have traditionally used 
interpersonal trust as a measure of social capital (Newton, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 
2001), frequently measured through the survey question ‘Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people’ (Latinobarómetro, 1996-2010). A second indicator often used to measure 
bonding social capital is the transfer of funds  a population receives from family or 
friends that have emigrated (Adger et al., 2002; Levitt, 1998).  
Bridging social capital, or vertical social capital, has been widely measured through the 
social participation of individuals in associations or organizations (Grootaert and Van 
Bastelaer, 2002; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 2001).  
Based on this debate, I have chosen several variables that represent bonding social 
capital at the aggregated level in the form of ties between individuals (Putnam, 2001), 
and bridging social capital, referring to links between different groups within the society 
(Putnam, 2001).  To measure bonding social capital two indicators are included: 
interpersonal trust and remittances (i.e. the transfer of funds from abroad). The available 
data for measuring social capital along years and countries is scarce and traditional 
measures applied at the individual level, based on surveys, as trust in the community and 
social participation are not available for all the years and countries included in the 
analysis. However, Latinbarometer (1996-2010), a public opinion survey applied every 
year for 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries includes a measure of interpersonal 
trust for 18 countries from 1996 to 20089. I aggregated the results for each country and 
year and constitute the first measure of bonding social capital included in the model. The 
                                                          
9 The survey also includes community participation and social involvement in activities although not measured for 
every year and every country. The World Values Survey also measures social capital but is only available for four years 
(four waves) and with limited coverage in Latin America.  
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model analyzing bonding social capital will, therefore, only include 12 time points in the 
analysis. Results of the survey for Latin American and the Caribbean show that 
interpersonal trust is higher in countries such as Dominica, El Salvador and Guatemala 
with almost 30% of the population answering that ‘most people could be trusted’ (Table 
2). On the contrary, the lowest levels of interpersonal trust are measured in Brazil (7.5%) 
and Paraguay (11%). The results appear to fluctuate with time although not necessarily in 
one or the opposite direction for each country. Venezuela increased from 11% of the 
population believing that most people could be trusted in 1996 to 23% in 2009. 
However, Paraguay decreased from 23% in 1996 to 11% in the last survey.  
Table 2: Interpersonal Trust, Latinbarometer (1) 
 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Dominican               12.9 23.6 27.1 20.3 20.3 33.8 
Guatemala 28.0 29.3 26.2 14.4 11.1 14.1 18.3 14.2 20.0 32.8 30.2 23 29.2 
El Salvador 23.0 29.6 21.3 14.9 14.3 20.6 12.3 16.0 24.6 16.9 20.1 30.8 28.2 
Bolivia 17.4 13.6 20.7 17.2 13.7 28.0 21.2 13.8 19.6 22.5 20.9 22.3 25.6 
Uruguay 33.0 30.9 33.9 22.9 23.6 35.9 35.0 24.5 34.2 30.3 27.3 27.3 25.5 
Mexico 20.8 42.8 39.8 34.6 36.1 22.0 18.9 16.7 24.7 27.7 19.8 19.7 24.3 
Venezuela 11.3 11.0 15.9 15.4 16.6 11.9 13.3 16.9 25.7 29.0 25.5 25.5 23.2 
Costa Rica 11.0 29.8 33.6 11.1 12.4 13.9 10.6 7.7 14.7 17.2 8.1 23.2 21.6 
Panama 24.8 19.8 18.1 15.7 24.0 27.9 24.9 20.3 15.9 13.4 22.7 22.7 20.5 
Colombia 22.9 31.7 19.9 17.7 13.5 17.5 13.4 21.9 19.5 17.9 8.8 13.8 19.6 
 Ecuador 19.8 17.0 21.6 16.3 17.7 23.8 19.7 18.7 17.2 28.8 11.8 34.1 19.5 
Nicaragua 20.3 34.8 10.5 9.0 30.5 16.8 17.8 11.9 10.7 20.5 20.8 21.9 19.3 
Argentina 22.9 18.3 23.2 10.7 15.6 22.2 17.8 15.4 29.8 24.1 14.1 19.3 18.6 
Honduras 24.6 28.3 16.1 9.6 12.1 15.0 17.9 20.4 13.4 22.9 16.4 21.4 17.2 
Chile 17.7 17.6 14.8 13.4 14.6 13.3 9.9 19.3 13.7 12.8 9.0 15.7 15.5 
Peru 13.4 13.1 12.9 10.4 12.9 14.5 15.0 16.0 15.0 22.2 14.0 14.0 13.8 
Paraguay 23.4 8.5 13.2 17.8 17.2 5.8 7.2 6.0 14.0 13.0 5.8 5.8 11.0 
Brazil 11.1 4.8 4.6 4.1 2.4 3.1 3.7 4.1 5.6 5.3 5.6 8.6 7.5 
(1) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people 
 
The second variable included as a measure of bonding social capital is the Migrant 
Remittance Inflows (US$ million), extracted from the World Bank’s World 
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Development Indicators. In Chile, the percentage of remittance inflows in the total 
GDP of the country represent 0% whereas in El Salvador, Honduras and Jamaica 
represented in 2010 almost 15% of the total GDP (WorldBank, 2010). The variable, 
frequently used as a component of social capital (Adger et al., 2002; Levitt, 1998) gives an 
account of the strength of the network ties within individuals and family members.  
To measure bridging social capital two variables are included: participation in 
demonstrations and a civil liberties index. Both constitute proxies of social involvement 
and participation in different activities.  
Ideally, a measure of participation in social organizations should be included (Grootaert 
and Van Bastelaer, 2002; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 2001). However, data on participation is 
scarce for Latin America and although some surveys do measure these variables 
(Latinbarometer, LAPOP) it is insufficient for the years and countries included in the 
analysis. This constitutes a limitation on studying social capital at the aggregated level. To 
solve this problem I include two measures already used as proxies for social capital by 
macro level comparative studies (Collier, 2002; Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2001; 
Knack, 2002): firstly civil liberties, as an indicator of social capital stimulated by the 
government, and secondly participation in demonstrations as an indicator of social 
involvement.  
The number of anti-government demonstrations is defined as any peaceful public 
gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their 
opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly 
anti-foreign nature. The data is originally from Banks (2008) but extracted from Norris 
(2009). The Civil liberties Index is calculated by Freedom House (2009) and includes 
freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and 
personal autonomy without interference from the state. The index ranges from 1 (most 
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free) to 7 (least free), however I have reversed the scale for the purpose of the analysis, 
therefore 1 is the least free and 7 the most free (FreedomHouse, 2009).  
As a measure of international aid I include the Net Aid Transfers (NAT), made public by 
Roodman (2007). The measure incorporates two changes to the traditional Overseas 
Development Assistance (Net ODA). Firstly, NAT measures the net transfers whereas 
ODA is a capital flow concept. Secondly, NAT excludes cancellation of old non-ODA 
loans. It is measured in constant 2005 US Dollars. I generate a new variable that is the 
NAT per capita to include in the model.  
For public spending I use a measure from the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank Indicators. This is calculated regarding levels of GDP per country.  
To measure the differential impact of aid regarding the regime type I include ‘regime 
type’ as an explanatory variable. I will use the variable from the Project POLITY IV 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). This is calculated as the difference between the 10-point 
DEMOC index and the 10-point AUTOC index. The 10- point DEMOC measures 
democratic characteristics, while the 10-point AUTOC measures autocratic 
characteristics. The final indicator fluctuates, therefore, from -10 reflecting the most 
autocratic countries, to +10, the most democratic. For some models, and following 
previous research, I dichotomize this variable between autocracies and democracies to 
simplify the analysis (Neumayer and Plümper, 2007; Plümper and Neumayer, 2009).   
Control Variables 
A measure of the population affected divided by the total amount of population within 
the country is included as a proxy of the intensity of the natural disaster10. The number 
of population affected is extracted from EM-DAT. The definition of population is 
                                                          
10
 The same variable has been applied by Neumayer, to control by strength of Natural Disasters (Neumayer, E. and 
Plümper, T. 2007. "The gendered nature of natural disasters: the impact of catastrophic events on the gender gap in 
life expectancy, 1981–2002." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97:551-566. 
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‘People requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency, i.e. requiring basic 
survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate medical assistance. 
Appearance of a significant number of cases of an infectious disease introduced in a 
region or a population that is usually free from that disease’ (EM-DAT).  
I include the variable ‘year’ in order to control for possible time trends that may 
influence changes in the homeless and death rates from a natural disaster. One possible 
change due to time could be technological acquisition; another could be changes in the 
natural disaster types.  
Different types of natural disasters might cause differential outcomes and therefore five 
variables representing different types of disasters are included as dummy variables: 
earthquakes, droughts, floods, storms and mass movements. The dataset includes 107 
droughts, 134 earthquakes, 454 floods, 344 storms and 115 mass movements11. A simple 
count of disasters by year and country is incorporated as a way of controlling by the 
tendency of each country to suffer a disaster. Also, fixed effects per country are included 
in order to control per country differences effects.  
Two economic variables are incorporated as controls. Firstly, the log gross domestic 
product per capita and secondly the output gap, measure that compares the actual GDP 
of an economy and the potential GDP, showing possible gaps between the two. 
Following literature in political economy in Latin America, I recognize the relevance of 
profound income shocks. Therefore, I control for the output gap to avoid spurious 
correlation with business cycles (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Wibbels, 2006). 
This is a relevant measure to include in the Latin American case due to the fluctuating 
economy and with the understanding that the tools that a government, international 
organizations and societies can have access to in moments of positive or negative 
                                                          
11
 Mass movement includes landfalls, avalanches, rock falls and subsidence http://www.emdat.be/classification  
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efficiency 12. Several measures of social vulnerability to natural disasters have traditionally 
included economic variables as determinants of the impacts of natural disasters. To see a 
detailed comparison refer to Birkmann (2006).  
‘Urban population growth’ is included as a control variable based on previous research 
that demonstrates an association between urbanization processes and vulnerability 
(Birkmann, 2006; Pelling, 2003). The percentage of the population under 14 years of age 
is integrated to the analysis to control for possible differential impacts of natural 
disasters regarding the age distribution of the population. Finally, I include a measure of 
the education level of the country: ‘illiteracy’. The level of illiteracy is extracted from 
Barro and Lee’s dataset for Educational Attainment (Barro and Lee, 1994). The 
following table (Table 3) summarizes the main dependent, independent and control 
variables of the analysis. It also suggests the predictions behind each independent 
variable.  
 
  
                                                          
12 I have estimated the output gap as the difference between changes in real per capita income and changes in trend 
per capita income as calculated using an Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
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Table 3: Description of variables and hypothesis 
 VARIABLES Description  Mechanism Predic
tion 
Dependent variable   
Death rate  Rate between dead population and total population (EM-
DAT)  
  
Independent variables   
Aid National Aid Transfers, extracted from Roodman (2007) More aid less the death 
rate after natural 
disasters 
- 
Public Spending Public spending as a percentage of GDP. Extracted from 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank indicators 
More public spending 
lower the rate of deaths 
after disasters 
- 
Interpersonal trust Survey question: ‘In general, You would say that you can 
trust in most of the people’” (Latinobarómetro, 1996-
2010) 
More interpersonal trust 
less people dead after 
natural disasters 
- 
Remittances  Migrant remittance Inflows (US$ million), World Bank.  More remittances 
inflows less deaths after 
natural disasters 
- 
Demonstrations The number of anti-government demonstrations, defined 
as any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for 
the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their 
opposition to government policies or authority, excluding 
demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature. 
Originally from Banks (2008) but extracted from Norris 
(2009). 
More demonstrations 
more deaths after natural 
disasters 
+ 
Civil Liberties 
Index 
Civil liberties Index includes freedom of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, 
and personal autonomy without interference from the 
state. The index goes from 1 (most free) and 7 (least free) 
but I reversed the scale for the purpose of the analysis, 
therefore 1 is the least free and 7 the most free 
(FreedomHouse, 2009) 
Less civil liberties more 
deaths after natural 
disasters 
- 
Polity Continuous variable from -10 (autocracies) to +10 
(democracies)(Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) 
Higher the level of 
democratization lower 
the death rate after 
disasters 
+ 
Politydummy Dummy variable. Democracies = 1. Extracted from Polity 
IV project.  
Democracies have lower 
probability than 
autocracies of having 
deaths after natural 
disasters 
+ 
 
Control variables 
   
Illiteracy Extracted from Barro and Lee, Educational Attainment Dataset (Barro and Lee, 1994) 
Affected ratio  Affected population by total population of the country year  
Log GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita from world bank 
Population under 
14 years old 
From World Bank 
Output Gap Gap between effective GDP and potential GDP.  
Type of disaster 5 dummy variables summarizing the type of disaster: earthquake, droughts, floods, storms and 
mass movements. Extracted from (EM-DAT, 2011). Note that in a year in certain country more 
than one disaster can occur, for that reason they are included as five different variables.  
Count Total of disasters per year per country (EM-DAT, 2011) 
Urban Population 
growth 
From World bank  
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Models 
To study count or rate data Generalized Linear models are generally used, as Poisson, 
Negative Binomial or Zero Inflated Models. A negative binomial regression is applied 
when the Poisson distribution is highly overdispersed (Gelman, 2007). The likelihood 
ratio test for overdispersion in the data shows that alpha is not significantly different 
from zero; therefore we are able to use a Poisson distribution for the analysis. Under the 
Poisson distribution the variance equals the mean; if there is overdispersion we expect 
the variance to be larger.  
Another possible model to predict count variables would be a zero inflated model, used 
to explain both variations between the count results but also the zero number. Because 
the objective of the chapter is to analyze how certain mechanisms operate to reduce the 
number of deaths after disasters, I have decided to keep only the countries that suffered 
from at least one natural disaster and the relevant years following Plumper and 
Neumayer’s (2009) research. For this reason a zero inflated model is not applied in this 
analysis.  
I will add fixed effects, a dummy variable per country, to control for possible differences 
between the countries, assuming that there might be variables out of my model that 
could cause some changes in my coefficients. I also include a time trend assuming that 
there may be some natural changes in the coefficients due to the time.  
The empirical analysis is divided in two main parts. Firstly a model is presented 
introducing the demographic, social and economical variables that might determine 
vulnerability towards disasters at the country level. The variables included respond to 
previous research carried out in the field although not always tested for Latin America. 
The second part of the analysis proposes testing for the three hypotheses introduced in 
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this chapter. It includes social capital, aid and public spending as enhancers of the 
adaptive capacity of the countries, and mitigation mechanisms of the impact of disasters.  
Because of the lack of availability of independent variables for all the countries and 
years, the number of cases of the models fluctuate from between 170 cases, in the model 
of social capital, to 475 cases in the model predicting determinants of vulnerability.  
The model of social capital, the one with less number of cases, includes 14 countries, 
with values from 1996 to 2008, although not for every country and every year. For most 
of the countries I hold data for 12 repetitive observations.  
The models for international aid and public spending are more extensive and include 
data from 1970 to 2008, for 20 countries. The regression includes 389 cases.  
Ideally the higher the number of cases and repetitions during time, the more accurate the 
results are likely to be. Beck (2001) points out there is no lower limit to the number of 
cases but in general around 14 repeated observations are used. He further suggests that 
the central concern should be the number of repeated observations and not necessarily 
the number of countries included in the sample (if included as fixed effects). Therefore, 
taking into consideration these aspects, when reading the results for the social capital 
model caution should be taken in the analysis of the regression results. However, 
through the inclusion of fixed effects and several repetitions for country and year I can 
be seen to be strictly controlling for possible misleading results.  
The equation of the model is: 
yi,t = b1 + b2xi,t2 + b3xi,t3 + ei,t for i=1,2 and t=1, . . . , 20 
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Empirical results and Discussion 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the social and economical determinants of social 
vulnerability to natural disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean. As predicted, 
natural disasters do not impact in equal ways among the countries, and the dissimilarities 
can be identified in the social, economical and political characteristics of the nations. 
Firstly, urbanization levels do have an impact on the likelihood of being affected by 
natural disasters. At a 1% increase of the urban population per year the ratio of dead 
population by disasters increases by 1.26, holding every other variable constant. The 
increasing demographic pressure on the cities has as a consequence a decrease in the 
quality of life of the population. In 1970 only half of the population of Latin America 
lived in urban areas, whereas in 1995 the percentage was 73% reaching 79% in 2010 
(CEPAL, 2010a). Those with fewer resources are marginalized to the periphery of the 
cities and construct their houses in precarious conditions, in general with fragile 
materials and in lands more prone to floods or mass movements. In addition to 
urbanization, a second possible determinant of the death rate constitutes the age of the 
population. As the proportion of youth rises there is an increase in the death rate after a 
natural disaster, holding every other variable constant. For every one unit that the 
percentage of children increases, the death toll rate increases by 0.53 (p < 0.01). 
Countries with high levels of young amongst their population appear to suffer more 
deaths after natural disasters.  
Another relevant socio demographic variable is population density. Results presented in 
Table 4 indicate that a higher population density raises the death rate after a natural 
disaster. A one percent increase of the population density leads to an increase of the 
death rate by 0.06, holding everything else constant (p <0.01).  
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Health levels of the population before natural disasters have been seen as one of the 
determinants of social vulnerability to disasters (Birkmann, 2006; Schneiderbauer, 2004). 
Countries with a strong healthcare system are more capable of coping with disasters 
subsequently leading to a decrease in deaths. One variable that could represent health 
status within the country is Child Mortality, measured through a mortality rate per 1000 
live births among a population less than 5 years old. The indicator is a leading indicator 
of the level of health among children and also used as an overall development measure 
for countries and is included as an indicator in the Millennium Development Goals 
(U.N., 2006). Results from the regression indicate that the higher levels of mortality 
within the country, then the higher the death rate after a natural event. At one unit the 
mortality rate increases with the dead population increasing by 0.05.  
Levels of illiteracy within the country constitute another crucial and fundamental 
determinant of social vulnerability to natural disasters. Countries with higher levels of 
education tend to suffer fewer deaths after disasters, being in general more prepared and 
possessing more tools to cope with and mitigate the impact of potential disasters. Table 
4 shows a positive relationship between illiteracy levels and the rate of the dead 
population after disasters. For every one unit that the illiteracy rate increases the rate of 
dead population of disasters increases by 0.10, holding every other variable constant.  I 
argue that education lowers the levels of vulnerability to disasters through several 
mechanisms. Firstly, being educated implies also being informed about the risks and 
challenges that the society faces. Preparedness techniques implemented by the country 
are more successful in contexts where the population is more aware and informed about 
the risks and possible consequences of natural disasters. Secondly, more educated people 
also possess more tools to react earlier and faster to the disaster, not only with general 
healthcare and emergency medical attention but also by being aware of the risks arising 
after natural disasters such as sanitation and health problems.  
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Moving now to the economical determinants, GDP growth of countries seems to have a 
huge impact on the rate of deaths after disasters. A one percent shift in GDP is 
associated with a decrease in the death rate by -21.9, holding everything else constant. 
Economic growth appears to operate as an economic insurance against the impact of 
disasters. The output gap, that is the difference between potential GDP and the actual 
GDP that the country has, is significantly correlated with the rate of deaths after 
disasters. A one unit increase of output gap is associated with an increase in the death 
rate by 0.08, controlled by other variables.  
As a final economic dimension, I include the percentage of GDP due to agriculture. 
GDP in agriculture is associated with higher rates of deaths after disasters. With a one 
percent increase of GDP in agriculture the death rate increases by 0.270. In conclusion, 
both socio-demographic and economical variables do determine the likelihood of the 
population dying from natural disasters. Urbanization levels, education, health quality, 
age distribution, GDP per capita and growth determine the impact that disasters have on 
Latin American countries.  
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Table 4: Socio demographic and economic determinants of deaths caused by natural 
disasters  
 Model 1 
Urban population growth (annual %) 1.26*** 
                (0.34) 
Population under 14 years old 0.53*** 
                (0.15) 
Population density 0.06*** 
                 (0.02) 
Under-5 Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Live Births)                    0.05** 
                  (0.02) 
Illiteracy  0.10*** 
                     (0.03) 
GDP growth per capita -21.95*** 
                (4.50) 
Log GDP per capita                -0.16 
                 (1.49) 
Output Gap 0.08*** 
                (0.02) 
% Of GDP due to agriculture  0.27*** 
                (0.05) 
Affected by total population 16.43*** 
                 (1.11) 
Number of natural disasters 1.09*** 
                (0.24) 
Droughts -3.02*** 
                (0.59) 
Earthquakes               -0.43 
                (0.49) 
Floods               -0.64 
                (0.44) 
Storms -1.76*** 
                (0.65) 
Mass movements                0.60 
                (0.62) 
Year 0.47*** 
                 (0.09) 
Fixed effects (Country dummies)              Yes 
  
Constant             -979.1*** 
 (173.3) 
  
Observations 475 
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Social capital and Natural Disasters  
This section is focused on testing the hypothesis that social capital enhances the adaptive 
capacity of the countries and attenuates the impact of natural disasters on the 
population. Following the theoretical argument presented in Chapter II, I maintain that 
societies hold a certain adaptive capacity, or potential, to prepare, adapt and cope with 
natural disasters. Human beings are not passive or mere victims of an external threat but 
instead are social actors, capable of responding and reacting to the impact of natural 
disasters. In this thesis, I argue that social capital is one of the most relevant mechanisms 
for mitigating the impact of possible natural disasters. I further propose that the manner 
in which social capital operates varies regarding the type of social capital between ties 
between individuals (bonding social capital) and ties between groups and segments of 
the population (Putnam, 2001).  
Results support the hypothesis that bonding social capital decreases the likelihood of 
being affected by a natural disaster, holding constant all the other determinants of 
vulnerability. The first model (1, Table 5) includes interpersonal trust as a measure of 
bonding social capital and a predictor of deaths after natural disasters. The second model 
incorporates remittances inflows (2) also as a predictor of the strengths of network ties 
between individuals.  
The regression shows that interpersonal trust is associated with a decrease in deaths due 
to natural disasters, holding everything else constant. Focusing on the first equation 
(Model 1) presented in Table 5, results indicate that at a one unit increase of 
interpersonal trust, the rate of deaths after natural disasters decreases by -3.15, with a 
significant coefficient. The trust between individuals seems to mitigate the impact of 
disaster. Also giving an account of bonding social capital, the inflow of remittances from 
abroad appear to have a positive effect in reducing the number of deaths after natural 
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disasters (Model 2). Both concepts of horizontal network strength, interpersonal trust 
and remittance flow, do decrease the number of deaths after disasters, holding 
everything else constant.  
In sum, I found evidence to confirm that both bonding social capital decrease the death 
rate from natural disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean. Higher levels of 
interpersonal trust and remittance inflows lower the death rate, holding every other 
variable constant.   
Table 5: Bonding Social Capital and deaths by natural disasters.  Poisson Regression.  
           Model 1            Model 2 
Interpersonal Trust -3.15** -3.67** 
 (1.55) (1.50) 
Remittances inflow  -0.00* 
  (0.00) 
Polity dummy -0.19 -0.16 
 (0.70) (0.75) 
Illiteracy 0.26*** 0.22** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Affected per population 18.39*** 19.14*** 
 (1.24) (1.31) 
Output Gap -0.16*** -0.18*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Urban population growth (annual %) 1.58** 1.92** 
 (0.79) (0.82) 
Population  5.92 5.56 
 (7.06) (7.58) 
Population under 14 years old -0.30 -0.36* 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
Log GDP per capita 14.94*** 16.88*** 
 (5.15) (5.47) 
Year -0.25 -0.27 
 (0.24) (0.26) 
Country dummies Yes Yes  
Number of disasters 0.61*** 0.63*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
Droughts -0.88* -0.89* 
 (0.52) (0.53) 
Earthquake -0.20 -0.25 
 (0.29) (0.30) 
Floods -0.66* -0.73* 
 (0.40) (0.39) 
Storms 0.72** 0.70** 
 (0.28) (0.29) 
Mass movement -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.27) (0.28) 
Constant 267.83 294.92 
 (371.45) (395.19) 
Observations 17013 170 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The next model presented in Table 6 captures the strength of civil society or 
interrelations between different segments of the population (bridging social capital) 
within the country as a determinant of deaths by natural disasters (Model 3). The 
prediction is that higher levels of civil society participation and involvement lower the 
                                                          
13
 Due to the lack of data for interpersonal trust for every year and every country the number of cases is reduced to 
170.  
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death rate from natural disasters. The model presented in Table 6 includes two variables 
to measure the involvement of civil society: participation in demonstrations and a civil 
liberties index. Results suggest that at a one unit increase of the quantity of 
demonstrations per year the death rate after disasters decreases by -0.37, holding every 
other variable constant. The second variable included in the analysis, as a proxy of 
bridging social capital, is the index of civil liberties, which measures freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state, also has a decreasing effect of the number 
of casualties. Regression results show that for every one unit that the index of liberties 
increases, the rate of deaths after natural disasters decreases by -0.48. These results 
support the prediction that higher the levels of political involvement and participation 
lower the amount of casualties after disasters. Societies with high levels of participation 
can apply more pressure on governments to better prepare for possible natural disasters. 
Protests and demonstrations can become a measure to communicate demands to 
institutions and nation states, and to demand the implementation of a transparent, 
inclusive and participative reconstruction process. Furthermore, once the disaster has 
occurred, high levels of participation and civil involvement can determine a more 
efficient and speedier recovery process. Any plan designed without community 
involvement could fail if does not contemplate the needs and context of the affected 
population. Social participation and involvement in the reconstruction process is 
increasingly seen as fundamental in easing the impact of disasters (Nakagawa and Shaw, 
2004; Pulgar, 2010). From a policy point of view, results indicate that any work done in 
empowering the local community and civil society can reduce the effects of natural 
disasters, both before and after they occur.  
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Table 6: Bridging Social Capital and deaths by natural disasters.  Poisson Regression.  
    Model 3 
  
Number of Demonstrations within the country  -0.37*** 
                               (0.12) 
Index of Civil Liberties -0.48** 
 (0.22) 
Polity dummy 1.13 
 (0.75) 
Illiteracy 0.24*** 
 (0.04) 
Affected per population 13.87*** 
 (1.30) 
Output Gap 0.05 
 (0.03) 
Urban population growth (annual %) 0.51 
 (0.36) 
Population  -6.65 
 (8.41) 
Population under 14 years old 0.45** 
 (0.19) 
Log GDP per capita -8.08*** 
 (2.66) 
Year 0.39*** 
 (0.09) 
Country dummies    Yes  
Number of disasters 1.44*** 
 (0.30) 
Droughts -2.88*** 
 (0.82) 
Earthquake -0.95** 
 (0.48) 
Floods -1.90*** 
 (0.50) 
Storms -1.55*** 
 (0.48) 
Mass movement -0.007 
 (0.46) 
Constant -744.0*** 
 (178.2) 
  
Observations 335 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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International Aid and Public Spending   
In this section I propose an empirical model that predicts the death rate from natural 
disasters in relation to different levels of international aid and public spending, thus 
testing the hypotheses that higher levels of international aid and public spending lower 
the amount of deaths from natural disasters, conditional on the political regime. 
Firstly, I study whether governments, through public spending, can stimulate the 
adaptive capacity of societies to natural disasters. Governments are mainly responsible 
for instigating preparedness measures among countries. I argue that they attenuate a 
possible impact of disasters both through mitigation of the determinants of vulnerability 
(increases in education, healthcare coverage, unemployment insurances, organized 
urbanization processes) or through direct intervention to prepare for a possible 
occurrence of a disaster as information dissemination, construction codes, and the 
implementation of early warning systems. Secondly, public spending is also crucial after 
disasters. Governments can choose between targeting certain segments of the 
population, through meeting particular demands, or can also provide public goods, such 
as shelter, healthcare coverage and food provision to all the affected population. Public 
spending is needed in the reconstruction process, through the provision of permanent 
solutions, reconstruction of roads, communications and restoring the economy. 
However, not every political context gives rise to public spending having an impact on 
reducing the number of deaths in the population. I predict that public spending is more 
efficient in reducing deaths due to natural disasters in democratic governments. 
Different investigations have demonstrated that democracies tend to be more effective 
in reducing the impacts of natural disasters (Besley, 2002; Kahn, 2005; Plümper and 
Neumayer, 2009; Stromberg, 2007). Democratic governments have more incentives to 
provide public goods to respond and recover from natural disasters.  
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Second, I predict that international aid can also stimulate the adaptation capacity of 
societies through several mechanisms before, during and after the occurrence of 
disasters. Programs and plans from the international community implemented to prepare 
a society for disasters are often the only source of funding developing countries can 
receive. These preparation mechanisms could imply the spreading of awareness within 
the population or even direct changes in constructions or infrastructures. After disasters 
occur, humanitarian aid is fundamental in implementing search and rescue operations 
and ensuring early attention to the affected population. Finally, long term reconstruction 
could involve huge amounts of funding that national governments are unable to spend.  
As discussed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, I further argue that the 
democratization level of a country determine the differential effectiveness of the 
distribution of humanitarian aid. Within autocracies aid encounters fewer obstacles to 
redistribution and the allotting of funds to the affected population. In addition 
intervention tends to be more direct and free from governmental control or supervision.  
Table 7, Model 1, shows that public spending tends to be more effective in reducing 
deaths among democracies than autocracies. In autocracies, government spending does 
not have a significant effect on decreasing the death toll, however results change when 
an interaction term with democracies is included. The interaction term between domestic 
spending and regime type (in a dummy variable) became negative and significant. The 
results therefore support the hypothesis that among democracies public spending 
appears to be more effective in reducing the death toll than in autocracies, holding 
everything else constant.  
To further analyze these mechanisms the next model (Model 2, Table 7) includes both 
public spending levels and international aid within the country. Results show that public 
spending within the country decreases the levels of deaths after disasters, as well as 
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international aid, both with significant results. Illiteracy levels are still included in this 
model to control by education levels within the country. Results demonstrate that if we 
keep constant public spending by the government, and every other independent variable, 
a dollar increase of international aid leads to the death rate decreasing by -0.02.  In the 
same direction, keeping constant international aid, an increase of one unit in the 
domestic spending would decrease the death toll from natural disasters by -0.14. In sum, 
both public spending and aid are effective, although the effectiveness varies regarding 
the regime type of the country.  
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Table 7: Public spending and deaths by natural disasters. Poisson regression. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Government spending -0.08* -0.14** 
 (0.04) (0.06) 
International aid per capita  -0.02** 
  (0.006) 
Polity dummy 2.28 -0.07 
 (1.64) (0.77) 
Government spending*polity dummy -0.14**  
 (0.07)  
Illiteracy 0.22*** 0.23*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Affected per population 13.09*** 12.20*** 
 (2.78) (2.55) 
Outputgap -0.06** -0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Population (Logan) 8.72* 13.22** 
 (6.47) (7.32) 
Urban population growth 0.75* 0.14 
 (0.49) (0.42) 
Population under 14 years old 0.56** 0.79** 
 (0.28) (0.32) 
Log GDP per capita 1.33 0.76 
 (1.10) (1.12) 
Year 0.31*** 0.35*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) 
Number of disasters 1.37*** 1.32*** 
 (0.38) (0.37) 
Droughts -3.35*** -3.47*** 
 (0.95) (0.99) 
Earthquake -0.60 -0.47 
 (0.62) (0.64) 
Floods -0.99** -0.79 
 (0.49) (0.48) 
Storms -1.87** -1.83** 
 (0.82) (0.78) 
Mass movement -0.20 -0.39 
 (0.56) (0.59) 
Constant -667.9*** -754.4*** 
 (239.6) (262.9) 
   
Observations 38914 389 
 
 
Supporting these results, Table 8 provides strong evidence to support the hypothesis 
that international aid decreases the number of deaths after natural disasters (Model 1, 
Table 8). Holding everything else constant, every dollar of international aid decreases the 
death rate by -0.02, keeping constant all the other variables. Model 2 (Table 8) includes 
                                                          
14 Data on Government spending in Latin America and the Caribbean is limited. This variable integrates two different 
sources, World Bank and IMF, but anyway decreases the amount of cases of the total equation to 389.  
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an interaction term with democratization levels, to study if democracies attenuate or 
reinforce the effectiveness of aid on the death toll. The results show that international 
aid is more effective in reducing deaths in autocracies, where democracy is not 
consolidated. In cases where international aid is null, higher levels of democratization 
leads to fewer people dying after disasters. However, the interaction term shows a 
positive effect on deaths, indicating that the higher the level of democratization. the 
impact of aid in reducing the death toll tend towards 0. As suggested in the theoretical 
argument of the thesis, aid organizations may encounter more freedom of action in 
weaker governments where they can design and implement policies without further 
consultation processes. This aspect of international aid has been widely criticized by 
pointing out that the process should be integrated with national governments and civil 
society, and not consist of a unilateral set of decisions without the integration of the 
affected population (Lizana, 2011; Pankaj, 2005; Rey, 2001; Woods, 2005). The result of 
the regression captures that in stronger democracies the direct impact of aid on reducing 
the death toll is not as powerful as in autocracies, where international agencies mainly 
dictate the implementation.  
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 Table 8: International Aid and death rate from natural disasters. Poisson regression. 
  Model 2 Model 3 
   
   
International aid per capita -0.02*** -0.05*** 
 (0.007) (0.02) 
Polity dummy 0.07 -0.70 
 (0.35) (0.49) 
Aid*polity dummy  0.04* 
  (0.02) 
Illiteracy 0.05* 0.04* 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Affected per population 16.16*** 15.43*** 
 (1.38) (1.43) 
Outputgap -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Population (Logan) 9.08* 9.57** 
 (4.86) (4.85) 
Urban population growth 1.64*** 1.60*** 
 (0.34) (0.33) 
Population under 14 years old 0.09 0.15 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
Log GDP per capita -1.68 -1.44 
 (1.19) (1.18) 
Year 0.15** 0.16*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Number of disasters 0.52** 0.54** 
 (0.27) (0.26) 
Droughts -2.69*** -2.62*** 
 (0.63) (0.61) 
Earthquake -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.73) (0.73) 
Floods -0.12 -0.10 
 (0.49) (0.48) 
Storms -0.92 -1.06 
 (0.82) (0.79) 
Mass movement 0.36 0.30 
 (0.70) (0.69) 
Constant -308.1** -323.5*** 
 (124.9) (118.1) 
   
Observations 538 538 
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4. Conclusions  
 
Results of this chapter suggest that the social, political and economical structures of the 
country determine a differential impact of natural disaster. Urbanization levels and 
population density increase the death rate due to natural disasters. Additionally, the age 
composition of the countries is related to a differential impact of natural disasters; the 
greater proportion of children within the country the greater the number of deaths from 
natural disasters. Furthermore, the healthcare levels in the country and education 
achievements are potential determinants of the probability of dying due to natural 
disasters. Finally, economic variables, such as GDP per capita, GDP growth and GDP in 
agriculture function as mitigation mechanisms for the impact of natural disasters.  
Apart from the determinants, the findings in this chapter confirm the predictions that 
social capital, international aid and public spending shape levels of the adaptive capacity 
of societies to cope with natural disasters, at least at the country level. These findings 
have theoretical and empirical implications. Firstly, from a theoretical point of view, 
acknowledging the relevance of the affected society as capable of mitigating a possible 
impact of disasters is fundamental for the further development of disaster research. The 
discussion regarding the role of societies and possible responses should certainly include 
social capital as a major dimension of the inherent adaptive capacity. Furthermore, it 
seems relevant to study further the ways in which international aid and domestic 
spending are implemented among different countries. The results in this chapter indicate 
that both are effective in reducing the death rate although with differential success 
among democracies and autocracies. The democratization level seems to be a crucial 
mediator of the efficiency of aid, both domestic and international, in reducing the 
number of casualties after natural disasters. It has been argued that international aid, at 
  
89 
least food aid, was more effective in reducing famine mortality in democracies than in 
autocracies (Plümper and Neumayer, 2009). However, my results suggest that 
humanitarian aid is more effective in reducing deaths in autocracies than in democracies, 
at least in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, one possible explanation can be that the aim of a 
democratic government is to be reelected, and the manner in which a government deals 
(or does not) with a natural disaster can determine if a part of their constituency is lost. 
On the contrary, autocracies respond to the demands of elites without a direct incentive 
to increase spending. In this sense, democracies have the stimulus both to increase 
spending and to take the lead in the reconstruction process. Autocracies, on the other 
hand, carry all the incentives to reduce government spending and to allow international 
organizations, bringing international aid, to intervene in the countries when they suffer a 
natural disaster. Secondly, the effectiveness of aid, or lack of it, might reveal the 
difficulties international organizations encounter in successfully providing assistance 
through strong national governments. These difficulties might be caused by a lack of 
adaptation skills in each country context or by more constraints emplaced by powerful 
governments on the implementation of aid.  
These predictions are further studied in the following two chapters at the micro level 
with the selection of two case studies, the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes in 2010.  
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IV. Chile and Haiti: The earthquakes 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapter III empirically tested the role of international aid, public spending and social 
capital as possible attenuates of deaths due to natural disasters at an aggregated level of 
analysis (countries). This chapter, and the following, aims to explore how social capital, 
humanitarian aid and public spending enhance the adaptive capacity of societies and 
decrease the levels of social vulnerability to natural disasters at an individual level. The 
objective of this micro analysis is to disaggregate the micro foundations behind the 
results found at the country level and to better understand the role of social capital, 
disaster relief aid and public spending in attenuating the impact of disasters. With this 
purpose in mind, two case studies are selected: Haiti and Chile.  
In 2010, Latin America experienced two of the most devastating earthquakes ever-
recorded in the history of human kind, the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes. In Haiti 270 
thousand people died and millions were affected generating a humanitarian crisis in the 
already extremely poor country. In Chile 520 people died and thousands were displaced 
or affected in other ways, increasing the levels of poverty and inequality already existing 
in the country.   
This chapter describes the main impacts of the quakes on the two societies. It also 
analyzes the role of social capital, public spending and humanitarian aid in the 
preparedness, response and reconstruction process after the quakes. The following 
chapter empirically tests the role of social capital by introducing two models: , 
humanitarian aid and public spending relating to the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes. 
The objective of including both countries is not to make a direct comparison between 
  
91 
the impacts of the quakes on each society, but instead to study how previous levels of 
aid, spending and social capital determine a different outcome in two different countries 
that suffer the same type of natural disaster.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I present a discussion of the decisions 
behind the selection of Haiti and Chile as cases studies. Second, I describe the main 
social and economic impacts of both earthquakes on the given societies. Finally, I 
provide an account of the roles of social capital, humanitarian aid and public spending in 
the preparedness and reconstruction process after the two earthquakes.  
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2. Case Study selection  
 
The selection of Haiti and Chilean earthquakes as case studies for this thesis is grounded 
in three main dimensions. Firstly, both countries suffered the same natural event within 
a couple of months, with almost similar intensity. Each type of natural disaster affects 
societies in dissimilar ways and therefore, causing different consequences. For example, 
in the case of floods or droughts which tend to develop slower, sometimes even 
spanning several months, more time is available for communities, governments and the 
international community to respond. In the case of earthquakes which tend to happen 
within the space of a few hours but with devastating results, a country can be left almost 
immediately without electricity, water supply and suffer extreme infrastructural damage. 
Taking this into account, it seems relevant to include two case studies that suffered the 
same type of disaster.  
A second reason to include both countries is found in their differential levels of 
international aid, public spending, democratization and social capital – crucial tools to 
mitigate the impact of natural disasters and the main theoretical argument of this thesis. 
Concerning international aid, prior to the earthquake Haiti was already played host to 
hundreds of NGOs and international organizations, and was one of the most significant 
recipients of humanitarian aid from the international community. In Chile, despite the 
presence of several NGOs within the country, international aid was considerably less. 
According to data from the World Bank, the Net Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) per capita, the measure of the amount of aid given by international donors, for 
Chile in 2009 was 4.7 (US dollars) against 113.59 (US dollars) per capita in Haiti during 
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the same year 15. In 2010, after the quakes, the ODA increased to 3021 (US dollars) for 
Haiti and to just 198 (US dollars) for Chile. The levels of public spending in both 
countries also substantially differ. Chilean levels of spending per capita in $US for 1998 
is 289 whereas the same indicator for Haiti is 21 (World Bank Indicators).  
Regarding democratization levels, based on the widely used Polity IV project (2009), the 
Haitian regime scores 6 in a scale that ranges from -10, for autocratic governments, to 10 
for democratic systems. However, Chile scores a 10, as a stronger democratic system. 
Associated to democratic institutionalization, the civil liberties index from Freedom 
House presents an integrated index from 1 (min) to 7 (max) measuring civil and political 
liberties within the country. Haiti holds a 1.5 index of civil liberties whereas for Chile the 
score is 5 (FreedomHouse, 2009).  
 
With reference to social capital, both countries considerably differ in their levels of civil 
participation (bridging social capital) and interpersonal trust (bonding social capital), 
variables selected to operationalize the concept of social capital at the aggregated level of 
analysis. Haitian society appears to have higher levels of civil engagement than the 
Chilean. In Haiti, 11% of the population in 2010 declared participating in meetings for 
community improvement, committees or associations at least once or twice a month 
(Table 9). In Chile, in response to the same question, the level of participation just 
reaches 2%, being similar to the 2008 results (LAPOP, 2010).  
 
                                                          
15 Net official development assistance (ODA) per capita consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional 
terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and 
welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients; and is calculated by dividing net ODA received 
by the midyear population estimate. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of 
discount of 10%). Data are in current U.S. dollars.  
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Table 9: Participation in meetings for community improvement, committees or 
associations during the last year 
 Haiti Chile 
 2008 2010 2008 2010 
Once a week 10.9 11.2 2.1 2.3 
Once or twice a month 21.4 26.9 7.0 11.2 
Once or twice a year 24.0 18.4 15.4 15.6 
Never 43.6 43.5 75.5 70.9 
     
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: LAPOP survey, Haiti 
In contrast, regarding bonding social capital, Chilean society seems more trustful than 
Haitian, based on the LAPOP survey results. In Haiti, during 2010, in response to the 
question of how trustworthy their social environment is, only 2% declared that they 
believe it ‘is very trustworthy’ (Table 10). whereas 27% of Chileans consider their social 
environment to be very ‘trustworthy’ (LAPOP, 2010) (Table 11).  
Table 10: Interpersonal Trust, Haiti (LAPOP surveys) 
 2006 2008 2010 
    
Very trustworthy 14.11 8.72 2.1 
Somewhat trustworthy 21.29 30.2 18.89 
Not very trustworthy 42.32 36.78 53.12 
Untrustworthy 22.28 24.3 25.89 
    
Total 100 100 100 
Source: LAPOP survey, Haiti 
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Table 11: Interpersonal trust, Chile.  
 2006 2008 2010 
Very trustworthy 24.2 20.9 27.3 
Somewhat 
trustworthy 
39.1 39.8 44.3 
Not very trustworthy 26.9 28.8 19.2 
Untrustworthy 9.8 10.5 9.2 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
Source: LAPOP, Chile  
 
In conclusion, Haiti holds higher levels of bridging social capital, referring to the 
strength of the network ties between segments of the population, and Chile has higher 
levels of bonding social capital, referring to network strength between individuals 
(Putnam, 2001). 
Table 12 summarizes how Haiti and Chile differentiate in the main independent variables 
and theoretical arguments of this thesis.  
Table 12: Case Selection. Institutional and Coping Mechanisms of Adaptive Capacity. 
Chile and Haiti.  
 Haiti Chile 
Humanitarian Aid + - 
Public Spending - + 
Democratization Levels - + 
Interpersonal Trust (bonding social capital) - + 
Social Participation (bridging social capital)  + - 
 
Despite these reasons, several constraints on analysis can be found when studying the 
Haitian and Chilean earthquakes. Firstly, both countries differ in the availability of data 
prior to and following the earthquake. After the earthquake, in March 2010, the Haitian 
Government designed an ‘Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of 
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Haiti’(PDNA, 2010a) summarizing not only the main impacts of the quake but also a 
plan for the reconstruction process. But despite this report, Haiti does not collect annual 
data on the social and economical conditions of the population and no statistical studies 
were carried out before and after the earthquake. The Institute of Statistics (Institut 
Haitien de Statistique et d´informatique, IHSI) carries a survey of the social life 
conditions of the population conducted in 2003 and a report on the Objectives of the 
Millennium from 2009, however both are based on projections and estimations (IHSI, 
2009). Moreover, the last measure of poverty available for the country, in the World 
Bank Indicators, is from 2001 (with 77% of the population beneath the poverty line).  
 
A public opinion survey that has been implemented four times in Haiti by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, Venderbilt University)and constitutes almost 
the only source of statistical data in the country. In 2010 LAPOP applied a post 
earthquake public opinion survey, in which I base most of the Haitian analysis.  
 
Chile´s data availability is considerably better. The National Institute of Statistics (INE), 
belonging to the Chilean Government, provides monthly information on social and 
economic variables. The Instituite conducts a monthly household survey and census 
every five years, subsequently making the datasets available to the public. Apart from the 
INE, many other institutions gather and produce public data, such as the ECLAC 
(Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean), with headquarters in 
the Chilean capital Santiago. In addition, the Ministry of Education conducts an annual 
panel survey ‘Casen’ (CASEN, 2010) that studies the socioeconomic conditions of 
Chilean households. After the earthquake Casen was applied to assess the 
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socioeconomic impact on the population, in which I base my analysis of the impact of 
the Chilean earthquake.  
 
The differences in the type of data suggest that I am unable to apply the same method of 
analysis for both countries. For the Chilean case I study the impact of the earthquake on 
the population via a panel survey, for Haiti I simulate and estimate the results based on 
the available public opinion surveys.  
 
The second constraint on the selection of Haiti and Chile as cases studies is the fact that 
both countries are diametrically different in their pre-social and economic conditions. 
The levels of poverty, health conditions, and expectancy of life, among many other 
indicators, are extremely dissimilar, suggesting very different social realities for the two 
societies.  
The analysis of both countries has, nevertheless, important contributions. Firstly, despite 
the political and social differences between the countries, the quakes left thousands 
homeless, caused numerous health problems, the disruption of education and an 
increase in poverty levels both in Haiti and Chile. At a political level, it also revealed the 
difficulties that both governments faced in implementing a rapid and effective 
reconstruction plan. Secondly, the aim of this chapter is not to make a direct comparison 
between both case studies but instead to showcase how different levels of international 
aid, public spending and social capital do have an effect in lessening the impact, not only 
at the country level as demonstrated in last chapter, but also at the individual level.  
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3. The earthquakes 
 
Chile is one of the richest countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, with one of the 
highest GDP per capita in the region, ranking 44 out of 187 countries in the Human 
Development Index (UNDP, 2011), it has a population of 17.3 million and a life 
expectancy of 79 for men and 82 for women.  On February 27, 2010, Chile suffered an 
8.8 Richter scale earthquake with its epicenter in the region of Maule and Biobio. 
According to International Disaster Datasets EM-DAT (2011), 525 people died, 12,000 
were injured, 800,000 were displaced and around 370,000 houses, 4,013 schools, 79 
hospitals and 4,200 boats were damaged or destroyed after the earthquake and 
subsequent tsunami. In sum, a total of 1.8 million people were affected in the areas of 
Araucania, Bio-Bio, Maule, O´Higgins, Region Metropolitana and Valparaiso (Unidad de 
Evaluación de Desastres, 2010) with a total economic loss estimated at 30 billion US 
dollars (EM-DAT, 2011). 
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake impacted on Haiti, one month before 
the Chilean earthquake. Almost 230,000 people were killed, making it one of the most 
harmful and deadliest earthquakes in the history of natural disasters (EM-DAT, 2011).. 
According to the Environmental Hazard Program (USGS), 222,570 were killed, 300,000 
injured, 1.3 million displaced, 97,294 houses destroyed and 188,383 damaged. The pre-
existent levels of poverty together with the lack of institutional and political stability 
created a chaotic and critical situation in the country in the earthquake’s wake. Almost 
80% of the schools in the capital of Haiti were destroyed or damaged (UNDP, 2010), 
and 60% of government and administrative buildings were destroyed.  
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Based on the Richter scale, the Chilean earthquake was of higher intensity (8.8) than the 
one in Haiti (7.0); however the impact on the population was disparate. The number of 
population dead in Haiti climbed to 230,000 against 525 people in Chile. Not only did 
the existing economic, political and social conditions of the countries determine a 
differential impact on the population from the same type of natural event, but also 
attenuated or reinforced the social consequences of the quakes.  
In both countries the earthquakes affected millions of people and those that survived, 
found themselves in a very difficult and critical situation. In this section I briefly describe 
the main impacts of the earthquakes, not with the intention to be exhaustive but to 
showcase the main social and economical consequences on the population.  
Health 
Based on a post earthquake survey conducted by the Chilean government a few months 
after the quake (CASEN, 2010), 3% of the population suffered from health problems 
related to the earthquake (Table 13). It is important to observe that despite the Chilean 
earthquake being one of the strongest earthquakes recorded in history, 97% of the 
population reported that they did not suffer from any health problem related to the 
event. Besides the effect on the population, there were also consequences on the 
healthcare infrastructure. The earthquake affected a total amount of 28 hospitals or 
health institutions.  
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Table 13: Health problem suffered in the last month, per region (Chile) 
 Yes, as a 
consequence of the 
earthquake 
Yes, but not as a 
consequence of the 
earthquake 
No Total 
Valparaiso 2.5 12.4 85 100 
O´Higgins  3.4 8.1 88.3 100 
Maule 4.7 10.6 84.5 100 
Bio Bio 5.5 11.0 83.4 100 
La Araucania 2.4 11.4 86.0 100 
Metropolitan Region 2.2 7.0 90.7 100 
Rest of the country 0.9 9.6 89.4 100 
Total 2.9 9.9 87.1 100 
Source: Author, based on Post Earthquake Survey (CASEN, 2010) 
 
The health situation after the earthquake in Haiti was significantly more severe than in 
Chile. After the earthquake, cholera spread in Haiti, infecting over 500,000 people and 
killing over 7000. The disease was spread through drinking and eating contaminated 
water and food and was related to the poor conditions the population was forced to live 
in after the earthquake. The most obvious reason for the outbreak of cholera was that 
over a million people were living in densely populated camps, with poor access to clean 
water and food. International and national aid organizations attempted to reduce the 
level of mortality due to the disease, designating funds not only to take care of the sick 
population but also to prevent further contamination.  The annual hurricane season 
arrived a few months after the quake, generating floods and aggravating the spread of 
cholera throughout the entire country.  Apart from the impact of the earthquake on the 
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population, the quake also damaged over 27% of the healthcare infrastructure, 
diminishing the amount of available medical personnel and further deteriorating the 
capacity of the healthcare system. The following graphs show cholera hospitalizations 
and deaths by December 2011, based on data from the Ministry of Health in Haiti.   
Graph 2: Cholera Hospitalizations in Haiti after the earthquake in 2010 
 
Source: Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (MSPP) 
 
Education 
The impact of the quakes on the education system, and therefore on children, was 
enormous in both countries; however, the previous fragile condition of education in 
Haiti determined much more severe consequences.  
Before the earthquake, the literacy level among those in the population older than 15 
years in Haiti reached 52%, whereas in Chile the level reached to 96% of the population 
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(CIA, 2010).  According to the Haitian Government, over 500,000 children between the 
ages of 6 and 12 were not receiving schooling before the earthquake and 70% of those 
attending school had an education deficit (PDNA, 2010a). 
After the quake many schools were destroyed in Haiti and the NGOs constructed 
temporary learning spaces in camps. According to the Ministry of Education, 4,992 
schools were totally destroyed, 24% of the total amount in the country and a total of 
38,000 students and 1527 lost their lives in the quake (UNDP, 2010). The Ministry 
calculated that almost 1,000,000 children and teenagers and 55,000 professors were 
affected by the disaster (Louidor, 2011). The government decided to reopen the schools 
at the beginning of March, two months after the quake, but more than 2.9 million boys 
and girls could not start their classes. According to some scholars, the situation of 
education in Haiti was extremely deteriorated by the quake and two years on is still 
struggling to recover (Louidor, 2011; Luzincourt, 2010).  
Public opinion appears to have been affected by the situation of the education system in 
Haiti. Based on the LAPOP survey (2010), conducted five months after the earthquake, 
in response to the question of which priorities the government should adopt in 
rebuilding the country, 66% of interviewees answered ‘building schools’ as the main 
priority over the creation of jobs (15%) and neighborhood security (3%) (Table 14).  
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Table 14: Actions the national government should be taking to rebuild the country. Haiti, 
2010  
 Frequency 
  
Building Schools 66.5 
Creating jobs 15.0 
Roads construction 6.2 
Neighborhood security 3.2 
Potable water 1.8 
Electricity and energy 1.7 
Access to health care 0.9 
Housing 0.9 
Environmental 3.0 
Capacity of the national government 0.4 
Capacity of the local government  0.1 
Other priorities 0.3 
  
Total 100 
Source: LAPOP survey, Haiti 2010 
 
The situation of the education system in Chile prior to the earthquake was utterly 
different. The literacy rate for the population older than 15 years old within the country 
reached 99% and the matriculation rate 95%, according to UNESCO. However, after 
the Chilean quake in February 2010, 24.6% of students in the six affected regions could 
not start the classes in March, as is done every year in Chile. At the epicenter of the 
quake almost 70% of children could not start the classes, and the rates are even more 
severe among the poorest population (CASEN, 2010). Those most affected by the 
natural disaster were people who possessed fewer resources and opportunities. Around 
4.5% of students were forced to change schools because of the tsunami or earthquake, 
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representing close to 117.000 of the total number of school students.  More than half the 
students of the most affected regions started their classes in transitory schools.  
The effects of the earthquake on education in both countries had major social 
consequences. On one hand, children could not continue with their daily lives and lived 
for months under an emergency situation, going to transitory schools in the case of Chile 
or to precarious schools assembled in displacement camps in Haiti. On the other hand, 
keeping children at home meant that fewer possibilities existed for parents to go to 
work, constraining the economic possibilities of families. Despite the education system 
being much more developed in Chile than in the Haitian case, the results suggest that 
schools and children suffered a huge impact after the earthquake, of course not 
comparable to Haiti, but anyway relevant taking into account the levels of GDP and the 
wealth of the country. These results theoretically support the conception that those 
suffering the majority of impacts from the disasters,  those more socially vulnerable were 
people with fewer resources before the disaster occurred. In this case, children and 
families with children suffered enormous consequences due to the earthquake.  
Housing and Displacement 
The impact of the Chilean earthquake on infrastructures and houses was severe and one 
emerged as one of the most devastating consequences of the February 2010 earthquake.  
According to the Ministry of Housing, a total amount of 81,888 houses were totally 
destroyed, 108,914 severely damaged and 179,693 with minor damage (Ministerio de 
Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2010). The majority of the destroyed houses (a total amount of 
13%) were located in the Maule region, which was at the earthquake’s epicenter, 
followed by 6% in the O´Higgins region and 4% in the Bio Bio.   
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The proportion of damaged properties was higher amongst individuals with less income 
per capita. Almost 8% of the houses of the prime quintile of income were destroyed, 
against a 4.8% of the higher quintile (CASEN, 2010). The earthquake affected the 
poorest, with fewer resources to rebuild their houses and also with fewer means of 
affording a new house. After the quake, temporary camps were created to locate the 
800,000 displaced by the earthquake and tsunami. Even in 2012, around 3000 people will 
be forced to spend another winter in these camps with limited access to water, sanitation 
and general well being (Bustamante, 2012; CEME, 2012).  
As in Chile, but on another scale, one of the major consequences of the earthquake in 
Haiti was the number of displaced population. Close to 2.3 million people had to leave 
their homes, 302,000 of them being children.  Around 188,383 houses collapsed and 
almost 105,000 were completely destroyed by the earthquake (UNDP, 2010). After two 
years, half a million Haitians remain living in internally displaced camps, amounting to 
two thirds of the initial population (Migration, 2012). According to the International 
Organization Migration (IOM) this is due to the lack of effective government measures 
to construct and allocate new houses (2012).  
To add even more complexity to the social situation of the displaced population, many 
of the camps were located on private land and during the last two years (2011, 2012) 
there has been an increase in eviction cases from the camps. According to the Human 
Rights Council, it is calculated that around 74% of camps are situated on private land 
(2011). The graphs presented below show the total number of displaced individual per 
month and the overall trend in eviction cases in the camps.  
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Graph 3: Number of displaced and evicted in Haiti after the earthquake in 2010 
 
Source: Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster, Haiti - November 2011 
  
Economy and Unemployment 
The total economic losses were estimated in Chile at 30 billion US dollars by the U.S. 
Geological Survey (2010) and in terms of the general economy a reduction in levels of 
exports and imports occurred. The agricultural sector was severely affected with both 
crop production and infrastructure impaired (Unidad de Evaluación de Desastres 2010). 
The impact of the earthquake and tsunami on these industries was accompanied by job 
losses and especially high levels of unemployment among those belonging to the most 
affected economic sectors.  In these affected regions the population is traditionally 
employed mainly in areas of agriculture and forestry, commerce and the public sector. 
Almost 20% of the population working in the agricultural and forestry sector claimed 
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that their place of work was directly affected by the earthquake, this value rises to 27% 
for the people working in the public sector – possibly due to the damage to 
infrastructure and services. Despite the effects of the earthquake, the Chilean economy 
grew by 5.2% in 2010, with an average growth rate over the last trimester of the year of 
6.4% (Dirección de Presupuesto, 2011).  
In Haiti the impact on the economy was of course much more severe. The Inter 
American Development Bank estimated that the earthquake cost $8.5 billion in damage 
to Haiti´s economy, with a 5.1% contraction of GDP that year.  
According to the Haitian Government, the most affected areas were commerce, 
transport, telecommunications and industry. The inflation was estimated in around 11% 
for 2010, mainly because the reduction in availability of goods and the increase in 
transport costsw  and also as a consequence of the influx of external aid (PDNA, 2010a). 
The Haitians that did survive found themselves in a chaotic and fragile situation 
immediately after the quake. The country’s unemployment rates were already 
exceptionally high before the event at around 30% for the country and 45% in the 
metropolitan area. It was estimated that there was a loss of 8.5% in the number of jobs, 
particularly in the fields of commerce, tourism, transport, and communications (PDNA, 
2010b). The absence of a social security system in Haiti caused the situation to become 
even more fragile for the population made unemployed by the quake. 
Poverty 
Poverty not only constitutes a determinant of the levels of social vulnerability to natural 
disasters, but also represents one of the most important impacts of catastrophes. Both in 
Haiti and Chile, poverty increased after the quake in different magnitudes. This chapter 
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will present a descriptive analysis of the impact of the earthquakes on levels of poverty 
levels within the countries16.  
Before the earthquake in January 2010 Haiti was already one of the poorest countries in 
the western hemisphere. Based on the scarce available data from a survey conducted by 
the government in 2001, 76% of the population of Haiti was living below the poverty 
line, with less than 2 dollars per day, and 56% were below the extreme poverty line, with 
less than 1 dollar per day (Table 15).  
Table 15: Poverty Headcount Haiti by region, 2001 
 Poverty Head Count 
Artibonite 89 
Nippes 87.9 
Nord 84.4 
Nord-Est 94.5 
Nord-Ouest 91.1 
Ouest 62.1 
Sud 87.6 
Sud-Est 84.9 
Source: Poverty in Haiti (Sletten, 2004) 
According to the Haitian government, during the past decade general poverty levels 
decreased in Haiti at more than 8% across the country but increasing up to 13% in the 
metropolitan area (PDNA, 2010a). The same report claims that following the quake 
poverty returned to the 2001 level (71% moderate poverty and 50% extreme poverty), 
based on several estimations (PDNA, 2010a). In a similar direction, according to a report  
produced by Vanderbilt University (Zephyr, 2011) supporting the results of the LAPOP 
survey (2010), levels of wealth changed dramatically after the quake. In 2006 22% of the 
                                                          
16 In the next chapter I provide a deeper analyze the impact on poverty, proposing two models that predict changes in 
the levels of poverty (or income) before and after the quake both in Chile and Haiti.  
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population fell into the first quintile of income whereas in 2010, after the quake, 45% of 
interviewees fell into the same quintile (Zephyr, 2011). These statistics indicate that the 
earthquake may have increased levels of poverty among Haitian society, aggravating an 
already critical social situation in the Caribbean country.   
According to the Chilean government, the earthquake in 2010 left 500,00 new poor, a 
total increase of 3% of the levels of poverty from 2009 (CASEN, 2010). In the region of 
Bio Bio poverty increased 2%, in O´Higgins 8.5% and in Valparaiso 4.6% (Table 16). 
The variations in the levels of poverty show that poverty increased in different degrees 
and were not directly related to the intensity of the quake. For example in Coquimbo, 
poverty levels increased 6.8%, but in Bio Bio, the epicenter of the quake, the poverty 
levels increased only by 2.1%. Furthermore, in places where the earthquake hit at mild 
intensity, as Valparaiso, the poverty levels increased by 4.6%.  
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Table 16: Chilean poverty per region and year (% of population under the poverty line) 
 2006 2009  
 
2010 Variation 2009 
2010 
 Tarapacá  14.5 21.5 22.0 0.5 
 Antofagasta  7.3 9.5 9.8 0.4 
 Atacama  10.5 16.7 17.0 0.3 
 Coquimbo  15.9 13.4 20.2 6.8 
 Valparaíso (VI) 15.3 17.6 22.2 4.6 
 O´Higgins (VIII) 11.4 13.2 21.8 8.5 
 Maule (VIII) 17.7 21.3 17.3 -4.0 
 Bío Bío (IX) 20.7 22.3 24.4 2.1 
 La Araucanía (VIII) 20.1 27.7 25.6 -2.1 
 Los Lagos  14 12.6 17.6 5.0 
 Aysén  9.2 16.1 10.5 -5.6 
 Magallanes Y La Antártica 
Chilena  
6.3 10.6 9.8 -0.8 
 Región Metropolitana 
(VIII) 
10.6 13.0 16.0 2.9 
 Los Rios  0 26.3 27.6 1.2 
 Arica y Parinacota  0 18.1 20.0 1.9 
 Total  13.7 16.4 18.9 2.5 
 
Both in Chile and Haiti simple analysis of the direct results of poverty and the changes 
per geographical area through simple frequencies can be misleading. I argue that the 
reasons behind the decrease or increase in poverty for both societies can be the 
consequence of a combination of factors. I maintain that international cooperation, 
national spending and social capital can either attenuate or reinforce the impacts of 
earthquakes on poverty levels17. In the next section I provide a brief account of how 
public spending, international aid and social capital operated to attenuate the impact of 
the earthquake on the population.  
 
 
                                                          
17 A detailed analysis of the impact of quakes on poverty and the role of international aid and social participation is 
proposed in the next chapter.  
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4. Adaptive capacity: States, International Organizations 
and Civil Society   
 
Having analyzed the main impacts of the quakes on Haitian and Chilean societies, I 
move towards the analysis of how the governments, international organizations and 
societies responded and adapted to the impact of the earthquakes. As addressed in the 
main argument of this thesis, I argue that societies, far from being static actors or mere 
victims of natural disasters, hold adaptive potential to respond and adapt to possible 
hazards. I further maintain that social capital, as an individual mechanism, and aid and 
public spending, as an institutional mechanism, hold the potentiality of enhancing the 
adaptive capacity of individuals and through this reduce vulnerability to natural disasters.  
The social determinants of social vulnerability throughout this thesis refer to the pre-
existing social, economic and political conditions within the society. Predetermined 
social inequalities give form to the future social impacts of natural disasters. Disasters are 
socially constructed, based on the combination of these social and political structures 
together with a hazard. In this sense, in order to study social vulnerability levels after a 
disaster occurs it is also fundamental to disentangle how societies and institutions 
prepare for, react, and respond to likely threats.  
This section presents a descriptive analysis of how social capital, disaster relief aid and 
public spending operated during the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes to reduce the 
impact on the respective societies.  
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Haiti 
The capacity of the Haitian Government was particularly affected by the earthquake not 
only because many national and municipal buildings were destroyed but also because of 
the number of casualties among civil servants (Committee, 2010). This, together with the 
already weak state of Haitian Government, caused delays and difficulties in coordinating 
the responding to the disaster in the initial stages. The government did created six 
working groups in the days after the quake to coordinate efforts in healthcare, food, 
water distribution, fuel, temporary shelters and reconstruction but it was not until a few 
months after the quake that an ‘Action Plan for the Recovery and Development’(PDNA, 
2010a).was developed by the Haitian Government. 
Three months after the quake, an Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was 
created, co-chaired by former U.S. President Bill Clinton and the Haitian Prime Minister 
Jean Max Bellerive. International organizations and NGOs were conglomerated in 
several clusters, a mechanism widely used by United Nations to respond to natural 
disasters or humanitarian crisis (IASC, 2010).   The aim is to include in the cluster system 
as many NGOs and organizations as possible but as the head of OXFAM acknowledges 
‘sometimes there are a lot more organizations out there... that don't even know about 
this cluster system’ (OXFAM, 2010). Many of the local NGOs operated outside the 
clusters without coordinating with the rest of the organizations. The lack of 
administrative capacity from the Government resulted in the non-regulation or 
supervision of the NGOs working in the country. This situation was aggravated by the 
fact that all visa restrictions and border controls were removed, resulting in foreigners 
being allowed to stay up to 90 days in the country without regulation. In the few days 
after the quake, hundreds of volunteers, NGO members and international organization 
officials began to enter the country with no clear mandate and coordination. According 
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to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), many of the 
people that entered the country were ill- prepared and unfamiliar with the ‘cluster’ 
organization proposed by United Nations. As mentioned in their Bulletin  
The lack of coordination caused problems for the Haitian authorities, who did 
not always know exactly who was operating in their country. This hampered their 
leadership role in the emergency response provided by local authorities and also 
directly affected other international actors trying to perform their work in 
accordance with the established coordination mechanisms.  (OCHA, 2012) 
Many scholars, journalists and NGO members have criticize the inefficiency, incapacity 
and delays with which the Haitian Government, and also the international community, 
reacted to the disaster (Council, 2011; McGreal, 2010; O'Connor, 2011; Provost, 2012). 
According to some international aid agencies, the in initial weeks following the 
earthquake aid failed to reach Haitians due to logistical confusion, disputes over 
priorities, and chaotic disorganization (McGreal, 2010).   
Soon after the quake, in March 2010, US$5.6 billion were pledged by donors to support 
the Government Action Plan for Reconstruction and National Development for 2010-
2011. As of December 2011, only half the money that has been committed by donors 
had been distributed according to data from the UN special envoy to Haiti (Provost, 
2012). The following graphs show the gaps between the pledged funds and those actually 
disbursed from the main donors.  
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Graph 4: Aid for reconstruction pledged and delivered by the top 10 donors 
 
Source: UN Office of the Special Envoy, Haiti December, 2011 
 
According to OCHA (2012) the situation is even more critical in 2012 with only 9% of 
the pledged budget has been distributed. Of the $53.0 million requested at least 11 
million is urgently needed to secure shelter and provide rental subsidies. Another $12.9 
million is set to be designated for the provision of water and hygiene promotion to 
prevent cholera outbreaks. Around $10 million are needed for food provision and 4.8 
million to protect woman and children from abuse and sexual violence in camps 
(OCHA, 2012). 
 
The graph below shows the number of persons that were covered by the aid and the 
number of persons that still need attention in different areas, based in the funding appeal 
made by the United Nations cluster system, named the Consolidated Appeal (CAP, 
2012). The coverage on food assistance seems critical, with almost 4.5 million people in 
need and only 1.2 covered by international aid by September 2011. The funding for 
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protection of children and females against sexual harassment and violence has covered 1 
million from a total of 3.5 million that are in need.  
 
Graph 5: Number of persons in need, targeted and covered by 2012 
 
 
Source: (CAP, 2012) 
 
The majority of the projects embarked on by International NGOs are being conducted 
at the epicenter of the quake, the capital of Haiti, Port au Prince. By 2012 a total of 369 
projects are being undertaken in Haiti, led by 59 organizations. Donors and international 
organizations have been widely criticized during the last two years, not only because of 
the gaps between what was promised and what was actually donated, but also due to the 
fact that only 6% of the total reconstruction process has been implemented through 
Haitian institutions and less than 1% through the Haitian Government (Provost, 2012). 
The lack of involvement by national governments in the process of redistribution of 
disaster relief aid from international agencies is a problem identified by several scholars 
(Pankaj, 2005; Woods, 2005). The way agencies distribute the money is based on 
strategic decisions and not only based in the population in need. Where, when and how 
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the funds are allocated respond to the international organizations needs and priorities, 
leaving sometimes the less visible injured and affected outside the equation. In a similar 
context, the funding of the agencies is often related to high profile events, and I argue 
that whereas most of the funding was distributed at the epicenter of the quake in Haiti, 
the remainder of the country was systematically overlooked.  
The United Nations cluster mechanism comes into operation at the beginning of any 
reconstruction process with the coordinator of each cluster being an international NGO 
or multilateral agency.  After a while the local governments and agencies are meant to 
take over and lead the reconstruction process from the inside. However many scholars 
and members of different organizations have declared that this has not been the case in 
Haiti where the international agencies are still leading the reconstruction process with 
very little participation from the Haitian government and even less from Haitian civil 
society (HaitiGrassrootsWatch, 2011; IASC, 2010).  
In this sense, the Interim Haiti Recovery Mission has been widely criticized for failing to 
ensure the participation of local authorities and civil society in the reconstruction 
process. According to the Periodic Review Working Group, from the Human Rights 
Council (2011), the reconstruction plan lacked a consultation process with stakeholders 
in order to assure efficiency in the implementation and accuracy of policies. They also 
add that ‘the lack of transparency and participation is inconsistent with a human rights 
based approach, and has resulted in little ownership of the plan by the Government and 
affected communities’ (Universal Periodic Review Working Group, 2011:4). The Inter 
Agency Standing Committee (IASC)18 also criticized agencies and NGOs for the lack of 
inclusion of civil society, acknowledging that such inclusion would have implied a faster 
and more efficient implementation of the recovery process (IASC, 2010). They further 
                                                          
18 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee IASC. 2010. "Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti." Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee. is a unique inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving 
the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. 
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pointed out that coordination between the international community and the national and 
local governments, and also civil society, was extremely weak resulting in a fragile 
implementation of the recovery process.  
 
Haiti boasted a vibrant civil society before the quake whose actions were crucial in the 
first days after the earthquake (IASC, 2010). According to the Haitian Civil Society 
Organizations Database (2012)19, before the earthquake there were around 800 
organizations working in Haiti, both national and international. After the quake 392 new 
organizations were created many of which were not included in the ‘cluster system’ 
applied by the United Nations and were left outside the centralized recovery process.  
Despite the critics of the lack of coordination and non-inclusion of Haitian civil society 
in the recovery process, in 2010, a few months after the quake the population was asked 
their opinions regarding the performance of different institutions after the January 12 
earthquake (LAPOP Haiti, 2010).  The results show that 64% of respondents believe 
that the action of foreign NGOs was ‘good’ or ‘very good’, with 49% believing the same 
for foreign governments, 33% for local NGOs, 27% for community organizations and 
finally merely 9% thinking that the Haitian government acted ‘good’ or ‘very good’ after 
the quake.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 http://csohaiti.org/ 
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Graph 6: How the government and other institutions responded after the January 12th 
earthquake?  
 
 
Source: LAPOP survey, Haiti 2010 
 
The Haitians seem to be more critical towards the national government, community 
organizations and local NGOs than foreign NGOs and foreign governments. As has 
been stated, the reconstruction process was led by international agencies and these 
results suggest that they are receiving the credit, according to public opinion, as main 
actors and are responsible for the reconstruction process. Despite the multiple 
complaints from specialized actors, such as academics and NGO members, regarding 
the lack of coordination and involvement of civil society and national government in the 
reconstruction process, the society itself appears not to consider that international 
agencies are to blame. Caution should be taken with these results as the survey was 
conducted just 5 months after the quake when the cholera outbreak was not as dramatic 
as it was to become a few months later. The protests and demonstrations by Haitians 
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came a year later, complaining of the lack of efficiency from MINUSTAH (United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti)20 in preventing the spread of cholera among the 
society.  
Chile 
The Chilean government took the lead in the reconstruction process after the 
earthquake, supported by military forces and the private sector. The first measure taken 
was to create provisional camps to allocate the population that was left homeless. As 
analyzed in the previous section, one of the most severe consequences in Chile was the 
destruction of houses and the subsequent number of the displaced. According to the 
United States Geological Service the quake resulted in 800,000 becoming displaced in 
Chile (U.S.GS, 2010).  Two years after the event,  in February 2012,  around 3,000 
people were still living in camps and is likely that they will not be given a solution soon 
(Lizana, 2011). The life in the camps has been harsh and difficult for displaced families. 
Firstly, access to basic services is limited, without a sanitation service, water or electricity 
in each house.  Secondly, many had to abandon their previous towns, therefore 
becoming disconnected from their own social networks and institutions. Thirdly, the 
social tension has increased during the last months mainly as a result of the inefficiency 
of the government to provide solutions (CEME, 2012). Protests have also spread among 
the camps with, demands made for more rapid and effective solutions for the families 
concerned (Figure 1).  
                                                          
20 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/ 
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Figure 1: The sign reads: ‘ The Government lies. Constitucion without Reconstruction’ Protest in 
Constitucion February 2012. (CEME, 2012) 
 
A second policy of the Chilean Government was to distribute subsidies to the families 
that suffered damage to their houses. The Ministry of Housing followed several steps to 
allocate the subsidies. Firstly, they identified the damage done to the houses; secondly 
they listed the individuals that were entitled to receive subsidies, and thirdly they began 
the distribution (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2010). However, criticism has 
been directed at the main Government policy of the provision of subsidies, which was 
viewed as the same social policy prior to the quake, but which was not effective after a 
natural disaster of this magnitude. Many scholars have raised the question of the efficacy 
of giving subsidies to families that have lost everything mainly because of the delays in 
distribution (Bustamante, 2012; CEME, 2012; Lizana, 2011).  
Furthermore, journalists and academics have claimed that not only did the government 
intervene very slowly in the recovery process, but also that the real numbers relating to 
the reconstruction process and spending were not transparent (Bustamante, 2012; 
Lizana, 2011). For example, according to the President, Sebastian Piñera,  47% of the 
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houses had been reconstructed by February 2012, whereas the Observatory of the 
Reconstruction, from the University of Chile, says the number stands at only 10% 
(Bustamante, 2012). Similar to what occurred in Haiti, there has been a gap between 
what was promised and what was actually executed, despite the availability of funds. The 
Chilean Government did not present disaggregated numbers for the reconstruction 
process, making the task of evaluating how the funds were spent per area even more 
difficult (Fazio, 2011). 
Most of the reconstruction process in Chile was funded and led by the Chilean 
government with a readjustment of the annual budget. For the process they were 
pledged $1.3 million, being primarily designated to areas of healthcare, housing and 
infrastructure. A fund for reconstruction was also created by the government to allow 
for private and individual donations (Government, 2010). Some scholars have pointed 
out limitations in the assignation of funds, because the government did not increase the 
total expenditure but only reassigned budgets for the reconstruction from the pre-
convened annual state budget (Fazio, 2011). The Chilean Government also stimulated 
the involvement of the private sector within the process, following the model applied in 
the reconstruction of New Orleans, after Hurricane Katrina. However this model has 
caused several problems whereby each private company fights for their own financial 
objectives leading to a more structured and expensive process of reconstruction (Pulgar, 
2010).  
Based on results from the LAPOP (2010) survey, conducted after the quake, almost 
eight out of every ten Chileans believes that the police (77%) and the army (77%) reacted 
‘good’ or ‘very good’ to the earthquake, and 82% consider that Red Cross actions in the 
aftermath were also ‘good’ or ‘very good’. In contrast, evaluations of the National Office 
of Emergency, part of the National Government, are mostly critical with more than half 
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the population claiming that the actions after the earthquake from this organization were 
‘bad’ or ‘really bad’. The public opinion seems to be divided when judging the actions 
taken by the government and local government after the event, with half of the 
population declaring that the actions where ‘good’ or ‘very good’.  
Graph 7: How the government and other institutions responded after the earthquake in 
Chile? (LAPOP 2010)  
 
Scholars, journalists, and NGO members have also widely criticized the lack of social 
participation in the reconstruction process after the Chilean earthquake (Bustamante, 
2012; CEME, 2012; Lizana, 2011; Pulgar, 2011), claiming that the process of recovery 
would have been more effective and faster if the civil society had been consulted and 
included. Also, criticism centered on the fact that the reconstruction process was not 
proposing long term housing solutions for the displaced but instead a fast and precarious 
remedy (Pulgar, 2010).  
The earthquake revealed the weakness of social networks and civil society organizations, 
with severe problems in the coordination of activities, adopting more individual 
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initiatives than collective action to face the reconstruction process. As theoretically 
stated by the sociology of disasters, catastrophes constitute an ideal moment to better 
analyze the social structures of the society. The strength of civil society, or lack of it, is 
easily seen in the eventuality of natural disasters. For the case of Chile, it appears that the 
participation and involvement of the community in local activities was already weak 
before the quake even happened, based on the LAPOP results (2008). The lack of 
participation in the reconstruction process became a mere reflection of the previous lack 
of involvement of the Chileans in communitarian activities.  
Based on results from the post earthquake survey carried out by the Chilean 
Government  (CASEN, 2010) among affected families (65% of the survey), more than 
half adopted an individual strategy to cope with the aftermath problems (52%), whereas 
only 14% were collectively organized. At the epicenter of the earthquake 92% of the 
families were affected and only 37% adopted collective strategies to solve the problems 
arising from the earthquake. Results further show that the main activities by which 
families opted for a collective strategy were the provision of food and water and to 
provide security to the neighborhood, with variations per region. For example in the Bio 
Bio region almost half of the affected families opted for collective strategies to provide 
security to the neighborhoods, whereas in Maule, Valparaiso and Araucania the main 
activity achieved collectively was access to food and water (Table 17).  
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Table 17. Principal activity in which they operated collectively, percentage only between 
the people that cooperated  
Region 
House 
reconstr. 
Water, 
Food 
Security 
Child 
supervision 
Taking care 
old people 
Other Total 
Valparaiso  9,6  49,1  12,6  6,0  8,4  14,3  100  
Libertador B. 
O´Higgins  
14,7  42,0  9,0  11,8  12,3  10,3  100  
Maule  7,1  47,6  27,8  9,8  4,3  3,5  100  
Biobío  5,8  40,4  43,6  6,0  2,1  2,2  100  
Araucania 4,3  50,1  17,2  11,8  8,7  8,0  100  
Metropolitana  4,1  27,2  35,3  10,5  12,4  10,5  100  
Total six regions  6,1  39,3  34,9  8,1  5,9  5,6  100  
Source: CASEN, 2010 
According to Pulgar (2010), from the University of Chile, one of the causes of the lack 
of civil society involvement has been the government policy of distributing subsidies 
converting the citizens into beneficiaries, instead of creating and reinforcing an active 
civil society. In this same sense, the population become simple ‘objects’ after the 
earthquake, needing to receive subsidies, shelter and healthcare coverage, without 
assuming any direct role in their own survival (Pulgar, 2010). Returning to the theoretical 
argument of this thesis, and in a similar direction, I maintain that society holds an 
adaptive capacity, with potential to prepare, respond and recover from potential hazards. 
Therefore, the lack of stimulus to reinforce civil participation could result in a less 
effective and more problematic reconstruction process. Seeing the civil society as mere 
victims brings several policy implications. First, because individuals are not capable of 
acting or responding, no participation mechanism is implemented by the institutions 
leading the reconstruction process. Second, the plans and programs to be implemented 
are not designed into consultation with the beneficiaries, frequently resulting in 
inappropriate plans that are detached from the reality.  
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5. Conclusions  
The earthquakes had consequences for both Chilean and Haitian society, yet revealing 
the disparity and inequality not only between but also within the countries. The most 
affected were the most vulnerable, the poor, and those with fewer resources. The 
impacts of the quakes on both societies were a consequence of previous social 
inequalities, together with the lack of preparation and mitigation mechanisms 
implemented by individuals and institutions. Social capital, public spending and disaster 
relief aid played different roles in Haiti and Chile.  
First, the Chilean and Haitian Governments reacted and operated in extremely different 
ways. The Chilean Government took the lead in the aftermath of the emergency and also 
in the reconstruction process with the active support of the military forces. In Haiti the 
government was totally devastated and in the days immediately after the earthquake 
more than 100 international agencies were working in the country, yet with major 
coordination and organization problems (McGreal, 2010). The Haitian Government 
found itself in an extremely weak position with no tools to take over the reconstruction 
process. Another enormous difference was Chilean economic strength having one of the 
lowest governmental debt to economic output ratios in Latin America (Smale, 2010), 
with a strong credit rating  together with a low government spending of the country 
copper reserves. Although the funds needed to face the reconstruction of the country 
exited which was not the case with the Haitian economic situation.  Public spending 
levels in Chile are extremely superior, being able to reduce the impacts of the quake on 
the population. In both societies the population assessment of how the government 
reacted and responded to the quake was extremely negative. Based on LAPOP, both 
Haitians and Chileans tend to attribute blame and responsibility to their national 
governments for the lack of efficiency in the reconstruction process. It is clearly stated 
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that for the citizens the role of safe keeping and providing public goods should be 
carried out by national governments, and they are the ones to blame in case the needs 
and demands are not being fulfilled.  
Second, apart from national governments, disaster relief aid organizations operated in 
dissimilar ways in Chile and Haiti. In Haiti they took the lead not only in the initial stages 
of the reconstruction process, the emergency relief, but also are still, two years after the 
quake, leading the reconstruction process. In contrast, in Chile, the national government 
did not ask for international aid during the first hours and it was two days after the 
earthquake until they asked for generators, water filtration equipment, field hospitals and 
also for a damage assessment from the earthquake. 
Despite these differences, both countries encountered similar problems in the 
reconstruction process. As analyzed throughout this chapter, one of the most important 
impacts on the societies was the displacement and subsequent homeless population both 
in Haiti and Chile. The provision of a long term solution of shelter for those affected by 
earthquakes still remains to be solved in both countries. The creation of temporary 
camps was a policy applied in both countries, and today there are still people living in the 
camps with consequences in health, employment, school attendance and violence.  
The sub-execution of promised funds was also a common denominator in both 
countries. In Chile and in Haiti there was a gap between the promised funds and the 
money executed. One of the reasons could be the difficulty encountered in 
implementing and redistributing funds in a effective and prompt manner.  To add more 
complexity, the lack of transparency in the execution of funds was also a common issue 
both in Chile and Haiti. The existing levels of corruption in Haiti, together with the lack 
of transparency in the Chilean government, culminated in a very shady accountability of 
where and how the international and national funds were spent.  
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Finally, the involvement of civil society in the reconstruction process was limited both in 
Haiti and Chile. As theoretically argued in this thesis, the participation of the population 
in the preparedness, response and reconstruction process after natural disasters could 
lead to a decrease in the impacts of natural disaster. In both countries, no matter who led 
the process, the population was treated as simple objects or victims of the earthquakes, 
almost no involvement in the reconstruction design and implementation. The lack of 
policies designed to engage the community, together with lack of prearranged tools of 
social participation (mainly in Chile) generated the fact that the process became led by 
institutions, without consultation or involvement of the affected communities. 
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V. Social Vulnerability and Adaptive capacity to 
earthquakes: Haiti and Chile 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapter IV introduced the main social, political and economical impacts of the Haitian 
and Chilean earthquakes in 2010. This chapter analyzes the micro foundations of social 
vulnerability to natural disasters in Latin America, testing if humanitarian aid, public 
spending and social capital enhance the adaptive capacity of individuals to natural 
disasters. It also presents a new conceptual and empirical framework to measure social 
vulnerability to natural hazards, illustrating that not only do natural disasters impact   
more on the most vulnerable, but also increase the poverty levels of the population. 
Chapter III tested at the aggregated level (countries) show that social capital, public 
spending and humanitarian aid reduce the number of casualties due to natural disasters 
in Latin America and Caribbean. This chapter predicts the same three hypotheses, at the 
individual level, under the assumption that vulnerability should be studied at different 
scales in order to better apprehend the mechanisms behind the adaptive capacity and 
vulnerability of societies.  
Grounded in vulnerability, theory I take forward the idea that the chances of being poor 
after an earthquake increases conditional on certain economic and social characteristics 
of individuals prior to the disaster. Disasters are generated as a reflection of previous 
social inequalities within the society; therefore dimensions such as healthcare quality, 
educational level, age, gender, type of the house and occupation determine the 
probability of becoming poor after a catastrophe. Furthermore, I theoretically sustain 
that human beings are not passive victims of natural events but instead flexible and 
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permeable actors, with the capacity of preparing, responding and reacting to the threats 
of a natural disaster. In this sense, I claim that humanitarian aid and national public 
spending, as institutional mechanisms, and social capital, as coping mechanisms, mitigate 
or reinforce the adaptive capacity of individuals, decreasing the impact of the 
earthquakes on the societies.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, I revise the theoretical argument and 
hypotheses presented in Chapter II, but adapted to the individual level of analysis. In 
second place, I test the predictions for Chilean earthquakes and finally for Haitian 
earthquake.  
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2. Adaptive capacity of Individuals to Earthquakes 
 
This chapter empirically tests if social capital levels, public spending and humanitarian 
aid, conditional on the levels of democratization, have an effect on the adaptive capacity 
of individuals and decrease the impact of natural disasters. To test these predictions at 
the individual level two countries with significantly different levels of social capital, 
public spending, humanitarian aid inflow and democratization are included: Haiti and 
Chile. As we have seen, in 2010 both nations suffered two of the most devastating 
earthquakes of the history of Latin America and Caribbean21.  
The macro level chapter of this thesis (Chapter III) applied as a measure of social 
vulnerability to natural disasters the number of casualties per country and year due to a 
natural disaster. At the individual level, I use as a measure of social vulnerability changes 
in the levels of the household income due to the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile. I 
maintain that one of the most relevant consequences of earthquakes among the 
population is an increase in poverty.  
I claim that three main mechanisms can enhance the adaptive capacity of individuals and 
in this way reduce the likelihood of a decrease in income after an earthquake: public 
spending, social capital and humanitarian aid. Below I review the three predictions, 
explained in detail in the theoretical chapter of this thesis (Chapter II), to be tested at 
micro or individual level of analysis along this chapter.  
 
The first hypothesis argues that both bonding social capital, referring to the ties within 
individuals, and bridging social capital, referring to the strength of the relationships 
                                                          
21
 A detailed argumentation of the case selection was presented in Chapter IV.  
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between different groups (Putnam, 2001) have the potentiality to enhance the adaptation 
mechanisms of societies to prepare, adapt and respond to hazards. I argue that in several 
ways bonding social capital enhances the potential capacity of individuals. Firstly, 
community members and family represent one of the most important sources of food, 
shelter and health attention after the impact of an earthquake. Specifically for the case of 
earthquakes, infrastructures tend to be severely affected, including roads and airport 
runways. Support from national governments might take longer than expected or may 
encounter difficulties in the distribution of resources, and in such moments the help 
provided by family and friends could attenuate or mitigate the effects of the quake on 
the level of poverty. A second mechanism by which social capital enhances the 
adaptation of societies is through the provision of information. Information became a 
crucial element both as a preparation measure, before earthquakes occur, but also after 
they occur. Holding information of how to react, where to attend, where to find support 
after an earthquake strike might prevent further damage, and mitigate the economic 
impact of the quake on the households. Finally, strong network ties could operate as 
emotional support to face the disaster and the recovery process. The emotional impact 
of losing family members, being injured or homeless can imply a long and difficult 
recovery process, decreasing the possibilities of household members to work and receive 
income. Strong backing from family and friends could help in reducing the emotional 
crisis, lead to faster recovery, and in this way reduce the probability of becoming poor 
after a quake.  
Bridging social capital, or the relations between several segments of the population, can 
potentially reduce the social vulnerability of individuals to earthquakes under several 
mechanisms. Firstly, they also operate as providers of food, shelter and health, mitigating 
the possible investment of money in the reconstruction process. Already existent 
organizations, such as schools, churches, community centers and also newly emerging 
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groups can centralize and provide basic public goods in the initial days after the quake 
occurs. Also, they can decrease the need of the affected individuals to flee to other cities 
in search of shelter or food provision, and in this way prevent the loss of jobs and 
network support. Strong network communities can also officiate as intermediates 
between the individuals and the governments both after and before quakes occur. In 
societies with a high propensity to suffer from disasters, active social participation can 
produce more effective solutions to mitigate its possible impacts. The provision of 
insurance, subsidies, constructions regulations, early warning systems, amongst others 
could be stimulated by strong and active pressure from social groups in the community.   
The next two hypotheses argue that humanitarian aid and public spending reduce the 
effects of natural disasters on the population. Both tools are institutional mechanisms 
that enhance the adaptive capacity of individuals.  
Public spending could potentially reduce the likelihood of becoming poor in several 
ways. Firstly, spending can directly shape the determinants of the vulnerability of a 
society, as healthcare coverage, educational systems, housing quality and income 
redistribution, amongst others. Secondly, governments can directly mitigate the potential 
impacts of natural disasters both before, within and after disasters occur. In the 
preparedness phase, governments can implement policies to prevent possible impacts, 
such as early warning systems, centralized emergency response plans, construction 
codes., They can also inform the population of the potential risks from a possible impact 
of a natural disaster and how to react.  
Humanitarian aid contributes to mitigate the effects of earthquakes in the preparedness, 
response and reconstruction processes. The funding in preparedness might be invested 
both in the improvement of national mechanisms of response and also in the 
dissemination among the population of the risks of natural disasters. Subsequently, after 
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the earthquakes occur, humanitarian aid could potentially reduce the effects on the 
population, through the provision of food, shelter and healthcare coverage. International 
organizations tend to have preexisting operation plans to provide these goods to the 
populations in case of disasters. Also, in this phase, search and rescue operations could 
potentially mitigate the effects of the quakes on the societies 
 
Regarding humanitarian aid, as discussed in Chapter IV, its relevance in Haiti after the 
catastrophe was unquestionable. In the first few hours after the quake hundreds of 
international organizations sent staff and volunteers to the scene, increasing the already 
high presence of international members within the country (IASC, 2010; McGreal, 2010; 
Provost, 2012). In contrast, support in Chile came from the national government, 
through public spending and help from the international community was almost 
insignificant. The government voted within a few hours after the quake for the 
readjustment of the national public budget to designate new public funding for the 
reconstruction of the country. The lead was taken immediately by the central 
government, guiding all the plans, programs and actions taken to as response to the 
earthquake. Although international help was welcomed a few days after the quake, it 
followed a list of priorities and rules settled by the Chilean government (Perasso, 2010). 
This differences can easily be seen through the Net Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) per capita, with the measure of the amount of aid given by international donors 
being 3,021 (US dollar) for Haiti and just 198 (US dollar) for Chile in 2010. 
Taking these elements into account, I test the role of public spending and humanitarian 
aid in reducing the likelihood of becoming poor in Haiti and Chile.  However, because 
after Chilean earthquake the disaster relief aid coming from international organizations 
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was almost insignificant, I am not able to test the effectiveness of aid within the country. 
However, for the Haitian case, both hypotheses are tested.  
 
In conclusion, the three hypothesis tested at aggregated level (countries) are tested at the 
individual level of analysis for the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes in 2010. The 
hypotheses are: 
H1. Social capital enhances the adaptive capacity of individuals and reduces the probability of 
becoming poor or experiencing a decrease in income due to the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile.  
 
H2. Public spending potentially reduces the probability of becoming poor due to the Haitian 
and Chilean earthquakes.  
 
H3. Humanitarian aid may reduce the probability of experiencing a decrease in income after 
the Haitian earthquake in 2010 (not applicable for the Chilean case) 
 
Based on the population that became poor22 after the earthquake, for the case of Chile 
and the population that declared experiencing a decrease in income for Haitian case, I 
discuss how quakes can affect the personal income under several mechanisms. To begin 
with, earthquakes can affect both the employability and the self-production capacity of 
individuals. Many economic enterprises stopped working partially or totally after the 
Haitian and Chilean earthquakes. Some companies ceased work only for a few days 
causing a small impact on their production and therefore employees, but others 
                                                          
22 A discussion of the limitations of this measure is presented in the Research Design Section of this chapter 
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struggled in recovering their normal productive level, determining a decrease in the 
amount of human resources they needed.  In Chile, for example, the earthquake affected 
the economic epicenter of the country.  According to the Association of Exports, 
Manufacturing and Services from Chile, only 45% of the companies operated normally 
after the earthquake (CEPAL, 2010b). In addition, besides the direct damage to 
infrastructures, there was indirect damage to the productive system caused by problems 
with the availability of water, gas, energy which generated the closure of companies not 
only because of the damage to the infrastructure itself, but because of the impossibility 
of resuming activity after the earthquake (CEPAL, 2010b). The impact of the earthquake 
on income can also be observed in the case of small producers. Both the products and 
infrastructures can be easily affected generating a decrease in production and therefore 
generating a decrease in income. In Chile, for example, industries such as the artisanal 
fisheries were severely affected mainly because of the impact of the tsunami on the 
coastal zone of Chile. The artisanal fisherman stopped producing for several days, even 
months, causing a decrease in their monthly income (Unidad de Evaluación de 
Desastres, 2010). In Haiti there was a total contraction in the economy of 5% in GDP 
with a total loss of 8% of jobs, according to data from the Haitian Government.  
In addition to impacts on the employment of individuals, another crucial element that 
can ease or strengthen the effect of the earthquake on the population is the occupational 
conditions of the employee, both in the type of contract (temporary or permanent) and 
also in the inclusion in the social security system within the country. On one hand, the 
population that is employed and covered under the social security system is more likely 
to receive compensation or support after the event and in this way easing a probable loss 
of job or decrease in income. Secondly, as seasonal workers they are more permeable to 
the economic situation of the sector. If the company is affected by a natural disaster 
temporary workers become almost immediately unemployed without any benefits. In 
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Chile almost 40% of the total employed population are hired temporally, 25% of the 
total employed did not sign a contract with their employers and 45% of the employees 
belong to a social insurance program (in case they are fired or the place where they work 
closes) (CASEN, 2010). In Haiti, the vast majority of the population are not covered by 
a social security system, and exist in extremely fragile employment conditions. Based on 
the public opinion survey conducted in 2010, from the total of employed more than half 
did not have a contract, and 83% have no health insurance through their employer 
(LAPOP, Haiti, 2010).  
 
Apart from the occupational characteristics, I discuss that the type and quality of the 
house where the individual lives can determine not only the chances of being affected by 
the earthquake, but also the investment people need to make afterwards in order to 
rebuild the property. First, the ownership of the property, more specifically the legal 
status of the occupancy, determines how fast or how directly the person can receive 
support from both government and international organizations. Secondly, the 
responsibility of rebuilding the property is on the owner, causing them to invest more 
money than those that are renting a property. Furthermore, the stronger the material the 
house is made of, then the less the impact of the earthquake and therefore the less the 
economic effort the family needs to make to rebuild it. In the Chilean earthquake, for 
example, 3% of houses were totally destroyed and 30% were partially damaged, 
according to a post-earthquake survey conducted by the Chilean Government (CASEN, 
2010). In Haiti, around 188,383 houses collapsed and almost 105,000 were completely 
destroyed by the earthquake (UNDP, 2010). During the months after the earthquake 
around 2.5 million people were living in tents and camps.  The construction codes in 
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Haiti before the earthquake did not follow any anti-earthquake measures as they do in 
Chile, making them extremely vulnerable to disasters (OCHA, 2012).  
 
Moving on in the identification of the characteristics that might predict an impact of the 
earthquake on income, I argue that the existing healthcare conditions of individuals can 
help in adapting and coping better with the disaster and therefore recovering easily and 
faster. Problems with health can affect the capacity for work and therefore cause 
limitations in generating income, but can also represent an increase in the expenses of 
the household. Therefore, the less the health quality of the individual, the more chances 
there are that they become poor after an earthquake.  
 
I maintain that houses with a single female parenthood are more likely to become poor 
after an earthquake. I argue that specifically in the case of female breadwinners the 
impact on their employability and possibility to generate income is higher than other 
types of households. After an earthquake the dynamics of the house can be affected in 
many ways especially in the presence of small children. School closures, healthcare issues 
and displacement can cause children to stay at home needing the attention of an adult on 
a daily bases. Households with two adults are more flexible and allow one of the adults 
to continue working while the other stays at home. In the same sense, I suggest that 
households with children have fewer tools to become resilient to the earthquake and 
tend to be more affected.  The presence of children can increase the impact of the 
disaster in many ways. Firstly, moving from one place to another to overcome the 
damages to houses becomes more difficult in the presence of children. Taking the 
children from schools or from their network of support, moving them to another city or 
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town, can be complicated for many families, causing them to stay in the place where they 
live despite the damage to their houses. Secondly, in case of impact on the health of any 
of the children at least one adult needs to stay and take care of the child. This can cause 
an impact on the income of the adults of the household, making them poorer than 
before.   
 
Apart from these variables there are many others that might cause a shift in poverty or 
income levels among the population, although not necessarily related to the earthquake. 
For this reason a set of control variables are included for the study of each country.  
The following section empirically proposes a model to measure the social determinants 
of social vulnerability to the earthquake in Chile and the role of social capital and public 
spending to mitigate those impacts. Finally, following the Chilean results, I present an 
empirical model for Haiti.  
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3. Explaining social vulnerability to disasters  
3.1 Chilean Earthquake 
 
The next section gives an account of the main social and economic characteristics of 
social vulnerability to earthquakes in Chile and tests the hypothesis that public spending 
and social capital stimulate the adaptation capacity of Chilean society to the earthquake.  
Research Design 
The predictions are based in a multilevel logit model. I include as independent variables 
the social and economic conditions of the individuals before the earthquake and as 
dependent variable the proportion of the population that became poor after the 
earthquake, replicating a quasi experimental design. The individuals are grouped 
regarding the intensity of the earthquake (or treatment) (Shadish, 2010).  
Data 
In April 2010, two months after the earthquake, the Chilean Ministry of Development 
implemented a post-earthquake survey, sampling a portion of the population that 
commonly integrates the household survey that Chile runs every year (MIDEPLAN, 
2010). The sample is a representative sample of the whole country and includes general 
questions on occupation, education and income but also includes new questions on the 
degree in which the earthquake impacted on the population. The main objective of the 
survey was to provide information about changes in the quality of the lives of the 
population affected by the earthquake and tsunami in February 2010. The data used for 
this analysis, therefore, is a panel survey, composed by two waves of the same 
households, one before the earthquake (November and December 2009) and the second 
wave two months after the earthquake (April, 2010).  
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The questionnaire includes eight parts, covering different social dimensions as education, 
occupation, income, health, participation, housing and psychosocial impact of the 
earthquake. The survey was carried out in 27,826 households of the 59,427 interviewed 
by the 2009 survey. The error margin is not higher than 8% in each region and 
communities affected by the earthquake or tsunami.  It was applied in April of 2010, two 
months after the earthquake. The person answering the survey was older than 18 years 
of age.  
Because many of the relevant variables are only asked once per household, I only include 
one individual per house in the model, the person who answered the survey, making a 
total of 27,271 and a second level of analysis, the geographical area, with a total 15 
geographical subdivisions representing the political regions in which Chile is divided.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of the model is composed by the population that became poor 
after the earthquake, as a dummy variable, where 1 is only people that changed from 
being not poor before the earthquake to being poor after the earthquake.  The decision 
of leaving outside of my dependent variable people that were and are still poor helps in 
the explanation of the causal mechanism. The reasons for poverty in the population that 
was poor and is still poor might be beyond the earthquake and is more difficult to isolate 
than just predicting the population that became poor two months after the natural 
disaster. The variable is created through a measure of poverty that is included in the 
post-earthquake survey, designed by the Ministry of Development for the CASEN 
survey (CASEN, 2010). Their method for measuring poverty is based on the settlement 
of a poverty line, calculated from the basic cost of food and goods for the individual 
survival. Table 18 summarizes the distribution of the variable. 
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Table 18: Dependent Variable Distribution. Population that became poor after the 
earthquake. 
 Freq. % 
   
Not poor 20.928        75.2        
Poor in 2009  2.161         7.8        
Poor 2009 and 2010 2.147         7.7        
Poor 2010 only (dependent variable) 2.590         9.3       
   
Total 27.826       100 
 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables of the model are segmented in two major groups based on 
the theoretical argument of this chapter. Firstly, I include socio-demographic or 
structural variables that could determine the likelihood of an individual of becoming 
poor after the earthquake. Secondly, I include social capital and public spending to test 
the hypothesis that higher levels of social capital and public spending lowers the 
likelihood of becoming poor.  
 Regarding the socio demographic determinants of the probability of becoming poor, I 
include health quality, house quality, occupation in agriculture and fisheries, tenancy of 
the property, type of occupational contract and membership of the social security 
system, gender, age, years of education, single female households, and the presence of 
children in the household, all of them measured at the individual level before the 
earthquake happened in 2009.  
The health condition is measured through the interviewee’s perception of his own 
health, in a scale from 1 being ‘very bad’ to 7 being ‘very good’. The house quality is also 
included as an aggregated index that includes two indicators: plumbing connections in 
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the household and the material with which the house is built. The index has three 
categories: houses with high (3), medium (2) and low quality (1). Years of education is 
measured by the question of ‘how many years have you attended the formal education 
system’, included as a continuous variable. Occupation status and characteristics is 
measured through three different variables. Firstly, a variable that measures the type of 
industry in which the individual is employed. I construct a dummy variable that includes 
as value ‘1’ the population working in agriculture, fisheries and mining; and as value ‘0’ 
the rest of the population. Secondly, I include as a dummy variable the population that 
belongs to the social security system, receiving benefits in case of unemployment (1= 
social security, 0 = no social security). I also include a measure of type of contract of the 
individual, being category ‘1’ temporary and seasonal workers and category ‘0’ the rest of 
the population. The tenancy of the house is classified in three categories in the survey. 
First, people that own the house where they live; second, the population that is renting; 
and third informal or illegal occupancy. I include the variable as a dummy, recoding the 
people that own a house as 1 and the rest as 0. Single female households measure the 
houses that have a single female leading the household. This has only two categories, 1 
for female households and 0 for all others. The variable ‘children’ is a dummy variable 
addressing if in the house there are children or not (1= there are children, 0= there are 
not).  
 
As measures of social capital I distinguish between measures of bonding social capital 
and bridging (Putnam, 2001). To measure bridging social capital I include the levels of 
social participation in the province, extracted from the LAPOP survey applied in 2010, 
before the earthquake occurred (LAPOP, 2010). The question applied in the LAPOP 
survey is ‘During the last 12 months have you contributed with your community to solve 
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any type of problem?’ The possible answers are ‘once a week’, ‘once or twice a month’, 
‘once or twice a year’ or ‘never’. I create an aggregated measure per geographical region 
with the population that declared having participated and have incorporated the results 
to the model.  At the same level (regional), I also include a measure of interpersonal trust 
to measure bonding social capital, created based on the question ‘Talking about the 
people of your community, do you think they are very trustworthy, trustworthy, not very 
trustworthy or not trustworthy’?. As was done for the Latin American comparison 
(Chapter III), I aggregate the results of the population that answered ‘very trustworthy’ 
at the regional level. The inclusion of these variables at the regional level is due to a lack 
of data at the individual basis. I have information on social capital but only after the 
earthquake, causing, if included, severe endogeneity problems. These variables are 
nevertheless presented as supporting information but not included in the regression 
models.  
To measure public spending, I include two variables. First, I include a variable, measured 
at individual level in the 2009 CASEN survey (before the quake) that provides an 
account of the proportion of the income of the household due to transfers and benefits 
from the States. To capture public spending before the quake I include a variable that 
measures public investment at the regional level (in millions of pesos), extracted from 
the Ministry of Development (2010). I divide the variable by the total population per 
region. The variable is also measured before the earthquake. A further variable captures 
the funding given by the national government to reconstruct houses, however, as it is 
measured after the quake it is not included in the regression model.  
As control variables, I include the number of individuals in the household, income per 
capita in 2009 (before the earthquake), regional levels of poverty in 2009, and if the 
individual has insurance against earthquakes on the property.  
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Also, I incorporate as control variable, or grouping variable, the intensity of the 
earthquake per geographical strata (cities or communities). For the intensity of the 
earthquake I use the modified Mercalli scale. The scale was developed in 1931 by Wood 
and Neumann (Wood, 1931), composed by 12 increasing levels of intensity, classified by 
the population experiences during the earthquake. The U.S. Geological  Survey 
summarizes the classification of the scale (U.S.GS, 2004) in the following way:  
 
I. Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable conditions.  
II. Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings.  
III. Felt quite noticeably by persons indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings. Many 
people do not recognize it as an earthquake. Standing motor cars may rock slightly. 
Vibrations similar to the passing of a truck. Duration estimated.  
IV. Felt indoors by many, outdoors by few during the day. At night, some awakened. 
Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck 
striking building. Standing motor cars rocked noticeably.  
V. Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows broken. Unstable 
objects overturned. Pendulum clocks may stop.  
VI. Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances of fallen 
plaster. Damage slight.  
VII. Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to moderate in 
well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed 
structures; some chimneys broken.  
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VIII. Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in ordinary 
substantial buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of 
chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned.  
IX. Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame structures 
thrown out of plumb. Damage great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. 
Buildings shifted off foundations.  
X. Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures 
destroyed with foundations. Rails bent.  
XI. Few, if any (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Rails bent 
greatly.  
XII. Damage total. Lines of sight and level are distorted. Objects thrown into the air.  
 
Although many scales have been developed to measure the intensity of an earthquake 
the most commonly used are the Richter scale and Mercalli. Because of data availability 
at the regional level I use the Mercalli scale. In the Chilean earthquake the maximum 
Mercalli scale intensity was IX at the epicenter of the earthquake. The variable is 
measured for 15 geographical regions and extracted from the U.S. Geological Survey 
(2010).   The variable is included as a dummy variable, recoding the Mercalli scale in four 
categories. From 1 to 3 category ‘1’ (reference category), from 4 to 6 category ‘2’, 7 
category ‘3’ and finally categories 8 to 9 as value ‘4’. Table 19 summarizes the 
distribution of the variable.  
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Table 19: Mercalli intensity, Chilean Earthquake, 2010.  
MERCALLI POPULATION % 
1 2.739 3.6 
2 4.256 5.6 
3 1.323 1.8 
4 1.088 1.4 
5 4.623 6.1 
6 6.093 8.1 
7 41.620 55 
8 11.326 14.9 
9 2.598 3.4 
   
Total 75.666 100 
 
The next table gives an account of the main independent variables included in the 
analysis as well as the mechanism behind.  
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Table 20: Variables in Multilevel Model. Chilean Earthquake. 
Variables Description Level* Time 
of 
measu
re (*1) 
Mechanism Pr
edi
cte
d 
Ef
fec
t 
Dependent variable 
Poverty Individuals that became poor after 
the earthquake (dummy 1=poor) 
Level 1    
Independent variables 
Government 
transfers  
Percentage of the salary that 
comes from transfers and benefits 
from the Government. 
(MIDEPLAN, 2010) 
Level 1 Before Higher the percentage of salary due 
to public transfers lower the 
probability of becoming poor after 
the quake 
- 
Public 
investment per 
capita at 
regional level 
Total in millions of pesos of the 
investments projects by region. 
Source: Ministry of Development. 
Calculated per capita regarding the 
total population of the region.  
Level 2 Before Individuals using their own savings 
to afford the reconstruction are 
more likely to become poor 
- 
Social 
Participation at 
regional level 
Variable that measures levels of 
participation at regional level. 
Extracted from LAPOP survey 
(LAPOP, 2010) 
Level 2 Before Population living in areas that have 
high levels of participation have 
lower probabilities of becoming 
poor after the earthquake 
- 
Interpersonal 
trust at regional 
level 
Measure of trust within the 
community. (1=very trustworthy) 
Extracted from LAPOP survey 
(LAPOP, 2010) 
Level 2 Before Population living in areas with high 
levels of interpersonal trust are less 
prone to become poor after an 
earthquake  
+ 
House 
insurance 
Dummy variable that captures the 
population that did have house 
insurance against earthquakes 
(1=yes) 
Level 1 Before Individuals with insurance are less 
likely to become poor after the 
quake than the population that 
does not have insurance  
- 
Female 
households 
Single female parenthoods (1=yes, 
dummy variable) 
Level 1 Before Households led by a female 
parenthood are more likely to be 
poor after the earthquake than all 
the other types of households   
+ 
Children Presence of children in the 
household (1=yes) 
Level 1 Before Households with children are more 
likely to become poor after the 
earthquake 
+ 
Occupational 
industry  
Workers on agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries (1=yes, dummy 
variable) 
Level 1 Before  Workers on agriculture are more 
likely than the rest of employers in 
becoming poor after the 
earthquake   
+ 
Occupational 
status 
Differentiation between 
temporary workers and 
permanent workers. (1=temporary 
workers, Dummy Variable) 
Level 1 Before Temporary workers have more 
probability of becoming poor and 
being affected by the earthquake  
+ 
Social security Measures if the individual belongs 
to the social security system 
(1=belongs to social security 
system, dummy variable)  
Level 1 Before Population that might have access 
to unemployment is less likely to 
become poor after the earthquake  
- 
House quality Index of quality of the house 2009 
(ordinal) 
Level 1 Before More quality of the house before 
earthquake less likely to became 
poor and being affected by the 
earthquake 
- 
Health 
condition 
Pre Health condition (ordinal) Level 1  Before Higher the health quality before 
the earthquake lower the likelihood 
of becoming poor or being 
affected by the earthquake  
- 
Years of 
education 
Years of attending to educational 
institution (individual) 
Level 1 Before Higher the education less likely to 
be affected or poor after the 
earthquake 
- 
Age Pre Age of the individual Level 1 Before Oder the person is more likely to 
be affected by the earthquake (note 
that the model includes from 15 
years old) 
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Control variables 
Mercalli scale Scale that measures the intensity 
of the earthquake per region 
(recoded in 4 categories and 
treated as dummy) 
Level 2 After   
Number 
people 
Quantity of people living under 
the same roof (continuous)  
Level1 Before   
Income in 
2009 
Income of the individual in 2009 Level 1 Before   
Poverty at 
regional level 
Poverty levels per region Level 2 Before   
(*) Level 1 refers to individuals and Level 2 to the 15 Chilean geographical regions.  
(*1) Refers to if it was measured before or after the earthquake 
Model 
Based on the hierarchical characteristics of my data and my dependent variable I apply a 
multilevel logit model, suitable for predicting binary outcomes.  Applying a multilevel 
model instead of a normal logit regression has some advantages for the analysis of the 
results. Firstly, I am able to analyze how covariates measured at different levels of 
analysis, in this case geographical clusters, affect the dependent variable. Secondly, 
ignoring a multilevel structure can result in misleading standard errors and coefficients. 
The multilevel model in comparison with the ordinary logit produces differences in the 
coefficients. This is because the logit regression fits overall population average 
probabilities but the random effects logit model fits subject probabilities for the 
individuals (Rabe-Hesketh, 2008). The more related the observations are within the 
cluster the higher the chances of having inaccurate standard errors as a result (Rabe-
Hesketh, 2008). Also, the multilevel logit models allows for residual components at each 
level of the hierarchy. The models presented in this chapter allow for residuals at 
individual and regional levels. For this reason the residual variance is partitioned into 
‘within’ geographical areas and ‘between’ geographical areas. The between geographical 
variance represents unobserved geographical effects that affect individuals (Gelman, 
2007).  
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The regression is calculated through a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) using an 
adaptive quadrature, with five quadrature points (Rabe-Hesketh, 2008). MLE is applied 
as an alternative to non-linear least squares for nonlinear equations (Gelman, 2007). The 
model contains 27,271 observations at level 1, nested in 15 geographical clusters, at level 
2.  The model only includes one individual per household. The average observation per 
group is 1,818 persons, with a maximum of 5,258 and minimum 377. The small number 
of regions could potentially produce biased estimators, however research has shown that 
there is no effect on the standard errors of the fixed regression coefficients but mainly in 
the standard errors of the random part (Maas and Hox, 2004).  
The logit model applied is a random intercepts model that calculates the coefficients as 
with normal logit but it adds a variance component at level 2, in this case geographical 
strata. The overall regression line is the coefficient, β0, but for each group line the 
intercept is the coefficient plus the variance β0+uj.  Every regression line has the same 
slope; therefore the random intercepts model is a set of parallel lines. I choose this 
model, and not a random slopes and random intercepts model, under the assumption 
that every explanatory variable has a similar effect by geographical region. My theory 
does not predict that each variable affects differently the outcome regarding each region, 
but instead the differences are explained by other variables included in the model. I 
include explanatory variables at level 1 and explanatory variables at level 2 (contextual 
effects).  
The regression equation of the multilevel random intercepts with two levels of 
explanatory variables is: 
y ij =   + β0 + β1 x ij + β2 x 2 j + uj + eij 
                                   Level 1           Level 2          
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Where   β 0  β 1 x ij   β 2x 2 j  refer to the fixed part of the model and uj  eij to the random part 
The model tries to replicate a quasi experimental design where all the independent 
variables are measured before the earthquake (t0) and the dependent variable is measured 
after (t1). It attempts to present a causal mechanism between the occurrence of the 
earthquake (x) and shifts in the poverty levels. This holds some advantages and several 
disadvantages. First, I monitor the same individual before and after the earthquake, 
studying changes in their wealth and quality of life after the quake. With this panel I am 
able to control by several other causes that might be causing social changes for the 
person and it better isolates the effects of the earthquake. Second, this model 
dramatically improves the explanatory power of the prediction, being able to establish 
causality in a much more clear way. Regarding the disadvantages, several variables that 
could be related or associated with social capital or public spending after the earthquake 
occurred cannot be included. Because the purpose is to study causality I am not able to 
include any action taken by institutions or individuals after the earthquake happened in 
Chile. For this reason in Chapter IV and also in this chapter I give some descriptions of 
the role and effectiveness of social capital and public spending in the recovery process, 
after the earthquake. I am not able to say, empirically, that the actions taken AFTER the 
earthquake by the government or citizens reduced or increased the likelihood to be poor 
due to the catastrophe. However, I am able to say that previous levels of social capital 
and public spending did have an effect (or not) on the social impacts of the earthquake. I 
will also be able to predict changes in the levels of poverty of Chilean society due to the 
earthquake, controlling by several other possible factors. Finally, I am also able to 
identify the social and economic determinants of vulnerability, that is, who is more 
prone to suffer the social consequences of an earthquake in Chile.  
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Results  
 
Returning to the theoretical framework of this thesis, I proposed that not only disasters 
impact in dissimilar ways among the population but also that there are social and 
institutional mechanisms that might reduce the effects of quakes: public spending and 
social capital23. I maintain that social capital and governmental spending constitute two 
relevant mechanisms to attenuate the impact of the 2010 earthquake on the population. 
At the aggregated level (countries), results have shown that education, GDP per capita, 
population density, urbanization and healthcare quality are determinants of the levels of 
social vulnerability to natural disasters in Latin American societies. I have also tested the 
role of social capital, humanitarian aid and public spending as mitigation mechanisms of 
the number of casualties due to natural disasters.  
Throughout this section I study the micro foundations of the results found at the macro 
level, under the theoretical assumption that earthquakes do not impact equally among 
the population but, on the contrary, its effects are determined by the previous social 
inequalities of the societies. As theoretically stated, disasters constitute a social 
construction shaped by the social, economical and political structures inherent to the 
society. In this sense, studying the impact of the earthquake on Chilean society also gives 
a complete picture of the social structures and inequalities in the country.  
 
The first model presented in Table 4 introduces the social and demographic 
determinants of the probability of being affected by the Chilean earthquake, measured 
through the likelihood of becoming poor as a consequence.  
                                                          
23 Humanitarian aid is not tested for the Chilean case due to the lack of involvement and participation after the 
earthquake in 2010. 
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To begin with, results show that the presence of children in the family increases the 
probability of becoming poor, generating a more challenging environment to overcome 
the earthquake. The log odds of becoming poor after the quake in houses with children 
are higher, in comparison to households without children, with a significant coefficient. 
The presence of children might be shaping the probability of becoming poor for many 
reasons. Firstly, families with children are less flexible in moving to another place, having 
in general more roots to the local community related to the children´s daily lives. This 
lack of freedom can be detrimental to the chances of adults to pursue new economic 
opportunities in situations where their employment status was affected by the 
earthquake. Secondly, in case of health problems of any of the children the adult needs 
to stay in the house taking care of the child constraining the possibilities of working and 
therefore diminishing the income of the household. Thirdly, after the quake in Chile, 
many schools were closed and stopped operating. This caused thousands of children to 
remain at home when they should have been at their schools, constraining again the 
possibilities of the adult to go to work. Adding complexity to these results, Table 21 
shows that the households led by a single female parent are also more likely to become 
poor after the Chilean earthquake in comparison with all other types of household, also 
with a significant coefficient. The population segment that was one of the most socially 
vulnerable to the impacts of the Chilean quakes was, therefore, single mums with 
children in the households.  
Moving the analysis towards the occupational characteristics of the individuals, the 
regression results show that, firstly, being a seasonal worker increases the probability of 
becoming poor after the earthquake, proving that more stable workers cope 
economically better with the effect of the disaster. Being a temporal worker against a 
permanent worker increases the log odds of being poor after the earthquake by 0.37 
(Model 1, Table 21), with a significant coefficient, holding constant all other variables. 
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One possible cause can be that temporal workers are more likely to be fired if the 
company or business where they worked was closed or production suspended. After the 
Chilean earthquake 27% of national industries stopped working, according to the results 
of the post-earthquake survey (CASEN, 2010).  From these industries, 15% were still 
not operating two months after the earthquake. I argue that the fact of being a 
permanent employee will decrease the likelihood of being fired and will assure more 
stability than those who are seasonal or non-permanent workers. The reduction in non-
permanent workers is an easier and cheaper solution for employers suffering the costs of 
the natural disaster, whereas firing someone that works permanently involves paying 
unemployment compensations. 
In second place, being entitled to unemployment insurance before the earthquake 
decreases the chances of becoming poor, holding everything else constant. Between the 
population economically active in Chile 13% claimed not to have social insurance against 
unemployment at the time of the earthquake (CASEN, 2010). Once the business 
stopped working this population would not receive any subsidy or unemployment 
benefit, and therefore they become more likely to suffer the extreme economic 
consequences of becoming poor after the earthquake.  
 
Finally, another variable that could be relevant to predict an individual becoming poor 
after the earthquake is if they work in the agricultural, forestry and fisheries sector. This 
economic area was one of the most harmed after the earthquake, and of the industries 
that stopped working after the natural event, 20% belonged to the agricultural sector 
(CASEN, 2010). The results show that the population working in agriculture and 
forestry increases the likelihood of becoming poor by 0.05 in comparison with all other 
economic sectors, holding all the other variables constant. However the results do not 
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seem significant. Apparently, after having controlled by the type of contract and 
pertinence to social security system, the economic area appears not to make any 
difference in the probability of becoming poor after the earthquake.  
As analyzed in the last chapter, one of the most severe effects of the 2010 earthquake in 
Chile was the destruction of houses and infrastructures. Results of the regression show 
that being the owner of the property increases the log odds of becoming poor after the 
quake in comparison to other forms of tenancy. These results might be caused by the 
necessity and also the responsibility of the owners to rebuild houses if they were 
affected. After the Chilean earthquake, 3% of the houses were destroyed and 30% 
severely damaged.  In the most affected areas, 56% of the interviewee’s claim that they 
are going to rebuild their properties with their own savings and only a 9% will be using 
funds from national or local governments.   
Taking all this into account, being the owner of the house would imply economically 
affording the costs of rebuilding the damaged property and in very few cases the 
government supported this construction. This data backs the idea that the reconstruction 
of houses is paid for by owners, generating an increase in the probability of becoming 
poor after the earthquake. The results support the already analyzed discussion in the 
previous chapter on the efficiency and efficacy of the subsidies given by the Chilean 
government. At least 2 months after the earthquake, and the moment when this survey 
was applied, the subsidies designated to the reconstruction of houses from the 
government was extremely small, reaching a 9% of the total houses that were destroyed.  
Another important variable in this matter constitute the population that did have house 
insurance against catastrophes. The regression results (Table 21) indicate that having 
insurance against earthquakes before the event happened also diminishes the likelihood 
of becoming poor after the quake, controlling by all the other variables.  
  
155 
Besides the contextual characteristics of the house quality, ownership and type of 
occupation, other socio-demographic variables appear to be predicting the likelihood of 
becoming poor after the earthquake. Firstly, age seems to be a determinant of social 
vulnerability to the earthquake in Chile24. At one unit the age increases and the log odds 
of being poor decreases, with a significant coefficient (Model 1 Table 21). The results are 
presented below (Graph 8). Apparently, the young population found it more difficult to 
cope with and resist the impacts of the earthquake. These results support the already 
found association between the presence of children in the household and a higher 
likelihood in becoming poor due to the quake. In this sense, households with children 
and the young population hold a higher probability of becoming poor.  Based in these 
results, I argue that the Chilean earthquake does not affect equally among every age 
segment but more among children and the young population.  
Graph 8: Probability of becoming poor per age 
  
                                                          
24 The regression analysis includes only individuals older than 18 years old.  
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In the same line of argument, the health quality of individuals also predicts the likelihood 
of becoming poor due to the quake. The health status of the individual prior to the 
catastrophe seems to be a determinant of social vulnerability to the Chilean earthquake. 
Having health problems could imply more difficulties for the person to adapt to the 
economic problems arising due to the quake. Health issues can often be translated into a 
lack of mobility and further dependency on the geographical area where the person lives. 
Also, health issues could be detrimental to the capacity of individuals to find another job 
in the case their previous position being affected by the quake. Income, in this sense, 
could decrease, generating poverty.  
In addition, Table 21 shows that being educated decreases the social vulnerability to 
quakes in Chile. Under a seemingly straightforward mechanism, being educated operates 
as an insurance against the impact of the earthquake. Education provides knowledge, as 
information, and above all provides tools to cope, adapt, and respond in a better way to 
natural disasters. Knowledge is relevant in every state of natural disasters, in the 
preparedness, response and recovery stages. Being well informed of the risks and 
challenges of a possible hazard threat might imply less exposure. For example, knowing 
the risks inherent to living in coastal areas, and in potentially flood areas, could cause the 
individual to react sooner or more efficiently to a potential risk. Also, being informed 
after the disaster occurred can save several lives, with faster and more efficient response 
mechanisms. Afterwards, during the recovery process the more educated are those with 
the more opportunities to mitigate the economic impacts of the disaster. Education 
implies opportunities, and these opportunities are fundamental after a hazard shakes the 
social structures of a society. The educated are those with better and faster access to 
public goods, to jobs, subsidies, and support from the government. On the other hand, 
the less educated, with fewer resources, encounter several problems in gaining access to 
these goods after the disaster.  
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Finally, results of the regression (Table 21, Model 1) demonstrate that the log odds of 
becoming poor after the earthquake is -1.89 in an ‘average’ community, this would be a 
community with variance at level 2 u0ij = 0. The intercept of geographical region j is -
1.89 + u, where the variance of u is 0.03. This implies that in the remote case where all 
the independent variables were 0, the likelihood of being affected by the earthquake 
would be less than even odds.  
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Table 21: Probability of becoming poor after the earthquake, random intercepts logit 
multilevel model (Chile)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LEVEL 1 VARIABLES    
Government transfers before earthquake    -0.001** 
   (0.0006) 
Children  0.376***   0.369*** 0.452*** 
 0.061) (0.062) (0.059) 
Female household  0.245***     0.245*** 0.273*** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) 
Education -0.062***     -0.061*** -0.094*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) 
Unemployment  insurance -0.069 -0.069 -0.191*** 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) 
Quality of house -0.059 -0.061 -0.124*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Economic sector (agriculture) 0.066 0.071 0.008 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) 
Health quality -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.069*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Temporal employment 0.359*** 0.367*** 0.356*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) 
Age  -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.00) (0.001) 
House ownership 0.126*** 0.120** 0.192*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) 
Number of people in the household 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.139*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
House insurance  -0.556*** -0.572*** -0.622*** 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.119) 
Income 2009  -0.00*** -0.00***  
 (0.00) (0.00)  
LEVEL 2 VARIABLES     
Mercalli intensity (1 to 3), base category    
Mercalli intensity (4 to 6) 0.315** 0.276** 0.245* 
 (0.126) (0.123) (0.127) 
Mercalli intensity (7) 0.195 0.188 0.091 
 (0.129) (0.126) (0.136) 
Mercalli intensity (8 to 9) 0.328** 0.323** 0.237* 
 (0.137) (0.135) (0.143) 
Poverty 2009 (regional) 0.005 0.021* 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) 
Community Participation   -0.009**  
   (0.003)  
Interpersonal Trust   -0.001  
  (0.004)  
Government investment per capita    -0.011*** 
   (0.002) 
Constant -1.89*** -1.810*** -1.463*** 
 (0.278) (0.261) (0.298) 
Random Effects    
Variation 0.033 0.015 0.026 
 (0.0188) (0.012 (0.014) 
Observations 27,271 26,529 27,196 
Number of groups 15 15 15 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Social capital  
This section tests the hypothesis that that both bonding and bridging social capital 
decrease the social impacts of the Chilean earthquake on the population. Theoretically, I 
maintain that human beings are not mere victims of natural disasters but instead active 
actors, capable of preparing, adapting and responding to natural hazards. Network ties 
have the potentiality to reduce the impacts of disasters through the provision of shelter, 
food and other basic needs, through the diffusion of information and knowledge and 
also through pressuring local and national governments to satisfy needs and priorities. 
Furthermore, social capital can operate as emotional support for individuals. The 
regression analysis in Table 21 shows mixed outcomes regarding the role of social capital 
in Chile. 
Firstly, regarding bridging social capital, referring to the association between different 
groups and segments of the population, results show that the higher the levels of 
regional social participation the lower the probability of becoming poor after the quake, 
keeping all the other variables constant. The average levels of social participation at 
regional level, level 2 in the multilevel regression, determine a differential likelihood of 
becoming poor among individuals. The fact of living in a region that has pre-established 
mechanisms of social participation results in a decrease in the impact of any disaster in 
the long term. This variable captures the pre-established structures of participation. 
Theoretically, I argue that social participation is one of the most relevant mechanisms to 
enhance the adaptive capacity of individuals and these results confirm this prediction. In 
this sense, bridging social capital appears to be relevant to mitigating possible impacts of 
disasters on societies.  
The relevance of community participation in the process of reconstruction after any 
disasters is unquestionable (Dynes, 2006; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977).  Measures of 
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participation after the earthquake, that is if they organized with neighbors to solve 
problems and if they reacted to the earthquake collectively or individually, seem not to 
have been a widespread tool after the earthquake in Chile. The variables reflecting the 
participation mechanisms after the quake are not included in the model as they measure 
actions taken after the earthquake, causing endogeneity problems. However, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, community involvement after the quake has been questioned, 
where the reconstruction process was not led by the community but, on the contrary, by 
the national government and the private sector (Lizana, 2011; Pulgar, 2010). In Chile, 
after the earthquake, 10% of the population claimed that they were organizing with 
neighbors and among the community to rebuild their houses; obtain food, and take care 
of children and elderly.  At the epicenter of the earthquake, where the Mercalli scale 
reached level 9, 24% declared having organized with neighbors. A second question, 
regarding if after the earthquake they solved the problems arising from the quake 
collectively or individually, only 4% of the individuals in the survey declared having 
operated collectively to solve issues related to the quake. At the epicenter this percentage 
raises up to 13%.  
Regarding bonding social capital, the variable of levels of interpersonal trust at the 
regional level does not reveal any significant results. Apparently, the fact of Chilean 
society having high levels of interpersonal trust, or bonding social capital, did not 
operate dramatically to diminish the population affected. These results are consistent 
with the analysis of the role that the population played after the quake, where they opted 
mainly for individual actions to mitigate the impact of the disaster, and not collectively 
or supported by family members.  
These results could be pointing to the fact that the impact of social capital comes from 
local organizations (bridging social capital) and not from the individual network ties 
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(bonding social capital) of those harmed by the quake. For this reason, the aggregated 
variable of social participation among the community does have an impact in decreasing 
the likelihood of becoming poor but interpersonal trust does not seem to be operating to 
decrease the probability of becoming poor. In sum, living in a province that has high 
levels of social participation does have an effect on the social effects of the quake. The 
already established and operating mechanisms of social participation seem to have an 
effect in reducing the likelihood of becoming poor due to the earthquake.   
Public Spending  
Theoretically, this thesis proposes that governments, through public spending, can 
potentially increase the adaptive capacity of individuals and in that way reduce the 
impact of natural disasters, conditional on democratization levels. Firstly, public 
spending operates in many of the variables that determine social vulnerability to hazards, 
such as educational level, healthcare coverage and social security systems. Secondly, the 
actions taken by governments to prepare the country against natural disasters could 
potentially reduce the impact on the societies. Measures such as construction codes, 
infrastructures, early warning systems are implemented by nation states through public 
spending. Thirdly, public spending is crucial after earthquakes occur. Governments can 
provide public goods, such as shelter, healthcare coverage and food provision to the 
affected population. In addition, spending is required in the rebuilding process, for the 
restoration of roads, communications and the general economy.  
The analysis of public spending is divided into two items. Firstly, public spending 
measured as governmental investment per region, to capture investment in 
infrastructures, constructions and public services before the disaster occur. Secondly, 
public spending measured in transfers and benefits given to the individual as a 
proportion of the total income, also before the earthquake.  
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Results of the regression analysis, Table 21 (Model 2) shows that both public investment 
and benefits before the earthquake do decrease the likelihood of the individual to 
become poor after the earthquake. Graph 9 shows that the higher the proportion of 
income of the individual due to subsidies and transfers from the government the lower 
the predicted probability of becoming poor. The stability that transfers and benefits 
imply could operate as insurance when the quakes affect the employability of individuals. 
These results suggest that public transfers of any kind (family subsidies, education 
vouchers, housing benefits) reduce the social vulnerability to earthquakes in Chile. 
Individuals with high proportion of their salary due to benefits and subsidies have more 
tools to face the potential risks of natural disasters. In contrast, populations that depend 
on occupational income are more prone to be affected.  
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Graph 9: Predicted probabilities of becoming poor by proportion of the income due to 
transfers and benefits from the State 
 
 Secondly, the level of investment within the region significantly reduces the social 
vulnerability of the societies (Graph10). Spending on infrastructures and projects at 
regional level reduces the social vulnerability of the population, controlling for all the 
other variables. When public investment per capita reaches more than 350 million 
Chilean pesos, the likelihood of becoming poor after the quake is reduced to less than 
even odds (less than 0.5 probability). This corroborates the prediction that any public 
effort by national governments to invest in regions reduces the social vulnerability of the 
population considerably. The chances of individuals becoming poor are mitigated by 
public spending both in direct transfers and in regional investment.  
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Graph 10: Predicted Probabilities of becoming poor by public investment in the region 
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3.2. Haitian Earthquake 
  
This section tests the three leading hypotheses of this thesis using as a case study the 
Haitian Earthquake in 2010. The first hypothesis predicts that both bonding and 
bridging social capital within the society improve the adaptive capacity of individuals and 
diminishes the social vulnerability to natural disasters. Bonding social capital, referring to 
the connections between individuals (Putnam, 2001), could mitigate the impact of the 
earthquake through the provision of food, shelter and health attention in the initial days 
after the quake impacted. Furthermore, social capital is an important provider of 
information and knowledge, both in the preparedness face and also in the response and 
recovery stages after the occurrence of a disaster. Knowing and holding accurate 
information could potentially reduce the impact of the earthquake. Finally, emotional 
support can also contribute to a better and faster recovery for the population affected by 
a catastrophe. Bridging social capital, referring to the association between different 
groups, could potentially stimulate the power the society has to express demands and 
concerns to the authorities. Also, pre-existent organizations can operate as providers of 
food, shelter and medical attention to the victims of the natural disaster.  
The second hypothesis of this thesis, and being empirically tested for the Haitian 2010 
earthquake, is that public spending reduces social vulnerability to natural disasters 
through the reinforcement of the adaptive capacity of the society. Public funds could 
operate both in reducing the social determinants of vulnerability, as healthcare coverage, 
education levels, housing quality, and also by directly supporting the community in the 
preparedness, responses and adaptation stages of natural disasters.  
The third hypothesis is that humanitarian aid reduces the effects of natural disasters 
among the population. In Haiti disaster relief aid played an enormous role in the 
aftermath of the 2010 earthquakes. US$5.6 billion were pledged by several organizations 
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in the international community, and were distributed in different areas such as 
healthcare, food, security and early response activities (CAP, 2012). This aid could 
potentially stimulate the adaptive capacity of individuals and reduce the social 
vulnerability to the earthquake.  
Research Design 
Data 
The analysis is based in the final wave of the Americas Barometer applied in Haiti in July 
2010, after the earthquake, carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project, 
LAPOP (2010). For comparative purposes the 2008 and 2006 waves are included in 
some sections of the analysis, with 1,625 and 1,536 cases respectively.  
The 2010 wave was designed by LAPOP to specifically assess the impact of the 
earthquake, including a special sample of population living in tents and in affected areas. 
The survey was applied to a total of 1,724 people, older than 18 years of age. These were 
face to face interviews conducted through a stratified sample, representing five main 
regional areas of Haiti. The sample comprises of 43 primary sampling units and 176 final 
sampling units. A total of 720 respondents were surveyed in urban areas and1,032 in 
rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.34. 
 
The sample represents five main geographical regions of Haiti and each stratum was 
further sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. The respondents were chosen in clusters 
of 6 to 8 interviews in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. As the dataset includes an 
oversample of the displaced population living in tents a sample weight was applied in 
order to achieve representativeness at the national level. The weight was created by 
LAPOP and included in the dataset.  
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of the model is if individual income decreased during the last 
two years, constructing a dummy with values ‘1’ for the individuals for whom the 
income did decrease or ‘0’ for individuals for whom the income did not decrease. 
Specifically, the question applied in the survey was: ‘Over the past two years, has the income of 
your household:  (1) Increased? (2) Remained the same? (3) Decreased?’ 
The distribution of the variable resulted in 561 cases where income decreased (40% of 
the sample) and 855 cases where income did not decrease (60%) (Table 22).   
Table 22: Proportion of individuals for whom Income decreased over previous 2 years 
 Freq Percent 
Did not decrease 855 60.3 
Decrease 561 39.6 
Total 1416 100 
  
The variables constitute the best proxy to study changes in the levels of income of the 
population before and after the earthquake although have several limitations. Firstly, the 
same measure is not applied in Chile; therefore the comparative power of the study is 
limited. Secondly, the income might have decreased but this does not necessarily mean 
an increase in levels of poverty, as shown by the dependent variable applied for the 
Chilean analysis. Thirdly, because of the lack of a panel design, I am unable to determine 
a causal effect of the earthquake on income. Despite the limitations I argue that the 
variable still captures an effect of the earthquake on the income of the individuals. 
Firstly, although extensive data is limited on the effects of the earthquake on poverty, the 
LAPOP surveys did measure household wellbeing through a number of indicators 
(LAPOP, 2010). A comparison of the same index with 2008 and 2006 shows a decrease 
of wellbeing in the population in 2010, after the earthquake (Graph 11). In 2010, 35.2% 
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of the interviewees fall in the lowest quintile of wealth, whereas in 2006 the level was 
24.5%. The biggest difference occurs in rural areas, where in 2010, almost 6 out of every 
10 individuals (57%) fall into the first quintile of wealth, in comparison with 31% in 
2008, and 30% in 2006. In contrast, in urban areas the amount of population in the 
lowest quintile of wealth decreased to 4% in 2010, from 8% in 2008 and 14% in 2010. 
This results show the changes suffered by the population after the earthquake, especially 
in the rural areas of the country where poverty is centered (Sletten, 2004). A post-
earthquake report conducted by LAPOP researchers (Zephyr, 2011) supports the idea 
that the main event that Haiti suffered during 2009 and 2010 was indeed the earthquake, 
validating the pertinence of the question as dependent variable. Secondly, as shown in 
the previous chapter, the earthquake did have a major economic impact in Haiti, with an 
increase in unemployment rates and a decrease in the GDP per capita (IASC, 2010). In 
conclusion, both survey data and structural data show that the earthquake did have a 
major impact on the social and economical situation of the population. The dependent 
variable proposed in this model is pertinent in the sense that is the best proxy to capture 
a change in income before and after the natural disaster.  
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Graph 11: Percentage of population falling in each quintile of wealth by year 
 
 
Independent Variables 
Three central independent variables are included to measure the hypotheses of this 
thesis. Firstly, two variables measuring humanitarian aid are incorporated. The 
international subsidy variable captures if the individual received subsidies for food from 
an international agency during the last month. The question applied in the survey is ‘Did 
you receive any subsidy for food from an international organization in the last four weeks?’ Secondly, I 
include a dummy variable that captures the population living in displaced camps (where 
shelter, healthcare coverage and food was provided) against the population that still lives 
in houses. The operation of the displaced camps was funded almost entirely by 
humanitarian aid, in this sense it constitutes a good proxy of the effectiveness of the 
disaster relief in decreasing social vulnerability to the earthquake. In conclusion, I 
distinguish between two main actions taken by the international community to palliate 
the impact of the disaster among the Haitian population: food distribution and shelter 
provision.   
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To measure public spending I include the amount of population that did receive food 
fee from the national government. The question is ‘Did you receive any subsidy for food from 
the government in the last four weeks?’ 
 
To capture bonding social capital I include two measures. Firstly, the proportion of the 
population that receives remittances from abroad. The measure has been applied as a 
proxy of the ties between individuals on several occasions. (Adger et al., 2002; Levitt, 
1998). It was also applied to measure social capital when studying the aggregated results, 
in Chapter III. The question in the survey is  ‘Do you or someone else living in your household 
receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad?’ (LAPOP, 2010).  
 
The second measure of bonding social capital is the widely used measure of 
interpersonal trust. The variable has been extensively used as a measure of bonding 
social capital (Newton, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 2001) and I also incorporate it to 
study the Chilean earthquake and the macro level comparison in Chapter III. The 
question is ‘Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this 
community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?’ 
(LAPOP, 2010).  I aggregate the responses between those that answered ‘very 
trustworthy’ and “trusthworthy”becoming a dummy variable.  
To measure bridging social capital I include two measures. Firstly, a variable capturing if 
the individual participated in protests during the last year. The question applied in the 
survey was ‘In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?’ 
(LAPOP, 2010).  I also dichotomize the variable to two options (did participate and did 
not participate). This variable was also included to measure social capital in the macro 
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level comparison, Chapter III. Second, I include a variable summarizing if the person 
attempted to solve a problem in the community or neighborhood during the last year. 
The question applied was ‘Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help 
to solve a problem in your community or in your or neighborhood.  Please, tell me if you did it at least 
once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in last 12 months’. I generate a 
dummy variable, with value ‘1’ with everyone that at least participated once or twice a 
year.  
Another set of independent variables are included to study the determinants of social 
vulnerability. In terms of occupation, three variables are included, capturing if the 
individual is unemployed, if they are a temporary worker and if he or she works in 
agriculture. Regarding household structure, I include if the household is led by single 
females, the presence of children in the home and the number of people in the house. 
Regarding individual characteristics, I include the age, education level, and if the person 
needed healthcare attention during the last year. Finally, as control variable I include a 
regional average of household wealth in 2008. Using the 2008 LAPOP wave, I calculate 
the mean levels of wealth of income by geographical census segments (149 groups), in 
order to control by the levels of poverty within the region. Because the data is not in 
panel format I am not able to directly associate the results from the variable in 2008 with 
the individuals in 2010, for that reason an average per census stratum is calculated.  
 As independent variable, the intensity of the earthquake is integrated, based on the 
Mercalli scale declared for each geographical area for the Haitian earthquake (U.S.GS, 
2004). As in Chile’s model each category of the Mercalli scale is included as a dummy, to 
control by strength of the earthquake.  
Table 23 describes the main dependent, independent and control variables, together with 
the prediction behind each indicator.  
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Table 23: Variables and Predictions in Logit Model. Haitian Earthquake.   
VARIABLES Description  Mechanism Predic
ted 
Effect 
Dependent variable   
Poverty Individuals that their income decreased in 
the two years (dummy 1=decreased) 
  
Independent variable   
Social capital 
Remittances  Individuals that receive remittances from 
abroad (dummy = receive remittances) 
Individuals that receive remittances are less 
likely to have affected their total income by 
the earthquake 
- 
Trust Interpersonal Trust among individuals 
(dummy = very trustworthy and 
trustworthy) 
Higher the levels of interpersonal trust 
lower the probability of having a decrease 
in income due to the earthquake  
- 
Protest Individuals that participated in protest 
(dummy = 1)  
Social participation reduces the likelihood 
of a decrease in income after 2010 Haitian 
earthquake 
- 
Participation Individuals that participated in solving 
community problems (dummy= at least 
once in the last) 
Social participation reduces the likelihood 
of a decrease in income after 2010 Haitian 
earthquake 
- 
Public Spending 
National 
subsidy  
Population that received a food subsidy 
during the last year from the national 
government (Dummy =received subsidy)  
Population that received subsidy is less 
likely to have their income decreased 
during the last year 
- 
Humanitarian Aid 
Tents Population that has been internally 
displaced and is currently living in tents. 
(Dummy=living in tents)  
Individuals that live in tents are less likely 
to have their income decreased 
- 
International 
subsidy 
Population that received a food subsidy 
during the last year from international 
organizations. (Dummy=received subsidy) 
Population that received subsidy is less 
likely to have their income decreased 
during the last year 
- 
Social Determinants  
Children Presence of children in the household 
(Dummy = children in household) 
Households with children are more likely 
to become poor after the earthquake 
+ 
Number of 
people  
Number of people in household, interval 
variable 
More people in the household less likely 
the household income decreased 
- 
Health 
attention 
Dummy variable that summarizes the 
population that needed health attention the 
last year (1=yes) 
Individuals that needed health attention are 
more likely to have their income decreased 
after the earthquake 
+ 
Female Dummy Variable 1 Females Females are more likely to be affected and 
become poor by the earthquake  
+ 
Work in 
agriculture 
Workers on agriculture (1=yes, dummy 
variable) 
Workers on agriculture are more likely than 
the rest of employers in becoming poor 
after the earthquake   
+ 
Unemployed Dummy variable that distinguishes between 
unemployed and the rest of the population 
(1=unemployed) 
Unemployed population has more 
probability of having their income 
decreased after the earthquake  
- 
Temporary 
worker 
Differentiation between temporary workers 
and permanent workers. (1=yes, Dummy 
Variable) 
Temporary workers have more probability 
of becoming poor and being affected by 
the earthquake  
+ 
Education 
Level 
Variable that measures 12 levels of 
education attainment  
More educated population is less likely to 
decrease their income after the earthquake  
- 
Age Age of the individual Older the individual is more likely to have 
their income decrease after the earthquake  
+ 
Rural area Dummy variable for rural area (1=rural)  Rural population is more likely to have 
their income decreased after the earthquake 
+ 
Control variables  
Mercalli scale Scale that measures the intensity of the 
earthquake per region  
Is used as control for the intensity of the 
earthquake. I assume that more intensity 
more likelihood of having the income 
decreased after the event 
+ 
Poverty in the 
area  
Average of wealth in 2008 per census 
stratum (149 groups)    
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Model 
A logit model is applied with clustered standard errors per 149 geographical segments 
(census strata) and weighted to correct for the oversample of the internal displaced 
population. The weight was already designed by LAPOP and included in the dataset. 
The clustering is done to control by interclass correlation (Gelman, 2007). The model 
uses a logit function, where the changes in the probability are not linear. The equation is:  
 
 
Accuracy of the model is measured by the area under the ROC curve. An area of 1 
represents a perfect test whereas an area of 0.5 represents a worthless test. In the Haitian 
model of social capital, the area under the ROC curve of the model is 0.72, correctly 
classifying 71% of the cases, for humanitarian aid it correctly classifies 67% of the cases 
and for the model of public spending 67% of the cases.  
A multilevel model is not included due to the small amount of cases in each potential 
stratum, if dividing the sample in 149 segments. Also, there is not enough contemporary 
statistical data to aggregate as a second level of analysis.   
  
0 1 1 2 2
ˆ
ln
ˆ(1 )
k kb b X b X b X


 
    
 
  
174 
Results 
Results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 25. The first model presents the 
social determinants of vulnerability to the earthquake in Haiti, without including any 
mitigation mechanism. The second model tests the hypothesis that social capital 
decreases the social vulnerability to the quake in Haiti. Thirdly, Model 3 and Model 4 
study the hypotheses that public spending and humanitarian aid, respectively, decrease 
the vulnerability to the earthquake, through a stimulation of the adaptive capacity.  
Coming back to the theoretical argument of this thesis, I maintain that disasters, in this 
case earthquakes, impact in dissimilar way among the population and these differences 
are a reflection of the social inequalities and lack of opportunities within the society. As 
both the sociology of disasters and social vulnerability theory propose, disasters occur 
when human beings are affected, being a socially constructed image of pre-existent social 
structures. How disasters develop depends on the previous social, political and 
economical characteristics of the affected area, therefore the impact is dynamic and 
varies within time and space. For the case of the Haitian earthquake, I suggest that the 
household structure, occupational characteristics and age, education and health quality 
can determine the social vulnerability of an individual.  
Firstly, regarding demographic determinants in Haiti, I found that age holds a significant 
effect on the probability of having the income decreased due to the earthquake. Results 
show the likelihood of being affected increases with the age of the respondent (Table 25, 
Model 1). In Chile results showed the opposite, with the young population being more 
prone to becoming poor after the quake. As in Chile, the survey is not capturing children 
because it is applied to individuals older than 18. However, results seem to be showing 
that the youth were less permeable to the impact of the quake in Chile and the elderly in 
Haiti. Many reasons can be shaping these results. Firstly, almost 47% of the people 
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under 24 years old in Haiti continued with their studies, despite the occurrence of the 
earthquake. Their income was not affected and most probably stayed the same as before 
the catastrophe. Secondly, among the population older than 48 years old, around 24% 
spend their time taking care of the home and 10% are pensioners or retired (Table 24). 
Despite 30% of the population being older than 48 years old and working, 10% are 
temporary workers (against 2% of seasonal workers among the population younger than 
24). In conclusion, the instability of jobs, the lack of a secure income among the 
household, and the need of taking care of the elderly and youth results in the older the 
individual the higher the levels of social vulnerability in Haiti.  
 
Table 24: Occupation of the population by age  
 18 to 24 25 to 30 31 to 39 40 to 48 More than 
48 
Total 
       
Working 15.1 20.86 36.99 39.77 37.45 29.48 
Not working, but have a 
job 
1.32 1.91 1.72 3.05 2.91 2.15 
Actively looking for a job 23.18 35.99 33.86 24.38 14 26.44 
A student 47.28 25.48 5.64 2.61 2.18 17.88 
Taking care of the home 6.89 11.78 16.3 21.77 24 15.71 
Retired, a pensioner 0 0.16 0.63 1.16 10.18 2.12 
Not working and not 
looking for a job 
6.23 3.82 4.86 7.26 9.27 6.23 
TOTAL  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: LAPOP (2010) 
Apart from age, females seem to be more vulnerable to the effect of quakes, with a 
significant positive coefficient of 0.3 (Table 25, Model 1). Also, households led by 
females, in comparison with the rest, tend to be more vulnerable to the earthquake. 
Holding everything else constant, households led by a female against those led by a male 
raise the log odds of having a income decrease by 0.41. The gendered nature of natural 
disasters have been long analyzed by many scholars (Barry, 2008; Neumayer and 
Plümper, 2007) my argument supports those findings but also argues that vulnerability is 
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even deeper in female led households where the female is responsible for maintaining 
the family. The reasons behind these findings are quite straightforward. Firstly, 
historically, despite the earthquake, females have more difficulties in entering the job 
market, and even more when they are head of the family. This inequality becomes more 
serious after an earthquake when not only the economic situation of the country is 
affected, causing disruption to many economic activities, but also the daily routine is 
affected. Closed schools, destroyed houses, and health problems are some of the many 
problems that families need to face, and such situation become even more difficult to 
face for single mothers. The survey shows that in Haiti almost 24% of females are 
responsible of taking care of the home (against 5% among men with the same 
responsibility) and 30% are working, against 37% among males. The fragile situation of 
females in the labor market, accentuated when they are head of the household, generates 
an increase in their levels of vulnerability due to the earthquake. Continuing with other 
dimensions of the household structure, the number of people in the home also seems to 
have an impact on the likelihood of a decrease in income. The greater the number of 
people living in the household the lower the likelihood of a decrease in income after the 
earthquake. The variable measuring presence of children in the household seems not to 
have a significant effect on the likelihood of experiencing income decrease, holding 
everything else constant.  
Regarding occupational predictors, seasonal and temporary workers seem to be more 
likely to have their income decreased, holding everything else constant. The 
precariousness of employment plays a large role in shaping the vulnerability to natural 
disasters. As shown in the previous chapter, soon after the Haitian earthquake the 
economic sector of the country was severely affected. Those that had temporary 
contracts, and therefore not in permanent positions, suffer the biggest social 
consequences.  
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Working in agriculture, being educated, being the owner of the property or needing 
healthcare attention during the last year does not seem to have a significant effect in the 
probability of a decrease in income after the earthquake in Haiti.  
Finally, is important to point out that the regression shows that the intensity of the 
earthquake does not increase the probability of having income decreased during the 
previous two years. Far from that, the first model indicates that living at the epicenter of 
the earthquake (Mercalli X) reduces the log odds of a decrease in income by -1.13 in 
comparison with living in an area where the intensity of the earthquake was lower 
(Mercalli IV), holding everything else constant. Each increase in the Mercalli level 
reduces the probability of experiencing a decrease in income due to the quake.  
Several reasons can be used in explaining these contra intuitive results. Firstly, subsidies 
and funding from agencies and NGOs might have attenuated the decrease in income 
mostly in the areas where the intensity of the earthquake was high. The results of the 
survey show that between those that received national subsidies for food during the last 
month, 80% were in areas affected by the earthquake (LAPOP, Haiti 2010). In the case 
of international subsidies, 78% of the population that received funding belonged to the 
affected areas of Haiti. Against all predictions, belonging to an affected area minimizes 
the chances of experiencing a decrease in income, whereas the provinces that suffered 
the earthquake at a lower intensity are more likely to have their income affected. These 
findings show that it is not only the population living at the epicenter of the earthquake 
that is vulnerable to disasters. Another reason for these results can be that, coincidently, 
the epicenter of the earthquake was in the wealthiest region of Haiti, the capital. The 
incidence of poverty in the capital is lower than in the remainder of the country, being 
impoverished in Haiti is predominantly a rural phenomenon. As shown by Sletten (2004) 
in the province Ouest, where the capital is situated, and the poverty headcount is 62% 
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against 94% in the Nord East province. This context, together with the regression 
results, could be indicating that despite the intensity of the earthquake the rural areas of 
the country are still more vulnerable than the capital. The regression model includes as 
independent variable the population living in rural areas, showing a significant and 
negative coefficient in predicting a decrease in income. Nevertheless, a control by region, 
cluster by province, and controls by wealth should control these effects.  
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Table 25: Probability of decreased income after 2010 earthquake. Logit Model. Haiti 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Public subsidy   -0.446**  
   (0.180)  
Living in displacements 
camps 
   -1.014*** 
    (0.245) 
International subsidy    -0.0324 
    (0.156) 
Remittances  -0.630***   
  (0.153)   
Interpersonal Trust  0.256   
  (0.186)   
Protest participation  0.590***   
  (0.185)   
Community participation  -0.356**   
  (0.150)   
Health attention in the last 
year 
-0.114 -0.0697 -0.118 -0.124 
 (0.139) (0.144) (0.142) (0.139) 
Work in agriculture -0.254 -0.281 -0.250 -0.174 
 (0.341) (0.356) (0.336) (0.344) 
Female household 0.418** 0.385* 0.379* 0.356* 
 (0.197) (0.204) (0.201) (0.200) 
Unemployed 0.711*** 0.776*** 0.656*** 0.676*** 
 (0.151) (0.163) (0.150) (0.155) 
Female 0.305** 0.307* 0.318** 0.311** 
 (0.153) (0.161) (0.153) (0.155) 
Property owner 0.009 0.0213 -0.0145 0.0244 
 (0.148) (0.157) (0.147) (0.151) 
Seasonal worker -0.421*** -0.505*** -0.416*** -0.419*** 
 (0.147) (0.157) (0.149) (0.149) 
Urban area -0.452** -0.396* -0.448** -0.290 
 (0.201) (0.207) (0.200) (0.198) 
Education level -0.025 -0.004 -0.0246 -0.0229 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.0210) (0.0208) 
Children in the household -0.106 0.016 -0.0600 -0.0889 
 (0.163) (0.168) (0.167) (0.170) 
Age  0.014** 0.015** 0.0137** 0.0135** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.00625) (0.00624) 
Number of people in the 
house 
-0.132*** -0.107*** -0.134*** -0.210*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.0287) (0.0390) 
Wealth of the region 2008 -0.302 -0.401 -0.349 -0.305 
 (0.323) (0.338) (0.318) (0.311) 
Mercalli V           -0.524** -0.433** -0.447** -0.541** 
 (0.216) (0.220) (0.215) (0.218) 
Mercalli VIII -0.994*** -0.976*** -0.869*** -0.895*** 
 (0.277) (0.296) (0.271) (0.285) 
Mercalli IX -0.562*** -0.448** -0.459** -0.434** 
 (0.198) (0.193) (0.198) (0.201) 
Mercalli X -1.139*** -1.133*** -1.019*** -0.933*** 
 (0.289) (0.313) (0.277) (0.286) 
Constant 0.466 0.403 0.520 0.888** 
 (0.389) (0.407) (0.389) (0.413) 
     
Observations 1,280 1,226 1,267 1,273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Social capital  
From a theoretical point of view, supported by the sociology of disasters and 
vulnerability theory, I maintain that human beings do not panic or act erratically after a 
natural disaster, but quite on the contrary, the affected populations have the potentiality 
(or capacity) to react, respond and adapt to environmental threats. The strength of 
networks ties, or social capital, is one of the mechanisms of the society that can reinforce 
the adaptive capacity. I further maintain that two dimensions of social capital, referring 
to the ties between individuals and secondly to the relations between different groups, 
operate in dissimilar way to reduce the impact of disasters.  
The results, in Table 25 (Model 2), show that the bonds between individuals (bonding 
social capital) reduce the log odds of having a decrease in income due to the earthquake 
in Haiti. Having remittances from family abroad is a direct mitigator of the economic 
impact of the quake on the households. Not only does it represent a measure of network 
ties but, in this case, also implies a direct influence in the dependent variable that is, 
experiencing an income decrease. The coefficient is negative, and significant, keeping all 
other variables constant. The second variable to measure relationship strengths between 
people is interpersonal trust. In this case the levels of trust between individuals, as a 
measure of bonding social capital, appear not to be significantly related to the likelihood 
of having the income decreased during the last two years.  
Moving forward to the results regarding bridging social capital, measured through 
community participation and protest participation, results show that individuals that 
participated at least once in the year in any type of community action are less likely, by -
0.381, to have a decrease in income after the quake in respect to those that did not 
participate, holding every other variable constant. Results of the regression show that the 
social participation of the individual has a significant effect on the likelihood of a 
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decrease in income. People that claim to have participated in any type of community 
action reduce the log odds of having their income decreased, suggesting a possible 
positive effect of participating in the local community in attenuating the impact of the 
earthquake. 
As addressed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, I maintain that one of the most 
important mechanisms of the resilience of a community against natural disasters is 
community participation, and in the Haitian case participation seems to be having a 
positive effect in enhancing the adaptive capacity of individuals, holding everything else 
constant. A possible reason behind these results could be that the wealthier population is 
the one that tends to participate in the local community and also those who suffered less 
from a decrease in income. This would imply a reinforcing cycle between participation 
and wealth, attenuating a decrease in income after the earthquake. Social vulnerability to 
natural disasters, therefore, could not only be caused by a low level of wealth but also by 
the social attitudes that accompany it, low levels of social participation in the local 
community. Apart from this, the results anyway suggest that at same levels of income 
(control variable), social participation has a significant influence in attenuating the impact 
of the earthquake. Participation, hand in hand with bonding social capital, could be 
offering more tools to socially and economically cope with the disaster.  
In relation to participation in protests, Table 8 (Model 2) shows that those who 
participated in a protest in the last year are more prone to decreased income. 
Theoretically, I claim that one of the mechanisms under which bridging social capital is 
used to mitigate impacts of disasters is through the participation in protest, as a way to 
communicate demands and needs to the authorities. Both in Chile and in Haiti after the 
quakes protests where used as a way to communicate demands and show discontent with  
the reconstruction process being carried out by international organizations in the case of 
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Haiti, and the government in the case of Chile. But those that participated were the ones 
most affected by the quake, those that saw their house destroyed, their jobs gone and 
quality of life affected. These facts made them gather and participate in protest or 
demonstrations to claim and communicate their needs to the authorities. In this case the 
social action did not bring an immediate mitigation effect on the social results of the 
quake, showing a significantly positive coefficient between those that protested and a 
decrease in income, in the case of Haiti (Table 8, Model 2). Many reasons might be 
shaping these results. Firstly, among the people that protested, 20% lived in areas that 
have been affected by the quake, against 14% in other areas (significant chi2), and the 
reasons for the protests were mainly economic factors (48% of these protests where due 
to economic factors). The results could be capturing that the population that suffered 
the most from the quake is the one protesting and demonstrating. Secondly, group social 
action does not necessarily favor those that participate. In the case of protest and 
demonstrations it might be the case that the whole of Haitian society beneficiates from 
the action taken by a few.  
Public spending and Humanitarian aid 
The results of the regression confirm the hypothesis that public spending reduces the 
probability of a decrease in income due to the earthquake in Haiti. Table 8 (Model 3) 
shows that having received national subsidies for food, during the last month, decreases 
the log odds of a decrease in income by -0.446, controlling for all other variables. As 
predicted, the subsidies seem to be attenuating the economic and social impact of the 
earthquake, although with this design I am not able to show causality I can acknowledge 
that both variables, subsidies and a decrease in income, have an inverse relationship.  
The predicted probabilities of a decrease in income after the earthquake disaggregated 
between those who received subsidies and is not presented in Table 26. The results show 
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that the population living in affected areas and who received national subsidies hold the 
lowest probability of an income decrease after the earthquake (0.203). In contrast, the 
population that lives in non-affected areas (Mercalli scale IV and V) hold the maximum 
social vulnerability.  
Table 26: Predicted probabilities of a decrease in income by affected and subsidies 
 Public Food fee  
Affected No Yes 
No 0.5201   0.3799 
 
Yes 0.3112   0.2034 
 
These findings are consistent with the findings of Model 1, where I found that the 
higher the Mercalli scale the smaller the probability of a decrease in income. Results are 
consistently indicating that the population that lives in areas where the earthquake had 
low intensity is suffering the most of the effects, at least in terms of incidences of 
poverty. One of the reasons behind these results could be a consequence of 80% of the 
subsidies being mainly distributed around the epicenter of the earthquake. Immediately 
after the quake occurred, those more vulnerable were most probably at the epicenter. 
The need for food, shelter and healthcare attention together with search and rescue 
activities could potentially save hundreds of lives in these most affected areas. However, 
results of the regression analysis indicate that after a few months, and after public 
spending was distributed, the population living at the periphery of the epicenter started 
suffering the most from the social and economical consequences.  
Regarding the third hypothesis of this thesis, that humanitarian aid enhances the 
adaptive capacity of individuals and reduces the impact of natural disasters, results go in 
opposite directions. For the case of international subsidies for food, the effect or 
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relationship appears to be not significant. Disaster relief in food does not appear to have 
an impact on the decrease of income. Two main reasons can potentially be shaping these 
findings. Firstly, results could be showing that international agencies have several 
problems in the redistribution of resources, despite Haiti being undoubtedly one of the 
most important donor destinations of money from developed countries (Cavallo, 2010 ). 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, some scholars and journalists have addressed 
this issue of the chaotic situation of the international aid in Haiti, with hundreds of 
organizations operating in the territory with high levels of disorganization and difficulty 
in coordinating activities and target populations (OCHA, 2012; Provost, 2012). These 
results could be supporting the idea that the performance of international aid in Haiti 
has been problematic, at least in attenuating a decrease in income for individuals. The 
second possibility behind these results can be that the objective of international aid 
exceeds the provision of subsidies for food, targeting housing, reconstruction of 
infrastructures, and healthcare coverage. Therefore, the impact of international aid is 
being captured by other variables in the model, as housing, healthcare or education. 
According to the World Bank data, in Haiti in 2011 there were 30 financed activities, 
working in 320 locations, with a total investment of $594,000 million. Of this aid, only 
14% belongs to projects related to food and water. Also, the Consolidated Appeal from 
International Organizations in 2012 (CAP, 2012) shows that there are around 4,500 
million people in need of food and just 1,200 million covered by international food 
subsidies. As deeply analyzed in the last chapter, the gap in the area of food, between the 
population in need and that actually targeted, is dramatically larger than the gap existent 
in any other social area. Furthermore, the population needing food provision extensively 
exceeds those needing shelter or health attention (CAP, 2012). This lack of coverage and 
effectiveness in the redistribution of food fees is severely impacting the population, 
without the capacity to attenuate the social vulnerability levels of the society.  
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Despite the lack of efficiency of the food subsidy in reducing social vulnerability, Model 
3 shows that living in displaced camps, against the remainder of the population, tends to 
reduce the probability of decreased income, holding every other variable constant. 
Apparently the fact of living in the camps decreases the vulnerability of individuals. 
Starting from the understanding that the displaced camps were mainly financed by 
humanitarian aid, results corroborate the hypothesis that disaster relief does decrease the 
likelihood of becoming poor (or experiencing income decrease) after the earthquake in 
Haiti. The reasons seem quite straightforward. Families living in the camps received 
food, healthcare attention and shelter. However, caution should be taken when analyzing 
these results because it was not until a few months after the earthquake that enormous 
problems started to occur among the displaced population. As analyzed in the previous 
chapter, there was an increase in sexual crime, an outbreak of cholera and increasing 
social tension due to the absence of a permanent solution for homeless families. Because 
the survey was applied just two months after the quake it might be possible that my 
results are capturing the short term effect of humanitarian aid on shelter, without 
including the long term problems.  
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4. Conclusions  
 
The quakes had major effects on the probability of becoming poor in Chile and on the 
likelihood of having income decreased in Haiti. These impacts were not suffered in the 
same way by the whole population. Mothers with children, seasonal workers, 
populations with health problems and those not educated were among those with higher 
levels of vulnerability to both earthquakes in Haiti and Chile.  
Regarding the adaptation tools, social capital operated as a mitigation mechanism in both 
countries, although with some differences. In Chile results show that social participation 
before the catastrophe occurs, that is pre-established groups or community committees, 
reduced the immediate impact of disasters. However, bonding social capital, that is the 
ties between individuals, did not significantly operate to reduce the social impacts of the 
earthquake. However in Haiti, both bonding and bridging social capital decreased the 
likelihood of having income decreased after the quake. Caution should be taken with the 
Haitian results as I am unable to isolate the effects of the quake as well as was possible 
with Chile, and the model does not clearly study causality. Despite this limitation I am 
able to say that interpersonal trust, at least remittances inflows, and social participation 
are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of loosing income after the quake.  
To turn to humanitarian aid and public spending which did not operate as predicted in 
every case. As analyzed in the previous chapter, both Chile and Haiti encounter 
problems in the distribution of aid and public spending after the disasters occurred. 
Results in Haiti show that subsidies were successful in reducing social vulnerability 
within the epicenter of the quake but not as successful in peripheral areas. These 
findings could be suggesting that not necessarily are the most affected areas the only 
ones vulnerable, but also the rest of the country, through indirect impacts. Furthermore, 
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millions of Haitians are still in need of food, meaning that the humanitarian aid has been 
totally ineffective in covering the needs of the entire population. In the area of shelter 
provision, the effectiveness of aid was higher, with a decrease in the levels of the 
vulnerability of the population living in displaced camps. 
 In the Chilean case, because of the type of model the actions taken by the government 
after the quake were not included in the model. However, results point to the fact that 
the Chilean Government was successful in shaping the determinants of social 
vulnerability through public spending before the disaster occurred. Individuals receiving 
subsidies and transfers before the quake occurred are less prone to became poor due to 
the catastrophe.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Natural disasters occur when a hazard, of any kind, affects a population. The degree in 
which societies are affected depends on their levels of vulnerability but also on their 
capacity to prepare, cope and respond.  This thesis is centered in studying the adaptation 
capacity of societies to natural disasters, focusing in possible actions taken by institutions 
and human beings to reduce the impact of natural disasters.  
Regarding the role of institutions, I ground my analysis in the conviction that the 
incentives of agencies and foreign countries to contribute in the preparedness and 
reconstruction process after a natural disaster is determined by several political and 
economical dimensions. Exposure, size, international pressure, and possible economic 
benefits are some of the numerous drivers behind a foreign country’s commitment to 
contribute assistance and aid in cases of natural catastrophe. National governments also 
make political decisions regarding how large the impact of the disaster is, where it strikes, 
how visible the impact is, and the probable political consequences that the lack of action 
might cause.  
But despite how decisions are made and the causes or drivers of aid, this thesis studies 
how effective disaster relief aid and public funding is in enhancing the adaptation 
capacity of societies to natural disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean. My thesis 
contributes to the understanding of how institutions can potentiality diminish the impact 
of natural disasters, not only operating on the social determinants of vulnerability (such 
as healthcare, housing, and education) but also acting in the preparedness, response and 
reconstruction processes before, during and after a natural disaster. I also point out that 
both temporal and spatial aspects determine a differential role of public spending and 
disaster relief aid in reducing the impact of disasters. The preparedness, early recovery 
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and reconstruction phases apply and demand different types of funds to decrease social 
effects. Finally, throughout the thesis I take forward the idea that the institutional 
framework of a country mediates the way spending and disaster relief aid mitigate the 
impact of disasters. Within democracies public spending tends to be more effective in 
reducing the effects of natural disasters than in autocracies. In contrast, disaster relief aid 
finds fewer difficulties in applying funding and reconstruction plans in autocratic 
environments. The incentives, decision process and geo-political strategies vary from 
autocracies to democracies, generating a differential outcome regarding the investment 
to be made in preventing, preparing or responding to a natural disaster.  
Apart from institutions and national governments, I argue further that the population 
itself holds the potentiality to prepare, adapt and respond to natural disasters. Social 
capital has been widely studied as a tool or mechanism of response to natural disasters, 
both by social vulnerability theory (Adger, 2003; Pelling, 1998) and the sociology of 
disasters (Buckle, 2006; Dynes, 2006). Throughout this thesis I have argued that social 
capital reinforces the adaptation capacity of societies to natural disasters in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. This thesis suggests two new elements for the development 
of the studies of social capital and disasters. First, I distinguish between the role of 
bridging social capital and bonding social capital as stimulators to the adaptive capacity 
of individuals. I claim that the way horizontal network ties operate to enhance the 
adaptive capacity of individuals is different from the role occupied by social 
organizations and community involvement. Bonding social capital functions by 
providing knowledge, assistance and support between family members or closest ties, 
before, within, and after disasters occur. On the other hand, bridging social capital, 
operate in a more extensive way, giving support to anyone in need and not necessarily 
with the aim of solving their own problems but instead community problems. The 
  
190 
beneficiary of the action, in this case, is not the individual or a family member (as with 
bonding social capital) but instead a collective or community.  
Apart from the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital, I also include a 
temporal and spatial dimension on the analysis of the role of social capital and disasters, 
sustaining that the role of social networks fluctuates in different stages of disasters and 
also on several scales (local, regional, national). The way social capital functions varies in 
the preparedness, early recovery and reconstruction pahses. The actions of social capital 
can shift from simple provision of information and knowledge, before disasters occur, to 
actual actions in search and rescue activities or provision of food or shelter after a 
catastrophe.  
In this section I briefly revise the main theoretical contributions of the thesis, afterwards 
I briefly restate the empirical results. I then provide an account of the possible empirical 
and policy implications, finishing by suggesting potential ideas for future research.  
1. Theoretical Contributions 
 
As discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, sociological studies on disasters have 
focused mainly in exploring possible responses from human beings after disasters occur, 
analyzing the role of groups and social action in the recovery and reconstruction process. 
Apart from the sociology of disasters, vulnerability theory has been profoundly centered 
in identifying the social, economical and political conditions that make a human being 
more prone to be affected by a catastrophe. However, during the last decades the idea 
that human beings hold the potentiality to adapt, prepare and respond has been rapidly 
growing under both perspectives.  
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Supported in this general idea, my thesis theoretically challenges and further contributes 
to the development of the social theory on disasters.   
Firstly, I differentiate between individual actions that enhance the adaptation capacity of 
societies to natural disasters and institutional tools of adaptation. My thesis proposes that 
different mechanisms, some originating with individuals and others from institutions, 
have the potentiality to shape the adaptation capacity of societies. Although some 
scholars have pointed out possible distinctions within the adaptation concept (Pelling 
and High, 2005) such differences were made regarding the type of action (if it is a  
coping mechanism or institutional modification) rather than who the actor performing it 
is. I suggest that in order to understand the possible impacts of disasters on societies we 
should beforehand understand from a theoretical point of view the possible tools that 
human beings and institutions hold and currently apply to mitigate these effects. It is 
fundamental to recognize that actions taken at different levels (individual and 
institutional) might have different outcomes in to preventing the occurrence of natural 
disasters. Moreover, it is fundamental to recognize that individual tools are constrained 
by institutional policies but also that any macro level decision might be reinforced or 
weakened by individual action at the local level.  
A second important theoretical contribution of my thesis is that social capital, as an 
individual tool of adaptation, operates in different ways to reinforce the adaptation 
capacity of societies.  Theories on the role of social capital (individual tool) in mitigating 
the effects of natural disasters has been long addressed both by the sociology of disasters 
and vulnerability theory. However, I maintain that existing theories have largely 
neglected the role of different dimensions of social capital in reducing the effects of 
disasters. Also, they have rarely taken into consideration the impact of social capital in 
different phases of disasters. In this sense, I propose several new elements to the theory 
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of the role of social capital as a stimulation mechanism for the adaptation capacity of 
societies. First, I suggest that a distinction between bonding and bridging social capital 
should be included, taking in consideration that the actions taken by family members or 
friends (bonding social capital) are very different from the incidence of community 
involvement (bridging social capital). Also, within each category of analysis a temporal 
dimension is relevant. Actions taken in a post-disaster phase are not the same as in a 
preparation phase.  
A third important contribution of my thesis is the acknowledgment that institutional 
action enhances the adaptation capacity of societies. The potential capacity of 
institutions to prevent the occurrence of natural disasters is unquestionable. 
Governments, agencies and international organizations hold the capacity of preventing 
catastrophes. Because natural disasters are evitable events, I argue that the theory of 
disasters should include institutional action as a main driver of the adaptation capacity of 
societies to the impact of disasters. Apart from this general starting point, I further 
suggest that attention should be given to the way today international agencies and 
national governments face the occurrence of natural disasters. Geopolitical strategies, 
visibility and exposure are some of the main drivers of institutional action. In this sense I 
suggest that the level of democratization of a country determines how successful or 
inefficient the plans implemented by governments or international agencies are.  Finally, 
as in studying the role of social capital, I also argue that the institutional action shifts and 
changes in every phase of disasters.  
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2. Results  
 
The thesis firstly studies the role of public spending, humanitarian aid and social capital 
at the country level, with a Time Series Cross Sectional analysis of Latin American and 
the Caribbean countries, from 1960 to 2010. It further selects two case studies, Haiti and 
Chile, to show how these mechanisms operate at an individual level.  
Empirically, several researchers have claimed the need for associating macro-
comparative studies with local study cases, arguing that this could lead to a better 
understanding of the adaptive capacity of individuals. Pelling and High (2005:313) 
suggest that ‘a combination of local qualitative studies linked to larger scale quantitative 
surveys may be a more appropriate way to proceed in comparative studies of adaptive 
capacity’.  
Taking their suggestion on board, my thesis studies the social determinants of 
vulnerability and adaptation mechanisms to natural disasters in Latin American society 
through a cross-country historical analysis. It further includes two cases studies to better 
understand the micro foundations behind the adaptation and vulnerability mechanisms.  
I study the national determinants of social vulnerability, such as economic growth or 
political regime, together with micro conditionings, such as health quality of the 
individual, house status, amongst others.  
Through a macro level design I am able to compare the effectiveness or inefficiency of 
countries to attenuate or reinforce their degree of vulnerability against natural disasters. 
The micro level models give me information regarding the micro foundations behind the 
effectiveness of social capital and international aid in reducing the likelihood of 
becoming poor after disasters. I study the effectiveness of social capital, humanitarian aid 
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and public spending both at the country level, through a cross country time series 
analysis, and at the individual level, through the selection of Haiti and Chile as case 
studies.  
The macro comparative analysis between countries showed that the higher the levels of 
social capital, disaster relief aid and public spending of the country the lower the number 
of casualties due to a natural disaster. However, the micro level analysis of this thesis 
pointed out that the micro foundations of these arguments are far from being simple. 
Spending, strong social networks and aid do not always operate in the same way and 
effectively reduce the social vulnerability levels of the societies concerned.  
2.1. Social Capital 
 
The initial hypothesis of this thesis claimed that holding strong network ties, or high 
levels of social capital, decreases the likelihood of being affected by a natural disaster. I 
further maintain that bridging social capital (associations between different groups) and 
bonding social capital (referring to the ties between individuals) operate in dissimilar 
ways to enhance the adaptive capacity of individuals to natural disasters.  
Concerning bonding social capital, results at the aggregated level show that the levels 
of interpersonal trust and remittances inflow of a country decrease the number of 
casualties caused by natural disasters. The support of social networks before, during and 
after a natural disaster occurs could potentially decrease the impact of the catastrophe on 
individuals and countries. However, at the individual level, the way bonding social capital 
operates was dissimilar for Haiti and Chile. In Chile most of the affected population did 
not have support from family, friends or the community to recover from the earthquake, 
but mainly they opted for individual mechanisms. At the epicenter of the quake, only ten 
out of every hundred declared having been supported by friends or network ties in order 
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to recover from the disaster. The analysis shows that bonding social capital in Chile did 
not significantly reduce the social effect of the quake on the affected population. 
Regarding the levels of interpersonal trust before the earthquake occurred, that is, levels 
of bonding social capital, these did not significantly reduce the likelihood of becoming 
poor after the quake.  
In Haiti, on the contrary, bonding social capital appears to decrease the impact of the 
earthquake on the society. Despite the levels of interpersonal trust does not seem 
significant, receiving remittances significantly reduced the effects of the earthquake. The 
fact of holding strong network ties provides more opportunities and resources to the 
affected families, operating as a buffer to the social impact of the 2010 earthquake. 
Thousands of Haitians lived with family members or friends after the quake, the network 
being one of the most important providers of shelter after the catastrophe. Also, family 
support provided solutions for healthcare attention, looking after children and job 
opportunities. As discussed in the selection of Haiti and Chile as cases studies, before 
the earthquakes the levels of bonding social capital in Chile were higher than those in 
Haiti. However, in terms of effectiveness in reducing the impact of the earthquakes, it 
seems that the levels of bonding social capital in Chile did not significantly reduce the 
probability of becoming poor due to the earthquake. In Haiti, however, network ties did 
operate to decrease the dramatic social and economic situation of the affected 
population.  
Concerning bridging social capital, results at the country level indicate that political 
involvement and social participation decrease the death rate from natural disasters. 
Highly organized societies, with strong participation tools, are more successful in the 
preparedness, early recover and reconstruction process. Before disasters occur bridging 
social capital (or social participation, community involvement) can operate by being a 
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major provider of information and knowledge regarding possible impact of disasters. 
Also, organized communities, with high participation, tend to be more effective in 
identifying possible risks and communicating the demands to the authorities. Also, they 
can pressure governments to provide solutions for populations living in highly 
vulnerable areas, prone to flood or to suffering mass movements. After disasters, the 
levels of organization and participation of the community can lead to a better and faster 
recovery process. It is unquestionable, and largely studied by several scholars and 
researchers, that the inclusion of the affected population in the recovery process 
determines a much more successful outcome (Eakin, 2006; Gruberg, 2004; Moore, 2005; 
Pelling, 2003; Pulgar, 2010).  
At the individual level, in Chile, results show that the higher the levels of regional social 
participation, before the earthquake occurred in 2010, the lower the probability of 
becoming poor due to the disaster, keeping everything else constant.  
In Haiti community involvement did reduce the effects of the earthquake. Individuals 
that participated in any type of community action at least once in the year are less likely 
to have their income decreased due to the earthquake, holding every other variable 
constant. Of course, this is not directly comparable with the Chilean results, because 
they are different variables, but in specifically studying Haiti the analysis illustrates that 
the people that participated in community activities during the last year hold less 
probability of having their income decreased. Regarding participation in protests, those 
that did participate are more prone to have their income reduced. The findings could be 
indicating that protests and manifestations are carried out by the most affected 
population and for that reason there is a positive correlation between participation and 
more severe social consequences of the earthquake.  
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Finally, the role of social participation (bridging social capital) and bonding social capital 
depends also on a temporal dimension. Results suggest that the pre-existent groups or 
community committees are more likely to reduce the immediate impacts of disasters 
than emergent groups, created only after the catastrophe. In the Chilean case, the 
emergent groups were not necessarily successful, where the real impact came from 
organizations that they were already present in the region. This implies that higher levels 
of participation in the community, no matter in which area, could potentially operate as a 
reduction factor of the social impacts of disasters. The population living in areas with 
high participation levels can potentially be more successful in communicating demands, 
acquiring public goods, being informed and emotionally supported. Regarding bonding 
social capital, the results of the thesis show that the help from family and friends 
received after the disaster occur did not significantly reduce the likelihood of becoming 
poor in Chile. However, the previous levels of interpersonal trust and ties between 
individuals did have an impact in decreasing the effects of the quakes. This could be 
showing, as with social participation, that the most significant role of social capital is 
occurring before a disaster happens, giving form and shape to possible tools that society 
might need in the preparedness and early recovery, but not necessarily in the 
reconstruction process. In the long term reconstruction process agencies and 
governments seem not to be finding the tools to include the affected community in the 
rebuilding plans. These results are indicating that although social relationships and 
participation significantly operate to enhance the adaptive capacity of societies before 
disasters occur, they seem not to be included in the reconstruction process.  
2.2. Humanitarian Aid and Public Spending 
 
As institutional mechanisms of adaptive capacity, I study the role of humanitarian aid 
and public spending in decreasing the social impacts of natural disasters.  
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At the aggregated level (countries) both disaster relief aid and public spending are 
effective in reducing the death rate from natural disasters. However, the democratization 
level of the country seems to be a crucial mediator of the efficiency of aid, both 
domestic and international, in reducing the number of casualties after natural disasters. 
Regarding humanitarian aid, results show that disaster relief aid is more effective, in 
reducing deaths, in weaker institutional frameworks. Disaster relief aid encounters fewer 
obstacles to implement and apply their own policies and programs where the 
institutional framework is weaker, or was weakened, by the natural disaster. 
In contrast, public spending seems to be more efficient in reducing the death toll from 
natural disasters in democratic contexts. Pressure from the constituency in asking for 
prompt and effective solutions after natural disasters, together with plans and programs 
to mitigate climate change, could be causing a more efficient distribution of public funds 
within democratic contexts than autocratic.  
Despite this direct and straightforward results found at the aggregate level, on the 
individual level humanitarian aid and public spending did not in every case operate as 
predicted. First, in Chile results show that any transfer of benefits or subsidies before the 
earthquake did reduce the probability of becoming poor. This shows that the transfer in 
any type of social policies from the government does decrease the social vulnerability of 
societies to natural disasters. Furthermore, the money invested in infrastructure and 
projects at the regional level seems significantly reduce the social effects in Chile. 
However, the subsidies given by the government after the 2010 quake occurred did not 
prevent the families from becoming poor, quite to the contrary, families receiving 
subsidies seem to be more prone to fall into poverty than those receiving help from 
families and friends.  
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These results confirm that the Chilean government encountered several limitations in the 
distribution of public spending among the affected population after the earthquake. In 
Chile, despite its being one of the richest countries in Latin America, two years after the 
quake there are still people living in settlements and precarious houses. One of the 
reasons for this has been that the government did not adapt the provision of housing 
subsidies to the new demand after the 2010 earthquake, but instead used the same 
procedures that led the subsidy provision before the disaster took place (Bustamante, 
2012; CEME, 2012; Lizana, 2011). The accountability and transparency of how the 
funding is distributed and spent became a difficult task for the Chilean government. 
Problems in superposition of activities enhanced by problems with the budget design 
and implementation are rife in governments facing disasters. Despite not being a central 
concern from the population in the initial days of disasters, it is not long before citizens 
start demanding a transparent account of how the money has been designated and spent. 
Governmental structures tend to be slow and heavy, generating problems in the 
implementation of plans, programs and policies to respond to natural disasters. 
Results in Haiti showed the subsidies were successful in reducing the impacts of the 
earthquake within the epicenter but not as successful in peripheral areas. Because the aid 
was focused at the epicenter of the earthquake, the areas that experienced the earthquake 
in a lower intensity still suffered the economic and social consequences but were not 
helped by international aid or national subsidies. These findings could be suggesting that 
investing all the efforts at the epicenter of the disaster could be leaving a considerable 
part of the population outside the support system, without preventing them to suffer the 
social consequences of the disaster.  
In Haiti, several problems emerged in the distribution of funds. The non-existence of a 
centralized governmental coordination entity generated superposition and overlapping of 
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tasks and responsibilities in the Caribbean country. Thousands of volunteers and NGO 
members were deployed to Haiti in the first hours after the quake, with no clear or 
unified mandate on how to act to help the affected population. This lack of 
coordination, lack of involvement of the local population, and lack of transparency are 
some of the many difficulties found surrounding disaster relief aid distribution in Haiti 
after the earthquake in 2010. These difficulties are clearly affecting the effectiveness of 
the aid distribution and support, causing hundreds of Haitians to remain living in 
displacement camps, needing food and healthcare attention, two years after the quake.  
 
3. Policy Implications 
 
Governments, agencies and the international community hold the responsibility of 
assuring the wellbeing of the population and decreasing the occurrence and the posterior 
impact of natural disasters on the population.  
From this starting point, the results of this thesis hold several policy implications. First, I 
argue that the policy design targeted to prepare, adapt to and cope with disasters should 
take into account the dynamic characteristic of vulnerability. Previous social conditions 
of individuals, for example being wealthy or educated, cannot assure that they are not 
going to be harmed or affected by a disaster, and vice versa, being poor does not 
necessarily imply that they are completely affected. In this respect, the study of 
vulnerability should acknowledge the risks intrinsic to identifying certain communities as 
vulnerable only based on their previous social, economical and political characteristics. 
Policy makers should have an inclusive and extensive perspective regarding the actions 
being made in the preparedness, mitigation and recovery plans against natural disasters, 
conceding that the levels of vulnerability changes dramatically at daily bases, especially in 
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the face of shocks, and that someone that is vulnerable today might not be tomorrow 
and vice versa.  
Second, the results of this thesis show that both governments and agencies systematically 
dismissed the affected communities in the recovery and reconstruction plans in Haiti and 
Chile. External actors have the tendency to view local communities as incapable of 
dealing with the disaster and recovery process. This has enormous implications at the 
time of applying policies and programs designated to the preparedness and mitigation 
towards natural disasters. The population should be taken into account as the most 
informed actor in terms of needs and demands regarding possible effects of disasters. In 
addition, their involvement in the reconstruction process could lead to a more efficient 
and accurate implementation. I argue that insiders better identify the specific 
requirements and adaptation tools needed by the population than outsiders. No one 
knows better the social and political situations than the population itself and local 
institutions. In the same sense, the population should be seen as active participants of 
the reconstruction and assessment process and not as mere victims of a natural 
catastrophe needing help from external actors to rebuild their country.   
Findings also demonstrate that public spending and humanitarian aid prioritizes the 
population living at the epicenter of the catastrophes and tends to dismiss the social 
effects that the disaster had on in the remainder of the country. I propose that attention 
should be given to the dynamic aspect of the social vulnerability as well as the potential 
negative side effects of distributing public funds and disaster relief aid only in the most 
affected areas. In the case of Haiti, the areas surrounding the disaster became extremely 
vulnerable with almost no support from national governments and international 
agencies. The opportunistic intentions from governments and international 
organizations generates that the funding is applied in the most visible areas, those that 
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were more affected in the early stages of the disaster. These decisions are extremely 
costly for the population living on the periphery of the epicenter that is nevertheless 
affected by the economic and social problems derived from the disaster. The motives of 
international agencies are far from altruistic and pursue their own political and 
economical agenda. The conception that their unique main goal is to help the affected 
population is naive. Therefore, in countries where national governments are weak, and 
international agencies take the lead in the reconstruction process the interests of the 
citizens are being (or could potentially be) neglected.  
Until today, international aid and public spending is helping to decrease the number of 
death in the population and also decreasing the likelihood of becoming poor; however, 
the individual level analysis show that in areas where the earthquake was not that severe 
the likelihood of becoming poor increases, mainly because the amount of international 
aid is smaller and ineffective.  
This implies that parts of the population could be dismissed because of a lack of visible 
relevance to the donor. The assessment regarding the needs of the population is carried 
out regarding exposure and visibility, and not necessarily under exhaustive and extensive 
assessment of whom and where the most vulnerable to the disasters actually are.  
Finally, the results of my thesis indicate that in regard to participation and humanitarian 
aid, and to public spending, the efforts made before the disaster occurs are significantly 
more important than the policies adopted after.  
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4. Future research 
 
A further development of the theory on disasters is needed, maybe associating 
perspectives from sociology, human rights and political economy. The way human 
beings react, adapt and respond is still a mystery within the developed world. My thesis 
provides a first glimpse of how the adaptation machinery operates in Latin American 
and the Caribbean context although I suspect these mechanisms differ from those 
applied in other geographical regions. A next useful step to the further development of 
disaster research would be to recognize the differences within the developing world and 
study further how the adaptive capacity of societies is constructed in different regions.  
Empirically, although my thesis contributes to a comparative study of the macro 
determinants of social vulnerability and adaptation, I acknowledge the limitations that 
quantitative methodologies hold. Variations and differences between countries are often 
neglected, the quality of the data is questionable and the assumptions made to test the 
hypothesis are sometimes blurry or too demanding. For this reason I would claim the 
need of including qualitative study cases to the work already done in my thesis. Showing 
how social participation or community groups worked in a certain territory linked to the 
aggregated level actions could lead to a better understanding of the micro-foundations of 
adaptive capacities of societies. Along similar lines, because of possible flows in the data 
on funding distribution and disaster relief aid, a qualitative study in a small region that 
explores the institutional support after or before natural disasters would be extremely 
valuable. As Birkmann (2006) suggests, the reasons behind the actions taken by 
individuals and families in coping with a disaster are only possible to be studied through 
local qualitative methodologies. 
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Furthermore, empirically the decision to apply a quasi-experimental design to the 
Chilean case has several constraints. I am not able to study through the regression how 
the role of institutions and societies shaped a differential probability of becoming poor 
or not poor. All actions taken after the quake cannot be included (because of cofounding 
effects problems). However, I am able to isolate the effects of the quake on the 
probability of becoming poor. A possible next step in the analysis of the Chilean 
earthquake would be to replicate a similar model as the one applied to Haiti (logistic 
regression), removing the panel and temporal conditions but including actions taken by 
individuals and government after the quake.  
For the case of Haiti, contrary to the Chilean analysis, I am not able to establish causality 
and to isolate the effect of the quake. This might be causing spurious results. For this 
reason a deeper qualitative study could be beneficiary to showcase my argument.  
In theoretical terms, I argue that the social sciences still have a lot to offer to the 
development of disaster research. The role of institutions, governments and societies 
should be studied further. In this sense I claim that sociology has several contributions 
to make to the development of disaster research, especially in the field of adaptation and 
vulnerability. Not with the aim of dividing but with the aim of contributing, I believe it is 
important to broaden the limits of disaster theory and to take on board decades of social 
theory in the areas of organization, social behavior, institutions and structures.  
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